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Summary
This dissertation analyses and appraises factors that lead SADCC/SADC to
restructure in 1992 and in 1999 respectively.  Regime theory is used as an
analytical tool of these factors throughout this study.  The restructuring of
regional organisation in the world is often associated with a decision that is
taken by regional leaders, only to hide failures of these organisations to
deliver.  Studies of this phenomenon, however, frequently fail to research the
underlying causes.
In the case of SADCC/SADC, apart from the fact that the organisation failed to
achieve its intended objectives, such as regional integration, economic
independence, regional security, and more, this study argues that there were
a lot of elements that influenced the pace and the operations of SADCC/C in
achieving regional integration and other objectives.  The basic debate in this
study thus revolves around the fact that the restructuring exercise in
SADCC/SADC was a result of many factors and this argument is supported by
the regime theory.
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7Chapter One
An Analysis and Appraisal of Restructuring in
SADCC/SADC since 1990
1.1 Introduction
Development of regional blocs and groupings as well as their restructuring 1 or
evolution, over the past years has become a steadily progressive feature of
post-1945 world politics.  International relations theories such as realists and
liberalists have explained such developments in terms of balancing against a
hegemonic or ‘great’ power, protecting small or weak states against a large
powerful neighbour, maintaining peaceful and co-operative political
relationships and as transformations of global power and wealth structures
(Butler 1997:412).
Generally, the emergence of regional blocs or any other organizational
formation, presupposed the rising of a challenge to the existence of a problem
crucial for the destiny of the parties or countries involved in particular regions.
For an example, the Andean Group was created in 1969 within the framework
of the Latin American Association of Free Trade, with the sole mandate of
facilitating economic development for its member countries by way of
combining mineral and labour resources.  The Economic Community of
Western African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975, with the
objective of developing economic collaboration of natural resources and
equating regional economic levels among its member countries (Tabunov
1990:352-253).
                                                
1 In this study, ‘restructuring’ of SADCC/C refers to institutional re-organisations or re-arrangements of
regional policies and institutional structures by SADC which consisted of 14 members including Angola,
Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, in order to achieve total regional
integration or cooperation.
8With regard to SADCC/C formation in 1980, Chikowore (1999:31) states that
the above reasons were applicable to the establishment of SADCC like it was
the case in other organizations. SADCC2 was instituted by the Lusaka
Declaration in 1979 and was officially founded in 1980 to facilitate socio-
economic development of member states by way of combining their economic
potential, curbing economic dependence of member states on the then
apartheid South Africa, instituting a balanced flow of commodities through
commercial activities and the creation of free trade zones.  The overall
objective was to rise above the challenge of dependency on South Africa and
international donors.
Since its formation in 1980, SADCC/C has restructured its institutions and
operations twice in order to stay on course with its objectives or to continue
existing.  Due to regional and international pressures such as the Cold War,
globalization, technological development, declining living standards within
member states, increasing military destabilisation by South Africa, changing
political situations in the region, and growing demands for multiparty
democratic systems in member states, made it difficult for SADCC to execute
its mandate.  By 1992, SADCC decided to restructure its institutions and
operations in order to accommodate or deal with the mentioned challenges to
SADC.
When SADCC restructured into SADC in 1992, it found itself challenged by
factors such as the aftermath of the Cold War, new regionalism especially in
Latin America, integration of Eastern and Western Europe which meant less
aid towards the third world countries of Africa, financial aid and conditions
from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), growing
demands by the United States of America for liberal democracy in SADC
states, globalization, evolution of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into
the African Union (AU) and its call for regional blocs to focus on economic
challenges facing Africa, and its (AU) further call that SADC should act as a
building bloc towards a united continent, served as great challenges.  With the
9above factors crippling, SADC leaders decided to restructure the
organizational structures and operations to deal with these challenges in
1997.  With this in mind, factors that had a role in the restructuring of
SADCC/C are explored in the forthcoming chapters. This is done to determine
the extent to which they influenced the pace of integration in the region and
the restructuring of SADC (SADC 1997:4).
From the 1990s, new structures and objectives were adopted by a number of
regional organizations to deal with the new challenges, as mentioned, within
their respective geographical environments.  In Latin America, for example,
the Southern American Market (Mercosur) comprising Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay and Uruguay was formed in 1991 in order to deal with political and
economic challenges facing member countries.  New regionalism in the 1990s
began to dominate the study of international relations in trying to deal with the
new challenges after the Cold War (Mutschler 2001:137).
Due to changes and restructuring that were taking place in the regional
organizations, analysis and appraisal of trends and factors forcing regional
organizations to restructure became important.  The Southern African region
was no exception in these changes and challenges taking place globally.
The purpose of this study is therefore to analyse and appraise factors that
lead SADCC/C to restructure.  This will be done by analysing and appraising
political and economic factors, as well as issues that may have played a role
in the formation of SADCC in 1980 that ultimately lead to the restructuring in
1992 and 1999, by following the regime theory.  The concept regime is
relatively new, coming into common parlance in the 1970s.  Regime theory’s
perspective on International Relations focuses on cooperation among actors,
states or countries in a given area.  An international regime, such as SADC, in
view of this theory, is seen as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms,
rules and procedures around which countries’ expectations converge in a
particular area (Krasner 1983:45).
                                                                                                                                           
2 SADCC countries from 1980 included:  Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Namibia
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There are many factors that contributed to the establishment and subsequent
restructuring of SADCC/C such as economic, social and international factors,
for example the evolution of international organizations like the United Nations
and the European Union.  Other factors include administrative problems with
SADCC/C such as human resources, financial problems, skills and technical
factors in the region.  However, these factors will not be the focus of this
study.  But, on how political and to some extent economic factors influenced
SADCC/C to restructure. This include factors such as: the end of the Cold
War, political changes in South Africa and Namibia, political changes in the
continent - especially the AU, donor conditions towards SADC countries,
regional demand for democracy in member states and other general factors
that affected SADC to consider restructuring its structures and operations in
1992 and 1999.
1.2 Comparative Perspectives on the Restructuring of the Regional
Organizations:  Europe and Latin America
The empirical focus of this study on Southern Africa was selected for several
reasons.  Firstly, SADC is the successful effort by a set of Third World
countries, particularly in Africa, to significantly realign their economies and
progress to this point.  While a good deal has been written about the plans
and the goals of the organization, considerably less has been done to assess
the feasibility of its success and why it continues to consider restructuring as
an important exercise to keep in touch with international and regional
developmental trends.
The second reason is that the regional characteristics of Southern Africa
provide an opportunity to explore in depth a set of dimensions that have not
been previously focused on in research relating to Regional Integration or
Cooperation (RI/C).  These include the existence of explicit political, as well as
economic goals, on the part of the regional organization and non-market
factors affecting the success of the undertaking.  These are the main factors
                                                                                                                                           
(only from 1990 to become the tenth member), Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
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that, if not achieved or dealt with, lead regional organizations to fade away or
to restructure in order to survive or continue functioning.
With the above in mind, the basic aim of this section is to draw a comparative
perspective on the evolutionary phases some regional organizations
underwent, particularly in Europe and Latin America.  The intent of this
comparative discussion is to identify such evolutionary phases among other
regional groupings, as it will be useful to analyse, appraise, and compare
political factors that played a role in the restructuring of SADCC.
The logic of using the European and Latin American integration as examples
is that the former success produced, both applied models of RI/C and a body
of theory, which seeks to explain and justify different forms of political and
economic interactions among nations.  The other reason is that its success
has been achieved through a series of organizational restructuring or
evolution throughout decades.  The latter is preferred because of similarities
with the Southern African region.  Both regions contain symptoms of
dependency and both regions seem to respond to the same global
challenges, such as globalization.  Also, both depend on external aid and their
economies are linked with Western economies.  In Latin America, as in
Southern Africa, regional integration is viewed as a basic form of survival
towards counter marginalisation by the developed nations.
1.2.1 Integration efforts in Europe
The history of regional integration in Europe dates back to the early 1950s
and culminated in the formation of the European Community (EC).  The EC
was formed in 1965 with the merger of the European Coal and Steel
Company (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euroatom), and
the European Economic Community (EEC).  The Treaty of Paris established
the ECSC in 1956, to plan and develop the coal and steel industry in Western
Europe.  Euroatom was established by the Treaty of Rome to encourage the
development of the civil nuclear industry (Winters 2001:889).
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The EEC was formed in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome, with three objectives.
Firstly, it was formed to lay foundations for a closer union among European
countries.  Secondly, it was formed for the establishment of a common market
through the elimination of trade barriers and lastly, it was formed to work
towards improving the welfare of European citizens.  The founding members
of the EEC were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Germany.  Later they were joined by Denmark, Ireland and Britain in 1973,
Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1983 (Winters 2001:890).
There were several objectives that led to the formation of the EC, both political
and economic.  Politically a number of motivations existed.  Firstly, there was
a need to solve the conflict existing between France and Germany in the post-
1945 period.  Secondly, it was perceived that a unified Europe could better
withstand any communist or Soviet military threat and thirdly, Europe had
gone through two World Wars, and one way to ensure that this would not
happen again was to form a regional cooperation body.  The communication
and mutual interdependence thus created was expected to become an outlet
for conflict resolution and better understanding between the different
European countries (Mokate 1986:66; African Development Forum III 2002:2-
3).
On the economic side, the EEC was seen as a way of counterbalancing the
economic dominance of the United States over Europe.  Regional integration
in Western Europe took place under conditions whereby there existed a
modern industrial economy, economic growth and virtual full employment of
modes of production.  Thus, a major goal of regional integration was to attain
better economic growth rates, encourage technological innovations and more
efficient use of resources (Mokate 1986:66).
In 1992, the EC evolved or restructured to become the European Union (EU),
adopted of a single currency (the Euro), a single market, a single parliament
and other features.  Prior to that, a Customs Union was established in 1968
and over time strong links were established until the EU was born, and that
can be referred to as the evolutionary phase (Winters 2001:890).
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Although the EU is largely regarded as the most successful regional grouping
in the world, it had to follow similar evolutionary phases as those that took
place in organizations such as SADCC/C.  It began as a sole political project
and evolved to be a pure economic driven project by introducing the Euro as a
single currency in Europe in 2001.  It also had to restructure to be in tune with
other regional organizations as its competitors in the world market.  The EEC
evolved into EC and later into the EU in 1992.  EU policy-makers had to take
political and economic factors within and outside the region into consideration
in order to derive good policies for European integration.  Considerations were
given to factors such as the Soviet military threat, the end of the Second
World War, as well as globalization.  The original objectives of the EEC were
also modified when it evolved into the EC and again when it evolved into the
EU.  Additional institutions like the European Parliament were drafted in the
EU to make it survive the challenges that modern states are faced with
(Mokate 1986:68).
The African Development Forum III (2002:2) maintains that, although the EU
is the most developed of regional organizations in the world, it is hard to draw
wider lessons from its experience for ‘north-south’ or ‘south–south’ integration.
However, the political institutions engaged in the EU process and its evolution
are worthy of study because they can provide strategic direction for African
integration.  This is an approach that this study will pursue in that the EU will
be used as an example where applicable.  One of the most important lessons
to be learnt from the success of the EU is the ability to evolve and adapt over
time.
1.2.2 Integration efforts in Latin America
According to Mutschler (2001:136) regional integration in Latin America
evolved under quite different circumstances and for different reasons than
was the case in Europe.  Regional integration efforts in Latin America began
in 1960. Although the Economic Commission presented the idea for Latin
America (ECLA) at that time, it actually began several years before, around
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the 1950s.  Support for the idea of regional integration within Latin America
grew out of dissatisfaction with the poor level of progress made towards
economic development.  Regional integration was thus seen as a response to
the historic problems of underdevelopment in Latin America.  In addition, it
was also viewed as a way of reducing dependency on the first world countries
by diversifying the Latin American economies through industrialization.  This
aspect is similar to conditions in Southern Africa.
Regional integration in Latin American differed from West European
integration in several ways.  Firstly, unlike the case of Western Europe, none
of the regional integration movements in Latin America [had] as a principle
goal political integration, although political integration [was] part of all
integration schemes.  Secondly, whereas regional integration in Europe took
place among countries with modern industrialized economies, full
industrialization in Latin America was still a goal to be achieved rather than
the status quo (Mutschler 2001:137).
The initial organizations formed were the Latin American Free Trade Area
(LAFTA) and the Central American Common Market (CACM).  The basic goal
of these organizations was to increase economic growth by eliminating trade
barriers.  These efforts were unsuccessful because their regional integration
processes facilitated transnational corporations and these organizations
lacked political will and political commitment from member states (Mutschler
2001:137).
Both discussed regional organizations went though unique challenges in their
respective regions.  In Europe, after the Second World War, the greatest
challenge to those countries was to reconstruct their political and economic
systems, and to further resolve conflict that led to war.  That required a lot of
sacrifice and compromise concerning different ideological preferences among
countries to help achieve these objectives.  With the advancement of
technology the organizations had to keep abreast of such developments and it
had to maintain policies that help it deal with such changes.  It is for this
15
reason that the EU went through name changes. This serves also as a sign
and efforts taken by European leadership of keeping the organizations on top.
The establishment of regional organizations in Latin America was influenced
by almost similar factors as in Southern Africa.  These include dealing with
globalization, market forces, neo-colonialism and similar domestic challenges
such as democracy and economic stability.  The evolution or the restructuring
of Latin America has also been influenced by the similar aspects as in
Southern Africa, for example the end of the Cold War and aid conditions from
the Western countries, among others.  The common factors that rise from the
lessons drawn from both organizations for Africa are that regional
organizations are always confronted with challenges that have to be
responded to. Therefore, changes within regional organizations are an
ongoing process. Reference to Latin America in this study will help in
explaining the identified factors that led SADCC/C to restructure.
A comparative study on the origins of regional organizations in Africa will be
discussed in chapter two.
1.3 Literature review
A lot has been written on the prospects of regional integration in Southern
Africa.  Scholars on this subject include Balassa (1961), Krause (1973), Lipsey
(1970), Mazzeo (1984a), Mokate (1986) and many others.  However, little
focus had been given to the restructuring of regional organizations, particularly
in Southern Africa.  In contrast, there are many publications on economic
integration and security prospects in the region.  Among the many examples,
specifically on regional security, are Cilliers (1996), Malan (1998), Solomon
(1996; 1998), and Tsie (1998).
The core focus of these publications has been on the evolution of the concept
security in international relations and its implications for Southern Africa.  Most
of the analyses have been on specific security issues in the region and the
impact such issues might have on SADC and its members, for example, the
16
land crisis in Zimbabwe and its implication for the region as whole.  The DRC
crisis has also been another focus.  Tsie (1998) focused on the Organ of
Politics, as well as Defence and Security within SADC, particularly pertaining
to how it could be utilised by regional leaders effectively to curb future conflicts
within member states and among each other.  The other focus on security has
been on poverty, border crime, immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism and
many other issues related to security.  Little reference has been made by
these publications that directly relates to the restructuring exercise.  Basically,
the focus has been on how SADC should deal with these issues or problems.
Other publications on SADC focussed on economic trade as the main driving
force of market integration in the region.  Among many scholars on this subject
include Cheru (1992), Hebert (2003), Patel (2000), Roberts (2003), and van
Schalkwyk (2003).  Their main focus has been on tariff and non-tariff barriers
to trade in SADC.  The other areas of focus include transportation obstacles to
trade and regional integration in SADC, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
telecommunication, banking systems, customs, licensing and border
procedures, agriculture and other subjects.  The issue of restructuring is
merely debated within the broad context of how SADC should utilise these
issues in the region for integration or to the advantage of member states.  Little
emphasis is given to how these issues initiated efforts to restructure SADC
and how these issues continue to influence the restructuring process.
Examples of the published literature that dealt with the SADC restructuring
includes Schoeman (2002), SADC Barometer (2003) compiled by South
African Institute of the International Affairs (SAIIA), and the Chr. Michelsen
Institute (CMI) researchers, Isaksen and TjØnneland (2002).  Schoeman
(2002:2) deals specifically with political factors such as the effects of the end of
the Cold War on the region and the role played by the independence of
Namibia from South Africa in 1990 to the SADCC restructuring in 1992.
Schoeman (2002:4) also deals with political factors such as the end of
apartheid in South Africa as aspects that had a role in the restructuring of
SADC in 1999.  Schoeman (2002:4) correctly points out why political factors
played an important role in SADCC, and further recognizes the fact that the
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1992 restructuring was mainly influenced by political factors rather than
economic factors.  Schoeman (2002:2) concedes that SADC was a politically
inspired organization, and therefore, political factors tend to dominate the
progress of the organizations.
Schoeman (2002:3) disagrees with the classical economic integration theory in
Southern Africa as it emphasises regional integration as an economic process
occurring largely as a result of greater interaction between neighbouring
states, functioning almost like some kind of invisible hand.  This theory,
according to Schoeman, is based on the historical example of the development
of the EU, yet it discounts the fact that the EU was foremost a political project.
According to Schoeman, a lot should be done in Southern Africa to follow this
route.  Based on this debate, the classical economic integration theory
downplayed the importance of politics in regional integration.  Most studies of
regional integration in Southern Africa used this theory to analyse SADC.  As a
result, political factors remained unimportant to the development of regional
integration.
Isaksen and TjØnneland (2002) prepared a study on SADC restructuring
entitled Assessing the restructuring of SADC – positions, policies and
progress. Isaksen first did a study in 2001 on the same subject entitled
Restructuring SADC – progress and problems.  Both studies focus on the
restructuring of SADC from 1999 only. No effort was made to look back at the
factors that led SADCC to restructure to SADC in 1992, let alone factors that
led to the formation of SADCC in 1980.  Due to this, the reports contains no
reference to the importance of the Cold War, emergence of democracy in
Southern African states, the collapse of apartheid, the independence of
Namibia - including factors leading to independence and how such factors
continue to impact on SADC countries to date.  The conclusion in their study
was basically that the lack of administration and political will among member
countries are the main reasons behind the restructuring of SADC.
The political and economic factors that led SADCC to restructure in 1992 have
relevance to factors that led to SADC to restructure again in 1999.
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Globalization, as a new factor, has its roots planted as far back as the end of
the Cold War in 1989.  The end of the Cold War led to the rise of the capitalist
system in the world.  As a result, developing countries, especially in Southern
Africa, had to adopt the liberal systems in order to receive financial assistance
from the Western countries.  The end of the Cold War also meant that
developing countries had to comply with Western countries’ conditions such as
adopting democratic governments.
Both reports favour or support the restructuring exercise within SADC.  The
reports’ findings are that the restructuring mainly revolved around changing the
roles and functions of the SADC secretariat.  These include the establishment
of SADC National Committees in member countries as well as the role of non-
state actors.  These factors are mainly the technical analysis of the
restructuring exercise as compared to the report that basically looks at factors
that necessitate the restructuring exercise.  These factors are crucial in this
study as they are an important reason why SADC restructured.
The little literature on SADC restructuring that is available, particularly by
Isaksen and TjØnneland (2002), only focus on the technical factors SADC
ought to adhere to in order to be successful.  Together with the SAIIA
publication on SADC restructuring, these are a few pieces of literature, if not
the only bit of literature aimed at addressing the whole question of
restructuring in SADC.  The SAIIA publication on SADC restructuring was
mainly on issues in the region that were seen to be important enough to
consider restructuring.  These included issues such as trade liberalisation,
immigration laws in the region and organised crime.  Due to the broad scope of
this undertaking in SADC, these publications often fail to cover political
aspects that have impacted the SADC restructuring.
1.4 The objectives and contribution of the study
After assessing the existing literature, this study has identified the following
gaps that it believes need attention from a research point of view.  This section
also discusses the contribution this study will make to this vast topic.
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The study on the restructuring of SADC mainly answers four questions. Firstly,
why was SADCC formed?  Secondly, why did SADCC restructure?  As a result
of this question, this study will state mainly the political factors that compelled
such an exercise.  In this instance, the study will examine political factors that
may have had a role in SADC restructuring both in 1992 and 1999.
Some of the reviewed publications lack a clear focus on these factors.  Rather,
their focus is on the analysis of issues regarded as problems within SADC,
such as security, poverty, crime, trade and other issues.  The gaps that
occurred in such analyses are that international trends on political issues are
often missed, as if the SADC region was an island cut of from world events.  In
the end, the possibilities of drawing narrow conclusions on the restructuring of
SADC are high.  Some studies such as Isaksen (2002), Patel (2000), and
Peter-Berries (2003), often regard the restructuring exercise as a result of poor
leadership in the organizations.  This might possibly be true, but it is normally
not the full picture and these studies exclude the influence of regional and
international events on SADC in general.
Thirdly, how was SADC restructured?  Since most regional organizations are
problem-driven (Young 1989), it is important to assess, analyse or to look at
the structures or changes implemented by the organizations after their
restructuring exercise.  This gives depth to how organizations resolved to deal
with challenges that confronted it prior to its restructuring exercise.  Some of
the reviewed publications on restructuring, specifically Schoeman (2002),
managed to point out types of political factors that led SADCC to restructure to
SADC in 1992, but failed to point out measures taken by SADC in responding
to such factors.  These include why the Organ of Politics, Defence, and
Security was formed in 1996?
Fourthly, this study aims to determine the significance of the restructuring
process.  As mentioned earlier, restructuring exercise is often confused for or
understood as a process, which regional organizations undertake to cover up
failures of not reaching their objectives.  However, what is normally overlooked
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is the fact that such an exercise is necessary to physically or philosophically
re-orientate organizational structures towards achievable objectives.  This in
turn helps regional organizations to audit their own progress. The exercise also
helps organizations to remain in touch with domestic and international trends
or challenges.
The transformation of the OAU into the AU (full discussion in chapter six) is
one of many factors that required sub-regional organizations such as SADC to
restructure their institutions to enable smoother relations and communication
between it and sub-regional organizations in the continent.  Under the AU
Constitutive Act, SADC is expected to play an important role in as far as
conflict resolution is concerned and in ensuring that the Peer Review
Mechanism is implemented among member countries.  This study is also
aimed at exploring the impact of the AU in the restructuring of SADC.
1.5            Research methodology and theoretical approach
The restructuring of regional organizations has a political content and cannot
be viewed as a neutral legal or economic exercise among member countries.
Restructuring also has an ideological basis, as the end of the Cold War
provided a single ideology for SADC members to adhere to, for example
capitalism.  The political nature of the restructuring of regional organizations is
determined by a number of factors, amongst which are included in an ideology
and culture, a country’s regional history and international criteria.  The
approach in this study is to describe, analyse and appraise factors that
impacted or influenced SADC to restructure.
SADC can and has been studied from many different perspectives.  This
includes the economic perspective (Tsie 1998), trade perspective (Cheru
1992, Van Schalkwyk 2003), legal perspective (Liebonow 1982), political
economic perspective (Schoeman 2002), social perspective (Williams 1998),
and many more perspectives.  As pointed out, the restructuring of SADC
consists of many elements, for example the integration of the banking system
in the region, SADC parliamentary forum, unification of nature reserves into
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trans-frontier nature reserves in the region, cooperation of security forces of
member states, and more.  Basically, factors that influenced restructuring
exercises in SADC covers broad factors and most are beyond the scope of this
study.  This study will mainly look at the restructuring of SADC from the
political perspective.
Political and social research has been dominated by two broad methodological
paradigms, namely the qualitative research method and the quantitative
research method.  Each of these methods is linked to meta-theoretical
traditions, for example qualitative research has been linked with
phenomenology that basically focuses on human consciousness, whereas
quantitative research has been linked with positivism, emphasising that the
social sciences should emulate the methodology or logic of natural sciences
research (Babbie and Mouton 2001:49).
Quantitative research consists of a number of themes that includes an
emphasis on the quantification of constructs.  In most cases, quantitative
researchers believe that the best way of measuring the properties of
phenomena (for example, the attitudes of individuals towards certain topics) is
through quantitative measurement that is, assigning numbers to the perceived
qualities of things research.  Quantitative research methods include surveys,
statistics and experiments.  Quantitative research is based on a specialized,
standardized set of data analysis techniques.  Analysis in quantitative research
is highly developed and it is built on applied mathematics (Babbie and Mouton
2001:49; Neuman 1991:434).
The quantitative research method is convenient as far as summarizing results;
assessing measurement reliability and validity; testing inferences from
samples (statistical inference validity) and planning precise research designs
with high internal validity are concerned (Dooley 1990:280).  In this study,
quantitative research is not enough to explain political factors that led SADC to
restructure in 1992 and 1999.
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This study is based on the descriptive and explanatory approaches to political
factors that caused SADC to restructure.  These approaches are best utilized
in qualitative research because qualitative research refers to a generic
research approach in social research according to which research takes the
departure point as the insider perspective on social action.  In this case the
political restructuring of SADC could be regarded as that.  Qualitative research
also attempts to study human action from the insider’s perspective.  The goal
of research is defined as describing and understanding (Verstehen), rather
than the explanation and prediction of a phenomenon (Babbie and Mouton
2001:49).
The emphasis in qualitative research is on methods of observation,
interviewing and the analysis of documents.  These include primary and
secondary sources, such as books and newspapers (Babbie and Mouton
2001:49).  Most written research on SADC used the qualitative method.  This
study has made use of SADC publications and interviews and prominent
SADC personalities were also interviewed to help fulfil such research
undertakings.
This study will make use of the qualitative research method, meaning that this
study will rely mostly on primary sources (like SADC documents from the
secretariat) and secondary sources such as literature from books, research
articles on SADC mostly from the Africa Institute, Institute for Security Studies
and newspaper clippings to analyse and appraise political factors that led
SADC to restructure in 1992 and in 1999.
Using the abovementioned methodology in this study, theoretically speaking,
regional integration can be political or economic.  Politically, integration
involves two schools of thought dealing with this perspective.  They are the
federalist and the functionalist schools of thought (Mazzeo 1984:3b).
Federalism is a form of integration that requires that nations surrender all their
sovereignty.  Under a federation, sovereign states combine and give up some
of their sovereignty to a higher authority.  The nation states become unified
politically, economically and socially.  In the federalist approach, politics rule
over economics (Mazzeo 1984:4b).  However, functionalists argue that
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integration should occur gradually and not totally. According to Mitrany
(1968:61), functionalism involves seizing available opportunities to link
together particular activities and interests one at a time as the need arises and
is based on the acceptability of the arrangement to the parties involved.  This
is the approach SADCC was founded on in 1980.
Economically, the integration concept is derived from classical and neo-
classical international trade theory, for example the movements of goods,
services, people, capital, funds and moneys across natural and political
frontiers are what inter-regional and international economic relations are about
and all these movements are part and parcel of economic integration.  In this
framework, regional economic integration rests on concepts such as
comparative advantage, free mobility of factors of production, equalisation of
factor prices and more, found in international trade theory (Machlup 1977:43).
 Within the realm of classical and neoclassical economics, RI/C is viewed as
occurring in stages.  These stages are outlined and defined by Balassa
(1961:5), and are used by many other authors as a framework, for example
Robson 1983, Lipsey 1973, Machlup 1977, and Mazzeo 1984 (a) use this
framework. Each successive stage is considered to be a more complex and a
higher level of integration.  Balassa (1961:5) outlines these stages as (1)
sectoral integration, (2) free trade area, (3) custom union, (4) common market,
(5) economic union, and (6) total integration.
According to Haas (1970:6) integration may entail both, as is the case with
SADC, because it is a process combining separate economies into larger
political communities to the extent that the political and economic forces are
inextricably intertwined.
As discussed previously, the federalist strategy approach claims that the best
path to regional integration is to create a higher supranational authority, to
which participating states surrender part of their sovereignty.  This strategy
was regarded by SADCC as too ambitious, as it requires member countries to
part with some autonomy almost right away.  The approach was never
considered in Africa for fearing loosing sovereignty by leaders (Babarinde
1998:100).
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At the polar end of the theoretical spectrum is the functionalist strategy.  It
refers to a mere functional cooperation by participating countries.
Conceivably, this road to regional integration does not require member states
to part with any of their autonomy.  It entails and encourages inter-
governmental cooperation (Lodge 1983:12-14).  For the analysis and appraisal
of SADC restructuring, this approach is not enough.   Although this approach is
the fundamental approach of SADC, it lacks analysis tools to investigate
political factors that led to the restructuring exercise in 1992 and in 1999.  It
merely focuses on how regional integration can be achieved without going too
deep into the analysis that propels member states to do so.
A third approach is the neo-functionalist approach.  It contends that, while the
federalist approach may be greedy by asking far too much too quickly, the
functionalists appear to be noncommittal.  Hence, a common ground is
proposed.  It posits that regional integration can best be achieved via the
creation of specialized administrative institutions at the trans-national level,
which will endeavour to demonstrate the relevance and worthiness of regional
integration to member states (Lodge 1983 14-16 & Haas 1964; 1971).
The limitation of this approach is that, like the functionalist theory, it is not
suitable for an analysis and appraisal of SADC restructuring.  Its emphasis is
on how to integrate a region.  The neo-functionalist approach in this study
offers little analysis of the political factors that played a role in SADC
restructuring.  This study is not on how SADC states can achieve integration
but on why SADC restructured.
The other theory that has been applied in the study of regional integration is
the theory of a Customs Union (CU).  The customs union model of integration
began to get much attention in the 1950s with the pioneering work of Jacob
Viner.  Viner’s (1950) analysis focused on whether the establishment of a CU
would result in a change in a nation’s production which has the net effect of
diverting purchases to lower or higher cost sources of production for (a) a
particular member of the customs union, (b) the customs union as the whole,
(c) non-customs union members and (d) the world as a whole.   Without
discussing the CU theory in detail, this theory is unsuitable to analyse the
factors contributing to SADC restructuring for the simple fact that SADC is not
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yet a CU.  This is the stage SADC is yet to achieve.  SADC still functions
outside of the CU and it is difficult to apply this theory to investigate factors that
led to the restructuring exercise.
The theoretical focus in this study is on the restructuring of SADC/C within the
synthesis of integration and cooperation.   This makes sense because the
integration and cooperation theory belongs to the same genus of international
relations theory.  Neither the cooperation theory nor the integration theory
explains how cooperation is institutionalised and more importantly, how
countries restructure regional organizations to survive challenges confronting
them.   Both these theories are rationalist approaches that omit how countries
or regional organizations are formed and how they evolve.  Therefore, in a
situation where regional organizations restructure, neither one of the
mentioned theories or approaches explain why the exercise takes place
(Koehane 1988:981).
Another weakness of a regional integration theory and regional cooperation
theory is that they are unable to address the link between choosing to
cooperate and the institutionalisation of cooperation.  Both pay tribute to the
importance of institutionalisation in cooperation or integration.  That leaves a
gap in looking at factors that lead regional organizations to restructure or
cease to operate like the AEC (Keohane 1988:981).
1.5.1  Regime theory
Considering the abovementioned theories or approaches, this study will use
regime theory in order to analyse and appraise political and to some extant
economic factors that led to the restructuring exercises in SADCC/C. However,
other theories such as the functionalist, neo-functionalist, classical, and neo-
classical as mentioned before will be considered, to compliment the
shortcoming of the regime theory in analysing and appraising SADCC/C
restructuring.
This section will also refer to the strengths of regime theory, as well as some of
its most significant shortcoming. Regime theory like all theories offer valuable
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insights but in referring to its shortcoming, reference will be made to alternative
theories as mentioned.
Regime theory is basically a perspective in International Relations that focuses
on cooperation among actors, states or countries in a given area. An
international regime is viewed as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms,
rules and procedures around which countries’ expectations converge in a
particular area (Krasner 1983:45).  In subsequent work, Krasner (Little
2001:303) elaborates on the four defining elements of a regime.   These four
elements will be applied to both SADCC/C restructuring processes in the
subsequent chapters.  However, at this stage it is important to introduce these
elements.
Firstly, Krasner refers to principles as represented by coherent bodies of
theoretical statements about the international order.  Secondly, he refers to
norms, which specify the general standards of behaviour, as well as identifying
the rights and obligations of states.  These norms and principles form the
foundation of the character of a regime and can only be changed by
transforming the nature of the regime.  Thirdly, the defining element of a
regime is the rules it operates according to.  These rules are mainly designed
to resolve conflicts, which may arise among members and their interpretation
of principles and norms.  Lastly, a decision-making procedure underlies a
regime. These procedures identify specific prescriptions for behaviour, the
system of voting and for implementing these decisions.
During the 1970s, Southern Africa as elsewhere globally, also responded to
the formation of regimes.  SADCC formation in 1980 reflects characteristics of
an international regime.  The FLS members were concerned with the security
threats South Africa was posing in the region, and they were further concerned
with the economic position of the member countries in the region and as well
as globally.  These concerns became an issue area, which SADCC aimed to
address.
The interest of international regimes as a new study in the 1970s was rooted in
neo-functionalism.  In contrast to the theory of realism, regime theory assumes
that states have separate interests in different issue areas and does not have
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a stable hierarchy of interests with security at its top.  Opportunities for
cooperation depends on a particular situation in a given issue area.  The main
difference between the regime theory and neo-functionalism is primarily that
the former lacked attention to interest groups.  Secondly, there is the lack of a
specialisation of issue areas. `Even though it has a lot of inspiration from
regional integration, the regime theory is an attempt to explain cooperation
within a general framework.  This divides it from neo-functionalism (Krasner
1983:4).
Basically, regime theory, in the study of International Relations and particularly
regional organizations, deals with how and under what conditions different
types of governing conditions emerge or regional organizations emerge and
how they consolidate and become hegemonic.  Lastly, it deals with how they
develop and transform or restructure to keep up with regional and international
developmental trends (Anttiroika and Kainulainen 1998:4).
The studies of regimes are mainly addressed from two broad perspectives,
that is, liberalism and realism.  Both approaches share the following common
assumptions with regard to the analysis of regimes: (1) that states operate in
an anarchic international system, (2) that they are rational and unitary actors
and responsible for establishing regimes and (3) that regimes are established
by way of international cooperation to promote international order (Little
2001:301).
Having outlined these common assumptions in order to differentiate between
the liberal and realist approaches of regimes, the following comparative
assumptions outline the differences in these approaches.   In this regard refer
to table one.   This study prefers the realist assumption of the analysis of
regime behaviour on the basis that regimes are mainly established to co-
ordinate activities as opposed to collaboration as emphasised by the
liberalists.
Table 1: Liberalists and Realists comparative assumptions of the
analysis of regimes behaviour.
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Liberalist Realist
· Enhances collaboration among
states
· Promotes common interest
· Develops and functions
optimally when promoted,
maintained and led by a benign
hegemon
· Promotes globalization and
liberal world order
· Enables states to co-ordinate
· Generates differential benefits
for states
· Power is the dominant
characteristic emanating from
the relations between states
and hence determines the type
of regime established
· Supports the notion that the
international order is based on
the underlying principles and
norms of regimes
Source: Little (2001:301)
According to Stoker (1995:54) regime theory holds substantial promise for
understanding a variety of responses to regional organizational change or
restructuring.  It emphasises the interdependence of regional and non-regional
forces in meeting economic, political and social challenges within a geo-
regional area of regional organizations.
Regarding the issue of regime change, transformation or restructuring, Young
(1982:45), Puchala & Hopkins (1982:23) and Young (1983:33), approach the
idea from two basic viewpoints with similar objectives.  Examples of these will
be discussed in the next chapters.  Because of the dynamic nature of regimes
and the ways in which regimes may restructure or change, this is particularly
salient. Young (1982:45) maintains, “Contradictions within the regime
framework may lead to serious pressure for alterations”. Such contradictions
according to Young (1982:45) “may be from a dynamic point of view and
capable of becoming an element that may push regimes to fall apart or to be
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useless”.  The affiliation of some SADC member states to other organizations
consisting of objectives on regional integration in Southern Africa is one
example.  Another example is the EAC, which was regularly wracked by
internal crises and conflicts over the distribution of economic gains.  Despite
various negotiations and measures adopted to address these problems, it
disintegrated in 1977.
Young (1982:45) also mentions that the other view regarding regime change
could be a dialectical point of view, which looks holistically at social entities
searching for dialectical laws pertaining to change.  Thus, from the holistic or
dialectical point of view the regime may evolve or transform itself without
disintegration, for example the evolution of the EU from EEC.
Puchala and Hopkins (1982:8) mentions the same two approaches but label
the concept of regime disintegration as ‘revolutionary change’ and the concept
of regime adaptation as ‘evolutionary change’.  Evolutionary change, or
Young’s idea of holistic change, according to Puchala and Hopkins (1982),
“may involve a regime changing substantively by preserving norms and
changing principles”. In most cases, this would usually occur because of shifts
in knowledge, information or in changes with regard to challenges and
pressures facing particular regimes.  Regime adaptation or evolutionary
change, as explained is particularly relevant to the restructuring of SADCC/C
as it was mainly aimed at aligning it so that it could adapt to present time and
space.  The detailed discussion on SADCC/C restructuring phases will support
why the exercises were mainly aimed at re-aligning the organization to
relevant required mandate.
Based on the above, regime theory in this study will shed light on the following
core questions discussed below.  Furthermore, the study applies the realist
approach (as outlined above) to the analysis of regimes.  In classifying
regimes this study applies the vertical dimension, which highlights the formality
of the regime established by SADCC/C.  This refers to the formalised treaties,
namely the Lusaka Declaration for SADCC and the Windhoek Treaty for
SADC.
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Typically, the regime research agenda concerns itself with some of the
following core theoretical questions:  (1) what accounts for the rise of rule-
based cooperation in the international system?  (2) How do international
institutions such as regimes shape the behaviour of states and non-state
actors in the issue areas for which they have been designed?  (3) Which
factors, within and outside a regime, determine its success and coherence?
(4) How can we explain the particular institutional architecture of a specific
regime?  (5) What is the nature of bargaining within a regime framework
(Krasner 1983:4)?
As indicated previously in this chapter, the purpose of this study is to analyse
and appraise political/economic factors and issues that may have played a role
in the restructuring processes.  In order to do this, this study will address the
following questions:
· What political conditions led to the formation of SADCC in 1980?  This
refers to the specific political conditions prevalent globally as well as
regionally at this time.  These conditions also refer to the underlying
norms of states’ behaviour in the region.
· What were the implications of such conditions on SADCC/C functioning
after its formation?  The significance of these conditions is that states in
the region converged on, as Krasner (1983:2) states “sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures” in
order to achieve various political objectives.
· How has SADCC/C coped or dealt with such political conditions or how
has it consolidated them?  This question will be addressed by
focussing on SADCC/C founding principles, established norms and
operational rules, and its decision-making procedures.  Reference will
also be made to treaties, statements, communiqués, agreements and
the SADCC/C restructuring process.
· How has SADCC/C evolved or restructured?  As will be indicated in
chapter two, conditions in the region changed by the end of the 1980s
and the beginning of the 1990s.  One such an example is the transition
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in South Africa – one of the main issues SADCC wanted to address.  In
order to adapt to new conditions, new members, and new issues facing
the region, decision makers soon realised the need for restructuring the
organization.  These restructuring processes took on various forms and
produced specific outcomes as will be addressed in subsequent
chapters.
· Finally, against the background of the regime established by SADCC/C
the study will conclude with an analysis and appraisal of these
restructuring processes.  It must be said though that SADC’s future in
terms of NEPAD and the AU can only be discussed in preliminary
terms, as the latter organization has not become fully operational
during the period covered by the study.  However, the issue will be
provisionally addressed in the concluding chapter of the study.
Regime theory has been the dominant approach in international co-operation.
It recognizes the importance of both self-interested behaviors and institutional
factors in determining outcomes and focuses on the role of ideas, principles
and norms in a sociological account of international relations (Williams 1998).
However, depending on the school of thought, different emphasis was
attached to different aspects, for example power (by neo-realists), interests
(neo-liberals) or ideas and discourses (by constructionists) Young (2002b).
As for international co-operation concerning the environment, regime-centric
approaches have predominantly looked at the effectiveness of institutional
performance rather than environmental outcomes (Kütting 2000).  Only a few
authors (the Fridjof Nansen Institute) have focused on environmental
effectiveness and have considered the environmental problem necessitating
the agreement.  Young (1993), who in his study of regime formation, has
developed a model of institutional bargaining, more recently held that
environmental institutions should be designed to fit the properties of the
ecosystems with which they interact.  He found mismatches between
institutions and ecosystems and identified a number of mechanisms that can
produce misfits as well as corrective measures (Young 2002a).
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Young (2002a) stresses the need for bridging the gap between bottom-up
studies, that is, small-scale local systems, and top-down studies, such as the
international or global regimes of environmental problems.  Case study
methods are recommended but are somewhat neglected by international
regime theory for collective-action problems at the international level (Young
2002b).  The shortcomings are addressed in Miles et al. (2001) after gathering
over a decade of case studies on international environmental regimes.
Within regime theory, which tends to emphasize processes and holds state-
centric views, there was a late acknowledgement that governments have lost
control over their territory, that is, governments have become dispersed and
can no longer govern, and this can only be done by governments having the
authority over a single territory (Held et al. 2001).  In addition, regime theory
acknowledges an increase in the role of non-state actors such as non-
government organizations (NGOs), experts and business, but only if relative
to that of national governments.  In reality, however, the distinction between
state and non-state actors may become increasingly irrelevant in this study,
even though there remain some crucial differences in terms of legitimacy,
availability of resources, and capacity (Krasner 1983:17).
While this study examines regime theory, its main purpose is not to trace in
detail the process of negotiation and implementation of international regimes,
their formation and different types of regime theory like the urban regime
theory, environmental regime theory, security regime theories and more, but
rather to analyze the role of political factors in the formation and restructuring
of SADCC/C specifically.
Regime theory has mostly been used to study urban politics and urban
societies, especially in the United States of America and in the United
Kingdom.  This limits regime theory to develop as far as it should.  Regime
theory has also been criticized for downplaying the importance of internal
politics within a given region.  Its focus has been on the operational aspects of
the regime rather than the conditions regional organizations are expected to
operate from.  Krasner (1983:19) maintains that due to this, regime theory has
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failed to explain and predict the formation and the discontinuations of regimes.
Instead, regime theory has maintained that regimes are a result of a cause
and are also a factor in the formation, maintenance, and the discontinuation of
regional organizations.
Despite minor set backs regarding regime theory (Stoker 1995), this study
maintains that the regime theory will enable one to discuss political factors
that led to the formation and the restructuring of SADCC in 1992 and 1999.
1.6 Conceptual clarification
There are five general levels of regional economic integration:  (1) reduction of
tariffs on products granted to other countries subsequent to the granting of
most favoured nation status to a country which also automatically applies to
the most favoured country, (2) the next level of regional integration which is the
free trade zone area and implies the trading of goods and services among
member states at zero tariffs, (3) the custom union which, in addition to being
a free trade arrangement, typically involves the adoption of a common external
tariff (CET) vis-à-vis third countries, (4) the common market which basically
permits both the free movement of goods and services among member states
and the free movement of the factors of production and entrepreneurs and (5)
the last level of regional integration which is the creation of an economic and
political union and is regarded as the ultimate goal of regional integration as it
goes beyond the elimination of real and perceived barriers to facilitate mobility
and the movement of goods and services (Babarinde 1998:101).  In order to
achieve the objectives stated by SADCC members, as well as to fulfil some of
the requirements mentioned above, SADCC underwent a series of
restructuring, which is the focus of this study.  It is worthwhile to point out that
SADC is still within the first stage in terms of regional integration levels or
stages as discussed above.  It is where the two restructuring exercises (1992
and 1999) take place.  An example of regional integration that has achieved
regional integration according the mentioned levels is the EU.
This section will not adopt particular definitions for the concepts ‘region’,
‘regime’, ‘regionalism’, regionalisation’, ‘regional integration and cooperation’,
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‘analysis’, ‘appraisal’, and ‘restructuring’, but merely provide brief descriptions
of each to clarify the analysis in the coming chapters.  It should be noted that,
particularly in the case of the concept ‘region’, there is an extensive body of
literature dealing with the problems of defining a region (Evans and Newnham
1998a: 472-473).
At this stage it is important to clarify the main concepts relevant to the study.
Some of these include the concepts analysis, appraisal, region, regionalism,
regionalisation, restructuring and regime.
Regime:  despite various definitions of this concept offered by scholars such
as Hasenclever et al (1997), Keohane (1984) and Rittberger (1993), this study
prefers the definition offered by Krasner (1983:45).  Krasner views regimes as
a perspective in International Relations that focuses on cooperation among
actors, states or countries in a given area.  An international regime is thus
viewed as a set of implicit and explicit principles; norms, rules and procedures
around which countries’ expectations converge in a particular area.
Analysis:  the Collins English dictionary (1995:55) defines analysis as a
process of considering something carefully or using statistical methods in order
to understand or explain it.  Analysis may also refer to the scientific process of
examining something in order to find out what it consists of.  In this study,
analysis will simply refer to an explanation or description of political factors and
actors that led SADCC/C to restructure.
Appraisal:  the Collins English dictionary (1995:71) defines appraisal as an
official or formal evaluation of the strengths and weakness of someone or
something.  It often involves observation or some kind of testing.  In this study,
appraisal will be used to evaluate the successes and/or failures of the
SADCC/C restructuring.
Region:  is regarded as a part or segment of the world that consists of more
than two states within physical proximity of each other that consciously share
patterns of interaction at various levels, the territorial totality of which is
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considered a recognizable entity by other entities that form part of the region
and also by the external environment.  Such an entity though, is not a given
and in terms of its borders can contract or expand over time.  Its shared
patterns of interaction can be characterised either by patterns of amity or
enmity (Schoeman 2002:1).  For the purposes of this study the concept region
will be applied by using SADCC/C as the object of analysis.   This implies that
the region consists of the member states of SADCC/C.   Table 2 below
contains the member states of SADCC and SADC.
Table 2: Members of SADCC/C and other Regional Organizations
Country *FLS SADCC SADC SACU COMESA RIFF IOC EAC
Angola X X X X
Botswana X X X X
Lesotho X X X
Mozambique X X X
Malawi X X X X
South Africa X X
Mauritius X X X X
Tanzania X X X *Withdrew X X
Zambia X X X X X
Namibia X X X X
Zimbabwe X X X X X
Seychelles* X X X X
DRC* X X X
Swaziland X X X X X X
Source: Isaksen and TjØnneland (2001:50)
*DRC was part of the FLS when it was known as Zaire and Mobutu attended meetings from
1973.
*Seychelles cancelled its SADC membership in July 2004.
*FLS dissolved on 30 July 1994, and became the political and security wing of SADC in 1996.
*RIFF: Regional Integration Facility Forum for Eastern and Southern Africa.
*EAC: East African Community
*IOC: Indian Ocean Commission
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Due to a number of definitions associated with the concept ‘region’ this study
will refer to a region as provided by this definition.
Regionalism:  whereas ‘region’ denotes space and place, regionalism
denotes an aim or objective, and the term has both a normative and
descriptive connotation.  The normative understanding relates to the aims,
goals and driving forces that underlie and determine the conscious efforts by
members of a region to increase and/or control various forms of interaction
and cooperation (Gibb 1997:3).  In the Southern African region, the
destabilization efforts of the apartheid South Africa became an underlying
force in the formation of SADC by the FLS.
Evans and Newnham (1998b: 474) regard regionalism as a complex
combination of attitudes, loyalties and ideas that concentrates the minds of
people/s upon what they perceive to be their ‘region’.  Regionalism then
becomes a political project when cross-border transactions and the perceived
need for closer cooperation are recognized by the member states, when
governments react to these internal and external forces by means of
attempting to find a transnational level of governance (Lipietz 1990:8).
Based on the mentioned definitions, this study will regard regionalism as
relating to aims by states in a region to cooperate in order to deal with
common problems or challenges.
Regionalisation:  although often used as synonymous with ‘regionalism’,
regionalisation refers to the process/es through which ‘regioness’ is increased
(Schoeman 2002:3).  The idea does not express an evolutionary logic, but a
logic that depends on what the aims and goals of regionalisation are and one
that indicates levels of complexity in terms of regional interaction.
Regionalisation is often treated as largely a political phenomenon – a process
initiated by states and stimulated or driven by the global economic demands
and challenges of the spread of economic liberalism.  This view is based on
the influential market integration theory articulated by authors such as Viner
and Balassa (1961).
37
This study concurs with the definition of regionalisation as defined by Hurrell
(1995).  Hurrell regards regionalisation as the growth of societal integration
within a given region, including the undirected processes of social, political and
economic interaction among units or member countries in a region.  As a
dynamic process, it can be understood as a continuing process of forming
regions as geopolitical units as organized political cooperation within a
particular group of states or as regional communities such as pluralistic
security communities.
Regional Integration and Cooperation:  RI/C is the most central concept in
this study and has been defined in a number of ways.  At times it has been
defined essentially as an economic activity with social and political dimensions,
for example Schoeman (2002:3) states that a regional economy “is not
integrated unless all avenues are open to everybody and the remunerations
paid for (the same) productive services are equal regardless of racial, social
and cultural difference.”
Balassa (1961:3), on the other hand, views social integration as the gaining of
importance only as the unification of national economies proceeds.  Social
integration is not considered necessary for lower forms of integration, such as
the removal of trade barriers, as opposed to the equalisation of factor prices.
Basically, RI/C is viewed as the ultimate goal that countries in the same region
strive to achieve by coordinating their economies and harmonising their
political policies in order to uplift their social needs.
Restructuring:  is another central concept in this study.  The concept
restructuring has not enjoyed much academic attention.  Instead, political
actors have used the concept loosely and business figures to emphasise
changes planned to be introduced to a particular organization or business
structure. Mainly such move is aimed at improving a particular structure of the
organization or business entity if seen not meeting required standards or not
performing well to produce desired targets.  Restructuring relates strongly to
the concept of a regime.  As conditions in the region changed, so did the
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principles, norms and rules governing SADCC.  Restructuring was regarded by
decision-makers as the next logical development of the organization and thus
changed some of the fundamental aspects of the regime governing structures.
For the purposes of this study, KotŸe’s (1997:50) definition of the concept is
accepted in that it is seen as ‘a process in which status quo (existing)
institutions and/or practices are transformed into new ones that are radically
different from the old ones, with the view of democratising or decentralising the
situation if it was undemocratic or centralised.’  The Collins English dictionary
(1995:1419) defines restructuring or to restructure organizations or systems as
a means to change the way it is organized, usually in order to make it work
more effectively.
In the case of SADCC/C, as an illustration of the concept restructuring, upon
its establishment in 1980, stated as its objectives to create institutions to co-
ordinate its activities.  When it restructured for the first time in 1992 as well as
its subsequent restructuring to be discussed, the membership increased as
indicated table two, objectives were reviewed, more institutions were added
and sectors of responsibility increased – all of which were based on new
decision-making procedures.  Therefore, the concept “restructuring of SADC”
in this study will simply refer to changes that were introduced within SADCC/C
in order to operate effectively.
It can thus be said that the restructuring of SADCC/C will be appraised and
analysed by applying the theoretical framework outlined above.
1.7 Scope and limitation of the study
This study will mainly focus on the restructuring of SADCC/C, particularly in
1992 and 1999.  However, for historical background, this study will resume
with efforts of regional integration in Africa from the late 1800s in order to level
the understanding concerning this vast field.  In terms of SADC, the study will
focus on the early 1990s up to 2002 when the first restructuring occurred.  The
second restructuring resumed in 1996 and was officially announced in 1999,
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but continued beyond 2002, which was the estimated period of its finalisation.
Due to that, this study will assemble and analyse the data pertaining to the
restructuring of SADCC/C up to 2002, and to large extent, focus on the
influence of the OAU’s transformation into the AU.
1.8 Organization of the thesis
The first chapter serves as an introduction to the study.  This includes the
research problem and study methodology.  Chapter one also looks at concepts
that are central to this study.
Chapter two addresses factors that led to the formation of SADCC in 1980 and
two will serve as a historical background of SADCC.  This will include an
analysis of its institutions and its founding objectives.
Chapter three analyses and appraises political factors that led SADCC to
convert to SADC in 1992.  It also focuses on how SADC restructured by
looking at the institutions and measures that were introduced in the new
organizations.
Chapter four looks at the political factors that led SADC to consider
restructuring in 1999.  The chapter will examine the political factors from 1996
up to 2003 and will look at the new institutions that were introduced and
phased out as a result of restructuring.
Chapter five makes some general conclusions concerning the restructuring of
SADCC/C since the early 1990s.
Chapter six serves as a general conclusion and contains the recommendations
of the study.
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Chapter Two
The Formation of SADCC
2.1 Introduction
Chapter one presented an overview of the study.  The focus was mainly on
the justification of the problem at hand, and the methodology that will be
followed in analysing and appraising or discussing the problem.  Chapter one
also discussed the literature that has been written on Southern Africa and
prospects of regional integration.  Observations were made regarding gaps
existing in SADCC/C related literature and how existing literature will be
integrated into this study.
Chapter two is aimed at discussing why was SADCC formed, by discussing
factors that led to the formation of the region in Southern Africa, and by
discussing the history of regional organizations in Africa as a comparative
study?  This is the first research question of the study as stated in chapter
one.  Theoretically this question relates to the realist perspective of regime
formation as indicated in chapter one.  As pointed out, the liberalist view of
regime formation is a result of states’ endeavour to overcome the pressure to
compete under conditions of anarchy.  This assumption is relevant to the
formation of SADCC in 1980, because the underlying factor was to oppose
the apartheid South African government control in the region.  Be that as it
may, SADCC however, tried to focus further than South Africa’s economic
threat by also looking at the international economic threat.  In terms of regime
formation, however, realists argue that regimes are formed in a situation when
uncoordinated strategies in a given area or region can interact to produce
suboptimum outcomes (Little 2001:302).
The above question in this study will be answered by looking firstly at the
historical and political factors and processes in the region that led to the
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formation of the region in Southern Africa, as mentioned above.  The role of
the Frontline States (FLS) and the apartheid South Africa will also be
discussed.  Secondly, SADCC’s underlying principles, norms, rules,
operational structures and decision-making procedures will be addressed.
This study’s theoretical framework and aspects relating to its restructuring
such as conditions and justifications will be analysed and appraised in chapter
three.
As indicated in the previous chapter, Anttiroika and Kainulainen (1998:4) argue
that regime theory in the study of International Relations, and particularly
regional organizations, deals with how and under what conditions different
types of governing conditions emerge or regional organizations emerge and
how they consolidate and become hegemonic.  Lastly, it looks at how they
develop and transform or restructure to keep up with regional and international
developmental trends.  Based on this definition, the analysis and appraisal in
this chapter will be on how and under what conditions SADCC emerged prior
to 1980.  By doing this, it is hoped that in the subsequent chapters it will be
easier to analyse and appraise why SADCC restructured in 1992, after having
discussed factors under which it was formed at first.
2.2 The origins of regional integration in Africa
RI/C in Sub-Saharan Africa has occurred under different circumstances than
in Europe and Latin America.  In fact, one can discern two quite different
phases in the process of RI/C.  The first phase was the formation of RI/C by
colonial powers.  These regional groups were designed to coordinate and
promote the economic interest of the metropolitan countries.  Many of these
were carried over to the post-colonial era.  The regional bodies that were
formed during the colonial period include French West Africa or Afrique
Occidental Francais (AOF) formed in 1895 by the French government to
coordinate and control the governments in the various French territories,
French Equatorial Africa or Afrique Equitorial Francaise (AEF), and the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), among others (Mokate 1983:9).
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According to Tostesen (1982:111) regional bodies that were formed by newly
independent nations were characterized by the fact that members constituted
their starting point and arguably also the aim as perceived by the early
initiators, a collection of disarticulated economies with former linkages to their
metro poles than between themselves.  The colonial legacy meant that from a
regional integration perspective, the countries involved lacked
complementarities in production structure and product range.  They produced,
broadly speaking, the same agricultural produce or minerals which could not
be refined or minerals which could not be refined or processed locally.
According to Mokate (1986:10) the challenges that were facing African
countries after independence not only contained economic challenges but
political and social challenges that governments in the continent had to deal
with after colonialism.  The formation of the Organization of the African Unity
(OAU) in 1963 was the first effort designed by African governments to deal
with these challenges.  The formation of regional bodies after independence,
such as the East African Community (EAC in 1967 and revived in 1999),
ECOWAS (1975), SADCC (1980) and others were designed to cater for
member countries with new systems to enhance their economies.
At the regional level, the 1970s witnessed a remarkable growth of the
economic organizations, which can be regarded as central to Africa’s
economic growth.  The World Bank’s Accelerated Development in Africa, An
Agenda for Action (AA), the OAU and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) provided
a starting point for African thinking and articulation.  The LPA and its update,
the Abuja Economic Union of 1991, presented a blend of two approaches.
They envisaged a pan-African Economic Union (the United States of Africa)
and the consolidation of sub-regional units like SADC, COMESA, and
ECOWAS.  These regional integration schemes were referred to as building
blocs for a continental union as subsequently envisaged and included in the
African Union Constitutive Act (Patel 2000:4; Hoff 2000:1; AU Constitutive Act
2002).
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According to Hoff (2000:1) Africa is by far the most prolific continent, with
probably more than 200 regional groupings and agreements covering a wide
variety of arrangements and issues.  Some of these schemes have developed
significantly and the Western and Central African countries of the CFA zone
have jointly established a central bank for each region and adopted identical
banking regulations.  However, the overall progress was dismally slow, and
there were incidences of retrogressive development, the most prominent
being the collapse of the EAC in 1977.
Regional integration was seen as a strategy for overcoming Africa’s colonial
heritage of political fragmentation, underdevelopment and dependency on
advanced capitalist countries dominated the thinking of policy-makers since
the early days of decolonization. Since the 1960s, efforts to promote
continental and regional unity have sought to enhance Africa’s collective
political and economic bargaining power internationally and minimize
marginalization in the global division of labour (Shaw 1975:673).
Given the post-colonial state’s limited resource base, Lewis (1978:48) argued
that the tendency was to accept the channels of cooperation that might give
greater leverage to regional community institutions existing at independence,
or some version of them.  In East Africa, the functional strategy system was
pursued, in the Caribbean, where non-contiguous character of the archipelago
could not sustain the institutions of federation, a similar system was initiated,
and in the older States of Latin America, the Central American market came
into existence with US encouragement.  For states like those of French-
speaking Africa, which did not break monetary and financial institutional
arrangements with the metropolitan country, the terms of relations offered by
the EEC were an equal inducement to maintain or create regional forms of
cooperation (Lewis 1978:61-62).
The African Development Forum III (2002:13) maintains that there are a
number of powerful factors that militate against effective regional integration in
Africa.  The most significant of these is the lack of a dominant political-
economic power on the continent that can form the core of the regionalization
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process.  Most African countries are exporters of raw materials, especially
agricultural and mineral products, and compete with one another for markets.
Industrial production is concentrated in a relatively small number of countries,
and is not significant on the global scale.
The African Development Forum III (2002:14) further maintains that,
throughout Africa, there is a fear of the development of hegemonic sub-
regional states. Whenever one of the continent’s powerful countries (South
Africa, Nigeria and Egypt) appears to be taking an active interest in sub-
regional affairs, many of its smaller neighbours will try to combine to
counterbalance what they see as excessive power.
The majority of regional organizations in Africa came into being in an era
marked by inward-looking concepts of development, mainly industrial
development based on import substitution.  The goal of self-reliance and
collective self-sufficiency was to be pursued by creating sub-regional markets
with a view to eventually establishing a Pan-African Community (Hoff 2000:4).
However, the life span of regional organizations in Africa had its own problems
and challenges.  In brief, some of the regional organizations had to restructure
in order to continue functioning as credible bodies, for example, after
independence the structure of AOF changed substantially.  Some of the
countries that were part of the union withdrew from it, including Guinea.
Eventually in 1961, the former countries of the AOF formed a custom union
called the West African Customs Union.  The union included all AOF countries
except Guinea and Togo.  When this union failed, another union, namely the
Union of West African states, was formed in 1966, which failed too, in 1969.
Another attempt by AOF members was made in 1973 with the formation of the
Economic Community of West African States (CEAO).  Among the many
reasons behind the failure of these unions are problems of technical,
administrative, political, and economic factors (Robson 1983:34).
Another example is the EAC.  It originated during the colonial era as a
measure for coordinating administration, infrastructural development and
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economic policy in the region.  By 1960, the problems that were to eventually
lead to the break up of the EAC were evident.  This included the growing
resentment in Uganda and Tanganyika of what was perceived to be
disproportionate benefits accruing to Kenya under the exiting system.  In 1961,
the EAC structure called the East African Common Services Organization
(EACSO) was restructured to meet the needs of the newly independent
nations.  However, problems began to emerge and they included competing
priorities arising from regional demands versus internal national development
demands, the problems of distribution in favour of Kenya, and many others
(Springer 1980:14).
Many lessons for Southern Africa can be derived from the above encounters,
including factors that the abovementioned bodies had to respond to.  These
responses took different forms.  In some cases, regional bodies had to
reformulate regional policies in order to deal with such demands, and in other
cases, regional bodies had to abort their structures and to some extent cease
functioning as regional bodies when failing to respond to the challenges.
Restructuring processes or such an undertaking by regional organizations is
aimed at keeping an organization in touch with its immediate regional realities,
whether these realities are political, social or economical.
An analysis into the evolution of regional groupings in Africa has downplayed
the role of politics as the important factor in the progress or existence of
regional organizations.  The background on the origin of regional integration
schemes in Africa is hoped to serve as important background information on
regional integration politics in Africa with relevance to SADC.
2.3 Regional formation in Southern Africa
Realist theories on regime formation argue that, the reason why states choose
to form or observe a regime is because they realise that they operate in co-
ordination and they are normally confronted by the same challenges.
Therefore, the risk of not co-ordinating becomes higher and may move them
into a less advantageous position.  With that in mind, states then form regimes
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consisting of rules, norms, principles and acquired convictions, and decision-
making processes to help them deal with problems and thus create
opportunities for their regions or areas (Little 2001:303).
The abovementioned analysis can be applied to the formation of SADCC.  As
will be indicated in this chapter, regional leaders were influenced to form
SADCC in order to counter South Africa’s hegemonic position (economic,
military and political).  They realized that the price of not co-operating
outweighed their interest, as that would have allowed South Africa to have
more influence in the region.
The formation of regional organizations in Southern Africa was very complex
and most of the literature and debates on the topics, some of which were
referred to in the literature review; trace it from the colonial era.  What follows
is a brief descriptive presentation of the formation of a regional political unit -
SADCC.  This section also refers to the political processes within and among
states.  It should be taken into account that the region emerged when SADCC
was formed by largely former British and Portuguese colonial powers.  One of
the major features of the region during this period was South Africa’s
hegemonic position.
The discovery of diamonds (1870s) and gold (1880s) produced a decisive
shift in the importance of regional formation in Southern Africa.  The
transformations engendered by the discovery of gold were of such seismic
proportions that they engulfed virtually the whole of the sub-continent.  In the
process it created a complex structure of interdependent relations, which were
to endure into the future with profound implications for the wider political
economy of the entire region (Minter 1986:5; Blumenfeld 1991:8).
Minter (1986:18) maintains that the mineral wealth of Southern Africa was not
confined to the Union of South Africa.   There were gold deposits north of the
Limpopo River (not referring to the province in South Africa), coal in Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and copper in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).  The
discovery of minerals necessitated an extension of the railway system further
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into the interior.  The production of diamonds and gold for export shaped
transport the network of railways and ports that built the sub-continent into a
regional unity.
According to Blumenfeld (1991:18) the location of the mineral discoveries and
transport routes in the Transvaal and the Cape were instrumental in
determining the nature of development within South Africa.  The pursuit of
mineral wealth gave rise to similar social and economic processes in the rest
of the region.  Thus, the phenomenon of rapid urban development witnessed
on the Witwatersrand was repeated on a similar scale in Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe) and, somewhat later, in the Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) copper
belt. Similarly, other socio-economic consequences, including the
determination of the economic and physical infrastructures, the geographic
and spatial structure and distribution of economic development, and the
generation of racial inequalities in relative living standards were all repeated
elsewhere in the region.
After the discovery of minerals, foreign capital flooded into the region.
Britain’s control over markets of Southern Africa was contested by other rising
international powers, as the region became an increasingly important asset.
At the same time there were growing struggles between settlers (Afrikaners)
and British colonial officials over the revenues derived from trade with the
interior (John 1993:7).
British victory in the Anglo-Boer war was followed in 1967 by the
establishment of a Southern African Custom Union (SACU) comprising of the
Cape, Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony, Southern Rhodesia and
Bachuanaland (now Botswana).  When the union of South Africa was formed
in 1910, it was with the expectation that the Rhodesians and the High
Commission Territories (HTCs) of Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bachuanaland
and Swaziland would be joined.  Provisions were made in the Act of the Union
for incorporation (Hyam 1972:71).
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The vision of a Greater South Africa was certainly not limited to Southern
Rhodesia and the three HTCs, although these were obvious and concrete
objectives.  Hyam (1972:73) maintains that, due to inheriting expansionist
concepts of security and opportunity from local heroes as well as from offices
of the British government, from Kruger and Rhodes, as well as from Milner
and Selborne, the Union had designs on German South West Africa, and took
up the legacy of the old Transvaal’s urge to the sea, particularly in the
direction of Delagoa Bay and its port, Lourenco Marques.  Smuts looked
beyond the Union to an economic and political hegemony in the North,
extending far beyond the frontiers of South Africa into equatorial regions.
According Martin (1990:15), “after the pact government came to power in
1924 and the development of secondary industry got under way in South
Africa.  The 1925 Tariff Act secured protection for infant industries.  Through
this act, South Africa adopted protectionist measures to promote the
accelerated development of its industries.  The free trade that had existed in
the region was destroyed and other states of the region found themselves
facing higher commodity prices. Protected by the resilience of its gold mining
sector, South Africa escaped the worst effects of global recession and by
1933 industrialisation was well established.  What became obvious during the
interwar period was that increasingly unequal and interdependent
relationships were being established across the region”.
Furthermore, Martin (1990:15) maintains that, “at the turn of the century, the
whole of Southern Africa comprised both a zone of primary production and an
area marked by a high degree of free flow commodities, labour and capital
across territorial boundaries.  The end of World War Two dramatically
transformed this in that South Africa was increasingly industrialising power,
while the free trade zone assiduously worked according to colonial and
apartheid regime powers of the previous half-century.  This caused the
emergence of centre-hinterland linkages across the space of Southern Africa
to be affected by a rapture of long-standing regional relationships rather than
a simple strengthening of South African dominance.  In this instance at least a
“region” emerged not out of South-South cooperation, but out of the South
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African state’s drive to escape the effects of participation in an open and
common peripheral zone of the world economy”.
According to Butts and Thomas (1986:3-6) dependencies were established,
especially in the fields of transport, trade and migrant labour.  The region of
Southern Africa was united by its transport infrastructure.   Butts and Thomas
(1986) refer to these phenomena as a functional region that is an area
organised around a particular function.  In the case of Southern Africa, they
maintain that it is a transport network.  Typically there exists a core area that
serves as the hub for activities of the functional region that is united by lines of
communication to lesser nodes of activity located in the hinterland. The core
area (South Africa) generally dominates the hierarchy of needs.
The situation naturally nourished the quest for national independence in the
various countries and for majority rule in South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s.
Britain started to reduce her role in Southern Africa and political independence
was granted to Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
during the 1960s without major confrontations.  The imposed Central African
Federation between Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), that mainly benefited Southern Rhodesia,
was broken up in 1963 after 10 years of existence.  In 1965, the British
descendents in Zimbabwe refused majority rule and proclaimed ‘Unilateral
Declaration of Independence’ from Britain.  Portugal showed no sign of giving
up its overseas territories.  In South Africa, repression was intensified after the
massacre and the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the
Pan Africanist Congress in 1960 (PAC).  Namibia was still firmly in the South
African grip, in spite of the local and international protests (Haarløv1988: 13).
In the newly independent countries in the region, governments had to battle
with continued economic dependence on South Africa and the West.  In the
remaining colonies and minority ruled states, armed struggles and other forms
of resistance to the status quo grew steadily, leading to the independence of
Mozambique and Angola in 1974 and 1975 and Zimbabwe in 1980
(Haarløv1988:13).
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Hyam (1972:33) explains that the basis of regional formation in Southern
Africa rotated around other areas such as the following: (1) the micro-labour
system which referred to the concentration of emigrates from neighbouring
countries like Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and
Namibia to the gold mines in South Africa; (2) the political consideration of the
FLS, in other words, the unification of the liberated countries in Southern
Africa against the apartheid regime in South Africa had an effect in the
formation of the region (to be discussed later); (3) the formation of the
Customs Union as discussed had an effect on the shaping of the region; and
(4) the Rand Commentary Area (RMA) between South Africa, Lesotho,
Swaziland and Namibia had a huge impact in the formation of the region in
Southern Africa.
These patterns of regional formation established relationships most frequently
understood as dependent.  As already stated, the mere aim of the historical
overview on the formation of the Southern African region is to simply describe
how dependency and inequality came about in the region and to form a
platform as to why SADCC was considered.
2.4 SADCC historical background
According to Hoff (2000:4), SADCC was not established as an integration
organization.  Its objectives were mainly geared towards supporting the FLS,
that is, those countries bordering on being an apartheid state, to cope with
their precarious dependence upon South Africa.  On this point, Schoeman
(2002:2) further explain that, “to treat SADCC purely as an attempt at
economic regionalism or development coordination and cooperation would be
to miss much about the original driving forces behind the establishment of the
organizations, though the OAU’s 1980 Lagos Plan did encourage the principle
of sub-regional economic cooperation as building blocs for a continental
economic union”.
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SADCC was established in 1980 in terms of the ‘Lusaka Declaration’.  It was a
politically motivated response and defensive mechanism of the FLS to South
Africa’s idea of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS).
SADCC’s main objective was to reduce economic dependence on, and
vulnerability to South Africa through building economic, and particularly
infrastructural security, in the region. Although influenced by continental moves
towards intensified regionalization, SADCC was established as economic pillar
of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the region (SADC 2002:34).
The extent to which SADCC was a politically constituted region was obvious in
its membership, and that is why political factors played a big role in the
restructuring in 1992 and in 1999.  Schoeman (2002:3) argues that, apart from
the economic factors, the exclusion of South Africa made no sense.  The
(then) Zaire was also excluded, despite the fact that in geographical terms, at
least, it made more sense to include it rather that Tanzania.  However,
Tanzania had been a part of FLS since its inception, had harboured South
Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) dissidents for many years and it had
been active in the liberation struggle waged against the white regimes in South
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa.  From a regional-economic
perspective, though, Tanzania historically formed part of the EAC (together
with Uganda and Kenya) – a customs union that disintegrated in the 1970s
due to conflict amongst its members over the distribution of resources and
gain.  Zaire was basically excluded from SADCC membership because of its
support for and cooperation with South Africa, as well as its open sympathy
with and support for the Union Nacional Por La Independencee Totale Do
Angola (UNITA), the former rebel movement in Angola.
SADCC adopted a Programme of Action (PA) that identified and defined
economic activities and development projects to be pursued. The PA was
based on the project approach or sectoral approach with each member taking
responsibility for a particular sector (for example, Angola for energy,
Mozambique for transport, and Swaziland for human resources development).
This approach resulted in a highly decentralised organizational structure with a
small secretariat in Botswana and in a highly uneven distribution of efficiency
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and effectiveness within various sectors.  Ostergaard (1990:58) adds, “SADCC
was conceived as a service organization rather than a leader of countries that
constituted it.”
Politically though, such an approach had its benefits.  It underscored the basic
principle of equality amongst members, regardless of size or relative power,
fostering a sense of equal worth, and identity.  Due to poverty and limited
financial resources, of many SADCC states, certain sectors were neglected,
particularly the human resources development sector coordinated by
Swaziland.  This was due to the fact that the organization was heavily
dependent on donor funding, each sector procuring funds for projects in its
own realm.  Such an approach, apart from the dangers of unevenness and
differences in approach and commitment inherit, also opened up the possibility
that donors might have undue influence on certain sectors as they were
dealing, by implication, with SADCC on a bilateral basis (SADC 1995:9).
The above changes point to the early awareness of SADCC members to the
importance of the need to respond to international and regional political
changes, as will later be illustrated in chapters three and five.  These changes
also show the extent to which SADCC was moving towards the acceptance of
a conventional liberal economic doctrine on the importance of trade
liberalisation, a trend encouraged by international financial institutions, such as
the IMF through structural adjustment programmes.  These changes within
SADCC point to the evolution of a regionalism characterized by a sense of a
shared destiny, member states increasingly articulating their needs,
preferences and objectives in terms of their being part of the region and these
aspects as being indivisible.
The transformation of SADCC to SADC through the 1992 Windhoek Treaty is
a prime example of the extent to which the Southern African region has taken
cognisance of change at various levels and has moved towards such change,
using it in a positive way to promote and develop the well-being of the region.
The transformation of SADCC into SADC was influenced by a number of
external and internal factors.  Externally, forces that influenced the change
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were more economically oriented like the economic globalization with its
emphasis on economic liberalisation and increased bloc formation.  Internal
factors include the change in international political landscape at the end of the
Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa.  These factors shifted
the international emphasis on traditional military-political security to a
concentration on a much broader definition of security that included economic,
environmental, and societal security (SADC 1995:9).
An analysis of SADC restructuring, as mentioned above, contains various
aspects. Although regional integration schemes emphasise economic and
market integration, this study seeks to analyse specific political factors that
played a role in SADC restructuring in both phases.  The Southern African
region is a suitable unit of analysis for political factors that may have had
influence on the existence or discontinuation of regional organizations.
2.5      The role of the FLS and apartheid South Africa in the formation
      of SADCC
Table two in chapter one included the members of the FLS.  This alliance was
formed from the remnants of the short-lived ‘Mulungushi Club’.  Most of its
members once belonged to the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East,
Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA).  PAFMECSA, in turn, emanated
from a restructuring process that led to the establishment of the Pan-African
Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), established in 1958, and
changed its name and constitution in 1962 to accommodate newly
independent countries outside its original Anglophone region.
PAFMECA/PAFMECSA had a series of eight conferences before it was
eventually usurped by the formation of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) in May 1963 (ISS 1999:1).
At continental level, the OAU Liberation Committee took responsibility for
much of the work that PAFMECSA had engaged in, but the feeling remained
that this was too formal and broad for an institution to cater for the particular
and special needs of the sub-region.  As a result, and subsequent to the
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dissolution of PAFMECSA, a series of Conferences on East and Central
African Countries (CECAC) were initiated by Tanzania and Zambia to fill the
vacuum left by PAFMECSA.  Together with President Mobutu Sese Seko of
the former Zaire, Nyerere and Kaunda were the most active in the region.  As
will be indicated later, SADC runs the risk of falling into same trap due to the
Pan-African integration process (AU) that succeeded the OAU (ISS 1999:1).
For most of the time the region reflected an uncompromising commitment in
support of the armed struggle as opposed to dialogue.  Yet, the fifth CECAC
issued the Lusaka Manifesto in 1969, which was later adopted by both the
OAU and the UN and, for a limited period, provoked a debate on dialogue in
Southern Africa.  The seventh CECAC subsequently issued the Mogadishu
Declaration that reassessed the situation and concluded that “white minority
regimes in Southern Africa had not only rejected the Lusaka Manifesto, but
were not amenable to negotiation”.  The Lusaka Manifesto and the Mogadishu
Declaration laid a basis for the future alternative strategies of independent
Southern African countries.  Dialogue and the peaceful settlement of Southern
African conflicts were only to be revived by the Harare Declaration (1989) in a
very different, post-Cold War context and at a time that both Namibia and
Zimbabwe had joined the ranks of the FLS (ISS 1999:1).
The Mulungushi Club was the most short-lived of the groupings preceding the
FLS and there was a degree of co-existence between CECAC and the Club.
Operating approximately between 1970 and 1974, the Club was the
immediate predecessor of the FLS alliance.  Its original four members were
Tanzania, Uganda (until Idi Amin replaced Milton Obote in a 1971 coup), Zaire
(Mobutu attended meetings from 1973) and Zambia.  Its name reflected its
nature — that of an informal group of respected heads of state rather than an
interstate institution.  Like the previous groupings and others such as CECAC,
the Club also had its focus on the liberation of Southern Africa.  Its relatively
small size allowed it to meet frequently and at short notice.  Like all other
regional and sub-regional groupings, leaders of active liberation movements in
Southern Africa were being frequently invited to the Club summits.  Most of
these features were carried over to the FLS alliance (SADCC 1984:5).
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Within a sub-regional context, the FLS was the most important and indeed
most recognised structure to emerge in the mid-1970s, at a time when the
anti-colonial struggle was the most important concern in the sub-region. The
FLS was constituted as an informal forum for the discussion of mainly political
and, to a lesser extent, military problems common among the liberation
movements, and the problems faced by newly independent governments in
Zambia, Mozambique and Angola.  Security issues were discussed in the
ISDSC, the informal substructure of the FLS.  At summit level, the FLS was
not only a club of national governments, but included representatives from the
various liberation movements in its meetings and, for a time, the head of state
of Nigeria as a type of informal associate.  The heads of state of Botswana
(Sir Seretse Khama), Tanzania (Julius Nyerere) and Zambia (Kenneth
Kaunda) can be considered to be the founders of the FLS in 1975, together
with Samora Machel of Mozambique.  Angola joined in 1976, Zimbabwe in
1980 and Namibia in 1990.  South Africa briefly joined in 1994 before the
demise of the FLS later that same year.  Lesotho was never a member of the
FLS, although representatives of the government of Chief Leabua Jonathan
attended a number of ISDSC meetings (SADCC 1994:5).
The FLS alliance played its most important role in the final years leading up to
the end of white rule in the former Rhodesia and the creation of Zimbabwe in
1980.  Thereafter, the alliance lost a degree of impact, compounded by
economic decline among its members and South Africa’s aggressive
destabilisation policies.  Economic issues loomed as the next primary
challenge for the region and, as a result, SADCC was founded in 1980,
resulting in the further erosion of the influence of the FLS (ISS 1999:3).
The role of apartheid South Africa prior to the formation of SADCC could be
seen as a reason why the FLS was formed and formalised their relationship in
a form of SADCC.  Apartheid South Africa was basically playing a
destabilizing role in the region, especially on countries that were known to
support South African liberation movements.
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2.6 The formation of SADCC
In previous sections, the historical conditions in the region prior to the 1980s
were discussed.  Reference was also made to the integration efforts in the
region.  This section introduces the formation of SADCC as an organization
(including its structure), as well as the political role played by influential
leaders such as Sir Seretse Khama (Botswana), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia),
Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe).   By the time the
idea of an organization such as SADCC was mooted, specific conditions in
the region needs to be referred to.  Leading countries such as Botswana,
Tanzania and Zambia had already gained independence. Towards the end of
the 1970s South West Africa/Namibia was still under the political management
of South Africa.  Furthermore, most of the region, in one way or another was a
battleground for the Cold War.  In addition to this, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe had
not gained independence.  Emerging as the political leader of independent
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe received significant support from leaders in the
region.  In an effort, inter alia to establish Zimbabwe as a political force in the
region, Robert Mugabe played an important role in unifying the region to
minimize its dependence on South Africa.
By 1977, a series of consultations among the FLS took place under the
leadership of the president of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama (Hanlon 1989:4).
One of the outcomes of these consultations was the FLS’ commissioning of
various sectoral studies on the regional economy, with a view to assessing the
feasibility of creating a regional economic organization among the
independent majority-ruled states of Southern Africa.   These sectored studies
became the basis of SADCC's Program of Action for coordinated regional
development and disengagement from the Republic of South Africa.
Subsequent to these studies were two significant gatherings.  Firstly, an
exploratory meeting of the FLS Finance Ministers took place in May 1979.  A
second gathering took place in Arusha that following July to discuss the
possibility of establishing SADCC.  The latter, attended by the Foreign
ministers of Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (Nsekela
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1981: viii; Leys and Tostensen 1982:53-54), adopted a Declaration of Intent to
proceed with the establishment of SADCC.  At the Arusha Conference on
economic cooperation, Sir Seretse Khama noted “what we are trying to
achieve is the ability to exercise some degree of choice which insures us
against domination by one powerful partner.”  He further maintained “many
countries in the region had already won political independence but their
colonial past ensured that they continued to depend on others for economic
survival.  As a result, economic dependence made political independence
meaningless, particularly when one takes into account the fact that some of
the countries on which some SADCC countries depended for economic
survival did not share the human ideals on which it was founded, particularly
apartheid South Africa then” (cited in Thompson 1985: 258).
Although the Arusha conference had been limited to the FLS only, by April
1980, the latter had agreed to extend SADCC membership “to all independent
Southern African states and. Also cooperate where feasible with the
Liberation Movements in preparing for economic independence after political
liberation” (Nsekela1981: xv).  The FLS not only felt that a broader
membership would strengthen the organization, but also believed that
inclusion of states such as Lesotho and Swaziland, the so-called “hostage
states” and Malawi, which openly collaborated with South Africa, would
reinforce a Pan-Africanist political cohesion among the nine and promote the
effective isolation of Pretoria.   On 1 April 1980, the summit meeting of the
nine founding member states of SADCC adopted the Lusaka Declaration,
Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, which together with the
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Heads of State and
Government of the founding members in July 1981, remained the legal
binding documents of the organization to date (Nsekela 1981: xv-7).  These
nine founding members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and the newly independent state
of Zimbabwe.  However, the Lusaka Declaration granted observer status to
the liberation movements, specifically, the South West People’s Liberation
Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia, the African National Congress (ANC) and
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the Pan African Congress (PAC) of South Africa.  On attaining its
independence in March 1990, Namibia became the tenth member of SADCC.
Von der Ropp (2000:2) maintains that, it is often overlooked that the founding
of the SADCC was due largely to the initiative of Claude Cheyson, at the time
the EU’s commissioner in charge of co-operation with ACP countries.  He held
the view that, as a result of South Africa’s apartheid policy, South Africa would
probably be destroyed by civil war as its land-locked neighbours needed to
develop new trade routes to sea.  Consequently, members of SADCC
concentrated on developing their own infrastructure so that their dependence
on the South African powerhouse could be lessened.  In the years that
followed, SADCC collected the necessary capital, mostly from Western
donors, and particularly from the EU members, to establish the greater
independence.  SADCC at its inception, found itself developing along the lines
of the EU.
Though membership was extended to all the Southern African states and the
liberation movements, SADCC declined membership to Zaire.  Mobutu's close
ties with the South African and US-backed UNITA against Angola's ruling
party, the Marxist-inspired MPLA, might have ruled out Zaire's admission
(Johnson and Martin 1986: 74-88, Schoeman 2002:4).
Legum (1988:93) notes that Mobutu's relations with the FLS, which he had
dismissed in 1977 as “a restricted club, where hypocrisy is the only slogan,”
were far from cordial.  The inclusion of Tanzania, that is geographically and
economically not part of the subsystem, underlined that the political alliance
over the decolonization of Southern Africa was central in determining
membership.  Nyerere’s critical role in supporting the independence struggles
of Southern Africa and the formation of the FLS made Tanzania’s membership
natural.  Despite its collaboration with South Africa, Malawi’s admission might
have been determined by its geographical position and a history of economic
interactions with other SADCC states, particularly during the Central African
Federation.
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The founding members of SADCC did not require members to renounce their
economic ties with other states, including South Africa.  The BLS countries
could retain their membership in the South African-dominated customs union,
SACU, and the RMA that gave Pretoria decision-making powers over the
currencies of Lesotho and Swaziland (Cobbe 1991:67).
Zimbabwe, SADCC’s most powerful partner, retained its Preferential Trade
Agreement with Pretoria.  With the exception of Botswana, Angola and
Namibia, SADCC countries also belonged to the PTA.  SADCC’s flexible and
pragmatic approach was a response to the varying degrees of dependence
that the individual states had with South Africa and the need to maintain
political unity (Green 1981:14).
Before proceeding to a discussion of the structure of SADCC, reference is
made to its founding principles and objectives outlined in the Harare
Declaration. These are:
· the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the
Republic of   South Africa;
· the forging of links to create genuine and equitable regional integration;
· the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national,
interstate and regional policies; and
· concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework
of a strategy for economic liberation (SADCC  Treaty 198O:2).
2.6 .1 SADCC founding structure in 1980
Figure one refers to SADCC’s founding structure.  As noted earlier, Botswana
played an important role in the process leading up to the establishment of
SADCC. This Position of leadership continued at its inception as Botswana
chaired both the Summit and the Council of Ministers.  Furthermore,
Botswana is also the location of the SADCC Secretariat.
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SADCC was formed as a highly decentralized organizational structure and its
operational procedures reflected the members’ original intent to prevent the
development of a huge supra-national bureaucracy.  Above all, the
decentralization was designed to guarantee direct involvement in the planning
and execution of the regional programs of all member states that retain equal
rights and duties in the decision-making process.  The organization placed
tremendous emphasis on its policy coordination role (amongst the sectors
included in table 4) and decision-making by consensus.  Voluntarism,
flexibility and the primacy of national sovereignty influenced the institutional
character of SADCC.  As will be indicated in subsequent chapters, SADCC’s
original structure soon indicated some of its shortcomings, which resulted in
the process of restructuring (SADCC 1981:8).
In chapter one, regime analysis was identified as the preferred analytical
framework of this study.  The rest of this section will apply this framework with
regards to SADCC’s founding structure, guiding principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures.
Figure 1: SADCC founding structure in 1980
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Source: SADCC Treaty (1980)
Gwaradzimba (1993:89) stated that, ‘during 1980 to 1990 the organization
consisted of small, loose institutional structures, closely linked to the national
bureaucracies of the member states. The Summit, consisting of the heads of
state and government of the ten member countries, was the highest authority
of SADCC.  Its overall role was to guide policy, maintain political and
ideological cohesion of the organization and ensure that the objectives of the
organization were met.  The summit met once a year and in general endorsed
the decisions recommended by the Council of Ministers, including the
appointment of the Executive Secretary of Secretariat’.
The most important decision-making body in SADCC was the Council of
Ministers that comprised the Ministers of Finance of the member countries
and was responsible “for the overall policy of SADCC, its general
coordination, the supervision of its institutions and the supervision of the
execution of its programs.”  The Council met twice a year prior to the summit
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meeting and the Annual Consultative Conference (SADCC Handbook 1984:
6).
To assist the Council of Ministers in policy formulation was the Standing
Committee of Officials that oversaw the formulation of SADCC projects at the
national level and maintained liaison with the national government ministries
and SADCC’s SCUs.  This body consisted of regular government officials in
the Ministry of Finance or the President's office in member countries, which
were designated as SADCC national contact points.  They formed the
backbone in coordinating members’ participation in SADCC projects and the
representation of their governments at all SADCC meetings.  Any national
project earmarked for SADCC funding was submitted to national contact
points before being considered by the SCUs (SADCC Handbook 1984:56; Lee
1989:163-180; Hanlon 1989: 6-8).
Apart from the above functions, national contact points also reviewed all
sectoral project proposals and recommended policies to ministers who were
members of the Council of Ministers.  Ad hoc technical bodies could assist the
Standing Committee of officials, but essentially they carried out dual roles as
they also had regular duties within the national civil service.  Due to the fact
that national contact points had these dual roles, they were overburdened and
often failed to visit projects or adequately prepare for SADCC meetings
(SADCC Handbook 1984:59).
To address the above problem and ensure continuity the Secretariat, in 1989,
decided to develop guidelines for the national contact points and to urge
member states to appoint permanent senior level personnel who can make
binding decisions at SADCC meetings.  When SADCC was formed, the
Heads of State mandated member countries to create SCU within their
respective ministries to oversee the coordination of their sectoral
responsibilities.  Table 4 contains these SCUs and member states responsible
for it.  The SCUs are SADCC’s sectoral administrative units attached to the
corresponding sectoral ministry of each member government.  The SCUs
formed the backbone of SADCC’s sectoral regional programs since regional
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projects and development strategies originated here.  The body worked
closely with the Secretariat and the national contact points.  The Food
Security Technical Administrative Unit (FSTAU) within Zimbabwe’s Ministry of
Agriculture, the Energy Sector Technical Advisory Unit (TAU) in Angola’s
Ministry of Energy and the Industry and Trade Coordination Unit in Tanzania’s
Ministry of Industry are examples of SADCC’s ten SCUs (see table 3)
(SADCC Handbook 1984:60).
Table 3:  SADCC Member Countries Sectoral Responsibilities 1980-1992
        SECTOR COUNTRY
Food Security Coordination of Food and
Agriculture
Zimbabwe
Agricultural Research; Livestock and Animal
Disease Control
Botswana
Energy Angola
Transport and Communications Mozambique
Manpower Swaziland
Industry and Trade Tanzania
Mining Zambia
Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife Malawi
Tourism, Soil and Water Conservation Lesotho
Marine Fisheries Namibia
        Source: SADCC Handbook (1984)
In priority sectors such as transport, communications and agricultural
research, SADCC created autonomous Sectoral Commissions with “an
independent legal status” to coordinate program activities. The Southern
African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC) in Maputo and
the Southern African Center for Cooperation in Agricultural Research
(SACCAR) in Gaborone were the only two sectoral Commissions that SADCC
Heads of State sanctioned (Hanlon 1989:6; SADCC Handbook 1984).  From
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the outset, the SADCC member states made transport and communications a
priority section noting that “without the establishment of an adequate regional
transport and communications system, other areas of cooperation become
impractical” (Lusaka Declaration 1980:2).  With six of the member states
landlocked (Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Malawi)
especially the BLS whose only outlets to the sea are historically through South
Africa, regional transport and communication links represented an area where
dependence of the nine was high.  To this end, the Harare Summit of July
1981 approved the establishment of SATCC in Maputo, Mozambique, to
oversee the development of viable alternative routes (Convention on the
Establishment of The Southern African Transport and Communications,
Harare, July, 1981). The transport development strategy would hinge upon
five corridors, specifically, Beira, Nacala, Limpopo, Lobito and Dar-es-Salaam,
making Mozambique's ability to coordinate this sector critical to SADCC's
overall Program of Action.
While sectoral commissions had an autonomous status and their own
budgets, sectoral coordinators who planned and coordinated regional sectoral
development strategies on a full-time basis, but remained salaried civil
servants of their respective governments staffed the SCUs.  Though the
Sectoral Coordinators worked exclusively on SADCC sectoral programs, they
fell under the authority and administrative structure of their Ministers (SADCC
Handbook 1984:78).
Mandaza (1987:219-22) warned that, while the above views might reflect the
official intent of SADCC's founding members and had economic advantages,
it was also true that there were hidden costs and disadvantages in a
decentralized institutional structure.  Relying on national bureaucrats meant
that the pace of program implementation was subject to the dynamism or
inefficiency of the individual member states.  In areas where skills were in
short supply, this arrangement led to heavier reliance on external experts to
implement the regional development programs without advantages of an
overarching national policy framework to guide the work of foreign short-term
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experts.  These aspects were inter alia contributing factors to the need for
restructuring.
The Secretariat based in Gaborone, Botswana, formed the fifth tier of
SADCC's organizational structure.  The Executive Secretary of SADCC
headed the small secretariat of a dozen staff members that answered directly
to the Summit through the Council of Ministers. The secretariat had no
decision-making powers but it essentially existed to coordinate the sectoral
activities of the member countries, mobilize resources on behalf of SADCC,
and liaises with member states and donors and lastly, to service the
organization administratively (SADCC 1984:5).
The secretariat’s job was to assess all the activities of all sector contact points
and to ensure that those activities were concentrated on as agreed upon by
the member countries.  Beyond that, the Secretariat had to think forward as to
where the organization was going, and what problems the organization was
facing and attempt to seek solutions, together with the member countries and
not in isolation, in order to solve such problems as unemployment and
industrialization.  Those were concerns that most probably were much wider
than each sector could handle and as a result, the Secretariat acted as a
think tank.  In addition to that, it mobilized resources for almost all the
projects, and for that reason it carried out periodic briefing missions to
international cooperating partners to discuss SADCC needs (Gwaradzimba
1993:123).
In keeping with its objective to mobilize international assistance to achieve its
goals, SADCC developed a regular mechanism for liaising with donors.
Between January and February, member states alternated in hosting the
Annual Consultative Conference which was attended by bilateral an
international donors, or in SADCC parlance, cooperating partners, SADCC
officials and representatives of the Member countries.  The Annual
Consultative conference was organized by the Secretariat and was an
occasion during which invited donors were updated on progress in regional
cooperation, projects and studies were presented for funding and bottlenecks
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were ironed out.  Donors made financial pledges to SADCC projects at the
Annual Consultative Conferences and, as evidenced by the size of the 1988
Arusha conference that was attended by 1000 delegates, the gatherings
became donor conferences rather than simply policy consultative fora
(SADCC Handbook 1984: 6).
In general, its architects’ past experiences with supra-national regional
integration schemes have heavily influenced SADCC’s institutional framework.
It has been largely designed to allow for consensus in decision-making and,
above all, to protect the sovereignty and autonomy of its constituent members.
Throughout the decade under review, SADCC sought to improve this
decentralized organizational framework without eroding the spirit of sovereign
equality and the problematic issue of equitable distribution of the benefits of
regional cooperation among asymmetrical states.
2.7 Other forms of regional integration efforts in Southern Africa
Apart from regional integration efforts as espoused by SADCC, similar
initiatives were instituted prior to SADCC.  This section introduces a short
background on the nature of selected regional integration schemes such as
SACU and COMESA.  Following the realist approach of regime analysis, it is
imperative to refer to the power politics and competition among these
organizations.  In table 2 in chapter one, references were made to overlapping
memberships of regional organizations.  It was further emphasised that
competing interests, principles, rules, norms and decision-making processes,
often challenge states in most cases.  Another intervening aspect is the fact
that some of these organizations have progressed further in the process of
regional integration as referred to above in the context of the levels of
integration.
As an illustration of some of these aspects, the mentioned regional
organizations will be briefly discussed in a descriptive manner.  Three aspects
need to be mentioned, though, regarding the analysis of these organizations.
Firstly, this is not a detailed discussion as these organizations are not the
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focus of this study.  Secondly, as these selected organizations (SACU and
COMESA) have undergone their own restructuring, this study seeks to find
lessons from their experiences.  This will be referred to in the final conclusion
of this study.  Thirdly, both SACU and COMESA have a strong commitment to
economic integration.  The discussion on the FLS will highlight the mainly
political focus of its integration effort as a precursor to establishment of
SADCC.
2.7.1  The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
The SACU agreement was drawn up in 1969. The main tenet of this
agreement was that customs and excise revenues of Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS countries) would be collected by South Africa
and paid into a common pool.  This would later be distributed to member
countries according to a formula that was loaded 42 percent, later changed to
between 62 and 70 percent in favour of the BLNS countries with South Africa
keeping the remainder plus interest accrued. This loading was for
compensating the BLNS countries for loss of sovereignty in determining their
own customs policies (Monyai 1997:41).
Problems that have been encountered with SACU are that the Board of Trade
and Tariffs responsible for setting tariffs, was accountable only to the South
African government.  BLNS countries were not represented on it.  South Africa
unilaterally introduced a number of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, trading
standards and conditions that were beyond the capacities of BLNS countries.
These made BLNS countries virtual captive markets for South Africa (Monyai
1997:41-42).
Although there was much improvement in SACU, it is important to note that,
prior to the formation of SADCC in 1980 and COMESA in 1981; it was morally
difficult for other countries beside the BLNS to join SACU.  The reason then
was that, except for the already dependent BLNS states to the South African
economy, other countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe saw a
need to assist the liberation movements, and the way to do that was to
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boycott SACU and form an alternative regional structure.  The FLS became
such an alternative structure (Haarløv1988: 13).
Functioning alongside SACU was the Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA)
involving the same countries.  The MMA was established in 1974 as the Rand
Monetary Area, and in 1975 Botswana withdrew to follow her own monetary
and fiscal policies.  Lesotho and Swaziland were compensated for having the
Rand circulating in their countries but their currencies were not allowed to
circulate in South Africa.  In 1986, with the introduction of the present MMA of
the Rand Monetary Area, the Rand was stopped from being legal tender in
Swaziland and the free movement of currency between South Africa and
Swaziland was restrained.  With independence in 1990, Namibia gained the
right to issue its own currency (Monyai 1997:43).
2.7.2      The Common Market of Southern and Eastern Africa (COMESA)
COMESA was established in 1981 as the Preferential Trade Agreement
(PTA).  The principal aim of the PTA was promotion of trade within the sub-
region, by removing the barriers to trade through the granting of preferential
tariffs on selected goods, and improving payments arrangements. Since 1994,
the organization has changed to COMESA and is aiming at moving towards a
common market.
Monyai (1997:43) points out several constraints that have hampered this
process.  They include: (1) the process involving the removal of trade barriers
and non-trade barriers was hampered by high budget deficits, foreign debt
service costs, low foreign reserves, overloaded currencies, lack of trade
finance and dependence on customs revenue as a source of income; (2) the
second problem was the lack of a compensation mechanism - COMESA was
and still is characterised by wide disparities in the economies of member
states, with Kenya and Zimbabwe dominating the scene.  While member
states were expected to remove tariffs there was no mechanism in place to
compensate the weaker economies for the loss of their important source of
revenue; (3) the third problem was that the COMESA members represented
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minor markets for each other as destinations for exports or sources of imports.
The intra-regional trade in 1989 accounted for only 5 percent (Adedeji
1991:50).
There were many shortfalls in COMESA pointed out by other scholars that
could have contributed to a lack of success in the organization thus far.
Tikarambude (1993:154) notes “COMESA is characterised by the lack of
political will among its members. As a result that has contributed to the limited
implementation of treaty agreements in COMESA.”  The problems caused by
the lack of political will were further exacerbated by the fact that a number of
countries in COMESA held overlapping and competing memberships with
other regional institutions such as SADCC and others (Adedeji 1991:50).
2.8          Preliminary indications of structural changes
This section will address some of the early indications of the limitations of
SADCC’s founding structure.  Apart from these structural limitations,
operations of SADCC were further impeded by states’ unwillingness to
surrender their sovereignty.
The 1981 summit was held in Blantyre, Malawi, where it adopted a Program of
Action for SADCC, and identified and assigned a total of nine sectoral
responsibilities to each of the founding member states (as outlined in table 4).
The assignment of these responsibilities did not occur without any controversy
as states attempted to capitalize on these sectors to support their national
interests.  One case in point is the allocation of the Fisheries SCU.  Malawi
refused to relinquish fisheries to Namibia.  This resulted, in 1990, in the
Fisheries SCU splitting into two SCUs wherein Malawi retained inland
fisheries and Namibia was given responsibility for marine fishing (Southern
African Economist, March-April 1990).
Though Mozambique and Zimbabwe had demonstrated experience in the
transport and food security sectors, the allocation of sectoral responsibilities
were primarily assigned according to members' interests and did not seem to
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have been decided upon on the basis of proven capability or resource
endowment (Lee 1989:176; Green and Thompson 1985: 265).
That came from the fact that, though SADCC specified its objectives, it lacked
a clearly articulated regional development strategy.  In keeping with the policy
of primacy of national interests, decentralization and the assignment of the
coordination and implementation of the Program of Action to member states,
the national development plans of the constituent members were defined as
the source of all regional projects.  The only criterion was that these projects
be regional in nature, that is, address a regional problem, or involve more than
one country.  By 1985, SADCC was being heavily criticized for embracing a
“shopping list” strategy whose only development criteria was to obtain funding
from the donors for essentially nationalist projects  (Lee 1989:178; Ndlela
1987:58).
Mandaza (1987:219-20) holds that, the need to maintain unity and avert
disagreement and ensure that members not only plan but also coordinate and
implement SADCC projects in their respective countries, explains the loose
definition of regional capacity of the respective countries to undertake such
responsibilities, as with the (politically expedient) need to ensure that each
member state has at least been allocated something.
2.9         Summary
Realist's approach to regime formation as argued in this chapter has basically
been that power plays a crucial role as threat to discipline weaker states and it
forces weaker states to seek co-ordination or co-operation.  This chapter has
indicated that SADCC emerged as a direct response to both the adverse
position of African states in the international economy and the dangerous
external environment, which the South African apartheid government posed.
In seeking to restructure the historical patterns of asymmetrical economic
relations with South Africa, member states hoped to create and legitimize an
alternative regional economic order, which reflected an ideology of liberation.
Previous political and diplomatic cooperation within the FLS provided the
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foundation for an organization, which would seek the coordination and
harmonization of national policies to achieve economic autonomy.
Realist theories on regime formation also argued in this chapter that the
reason why states choose to form or observe a regime is because they realise
that they are operating in a co-ordination and they are normally confronted
with the same challenges. Therefore, the risk of not co-ordinating moves them
into less advantageous position.  With that in mind, states therefore, form
regimes consisting of rules, norms, principles and decision-making processes
to help them deal with problems and thus create opportunities for their regions
or areas.  This is apparent when analysing the SADCC 1980 structure in that
it was designed to co-ordinate developmental projects rather than design
regional integration in the form of borderless region like in the case of the EU.
The other argument put forward by the realist approach on the nature of
regimes is that a powerful state or a hegemon determines the shape of a
regime around which states will co-ordinate their efforts.  The power of South
Africa and its force in the region determined the shape of SADCC.  Drawing
from this, SADCC member states deliberately opted for a decentralized
decision making institutional framework and a micro or project approach to
regional development, in order to retain sovereignty and to deal with
developmental issues domestically.  They also declared a security issue or
security threats from South Africa as a regional problem.  Sectoral
Programming was thus a direct response to their varying levels of economic
dependence on South Africa, and resource endowment and power
capabilities of the member states.  This chapter also described SADCC’s
organizational structures and analyzed factors that might obstruct the
organization's operational efficiency, which emphasises the above.
As SADCC relied on members’ national decisions for every policy formulation
and implementation, this brought members to a conflict of choice between
regional objectives and national interests on one hand, and the need to
balance donors' influence and the level of economic dependence on South
Africa on the other.  These difficulties on which SADCC was founded had a
72
way of influencing its operations domestically and internationally.  This
resulted in the consideration of restructuring as will be demonstrated in the
next chapter.
This chapter showed that the main reason behind the SADCC formation in
1980 was to co-ordinate development projects with the aim of countering
South Africa’s dominance in the region and to deal with economic
dependence that was created by decades of colonialism.
Chapter Three
The Restructuring of SADCC into SADC 1980-1992
3.1 Introduction
The realist approach to regime formation in chapter two helped to introduce
the debate on why SADCC was formed and how it operated.  This chapter
seeks to answer the second research question this study has identified in
chapter one, which is why SADCC restructured in the early 1990s after it was
formed in 1980.  Although the emphasis in this study is to appraise and
analyse mainly the political factors that had a role in the restructuring of
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SADCC, recognition of economic factors both regionally and internationally
can not be completely ignored.  It is important to note that most economic
factors have political implications, and vice versa.
Factors that led SADCC to restructure in 1992 will be discussed in terms of
two levels in this study, namely regional and international.  Regimes, as
indicated in chapter one and emphasised in chapter two, are established to
assist states in dealing with shared issues.  SADCC was established to
address issues of mutual concern.  In this regard, the Lusaka Declaration
(regarded as the founding document of SADCC) signed on 1 April 1980,
highlights some of the mutual concerns SADCC states had at that time.  It
declares, inter alia, “… [O]ur commitment to pursue policies aimed at the
economic liberation and integrated development of our national
economies…” and minimising the economic dependence on South Africa
(SADCC 1980:1).
SADCC is identified as a regime in this study.  In chapter one, Krasner’s
definition was identified as the preferred conceptualisation.  In analysing
SADCC’s restructuring, the defining elements of a regime will be looked at.
During its various restructuring exercises, SADCC/C had to take cognisance
of its principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.  At the time
SADCC was established, specific conditions prevailed in the region, such as
the military attacks by South Africa on states in the region and economic
dependencies.  By the time of its first restructuring process, various other
conditions prevailed.  It is important to note that conditions and factors
discussed in this chapter were conditions and factors SADCC was created to
deal with.  Such conditions and factors had an effect on SADCC’s
operations.  In return, SADCC was required to respond to or deal with such
changes.
The Lusaka Declaration represents SADCC’s main principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures.  The most important principle for the
organization was to improve economic conditions in the region by minimising
dependence on apartheid South Africa.  In a normative sense, the Lusaka
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Declaration specifies general standards of behaviour, and identifies the rights
and obligations of member states.  It could also be regarded as the main
framework that the regime was based on and was expected to operate
according to.  In brief, the Lusaka Declaration served as the guideline in
which the regime (SADCC) was to operate to unsure co-ordination among
states that were opposed to the apartheid regime of South Africa.
In this regard, an example of a basic norm specified is that of economic
liberation and regional development co-ordination.  The latter is an essential
characteristic of SADCC as a regime.  Co-ordination (even outlined in the
name of the organization, Southern African Development Coordination
Conference) can therefore not be changed in any sector without the
transformation of the nature of the regime.  However, this norm was
transformed into one of development cooperation (evident in the new name
of the organization) with the establishment of SADC (Southern African
Development Community).
In terms of rules, the Lusaka Declaration identifies issues relating to the
conflictual nature of prevailing political and economic conditions in the region
vis-à-vis that of South Africa and the international arena.  In fact, the
Declaration states that rapid and effective development can be achieved if
development takes place within the context of global cooperation.
Furthermore, its states that “International bodies and states outside Southern
Africa are therefore invited to co-operate in implementing programmes
towards economic liberation and development in the region (SADCC 1980:1-
6)”.  With regards to the organization's decision-making procedures, the
Lusaka Declaration is silent.  It only outlines the importance of regional co-
operation and co-ordination without any reference to the structure with which
to achieve these objectives.  However, in subsequent documents, summit
meetings and conferences on the structure of the organization and its
decision-making procedures were outlined and implemented.  The first
structure of SADCC is presented in figure one in chapter two. Furthermore,
references were made to its decision-making procedures.
75
This chapter outlines factors and conditions that contributed to SADCC’s first
restructuring, which is the establishment of SADC in 1992.  The main focus
will be on how these factors had an effect on SADCC as a regional structure
and also as a regional or institutional regime as explained in the first chapter.
By the end of the 1980s, regional conditions (such as the end of apartheid)
and international conditions (the end of the Cold War) changed.  Within
SADCC member countries were faced with various internal conditions such
as those related to socio-economic conditions.  One aspect related to this, is
the fact that, a decade after its establishment, some of the founding
objectives of SADCC were not achieved.  In 1980, the Lusaka Declaration
identified, in principle, four main development objectives to be achieved by
the organization, as stated in chapter two.
By the late 1980s regional countries remained underdeveloped and were still
dependent on South Africa.  The regional economy according to Gibb
(2001:79) was built upon the region’s single dominant economy located in
South Africa, for example migrant labour, mining, water, transport and
increasing regional trade.  The patterns and extent of the inequality among
member countries led to some members getting into bilateral relations with
South Africa despite the fact that it was perceived as an enemy then, for
example Malawi under president Banda. The continuing inequalities and
dependency of most member countries undermined SADCC’s ability to
develop and integrate the region.  A call for an alternative organization or
regional structure started to be inevitable. SADCC officials started to realize
the need to restructure the organization in order to be able to deal with all the
needs and challenges that prevailed in the region as discussed above.
The global changes mentioned in the preceding discussion all pointed to the
fact that the value of foreign aid to Third World countries was dropping
substantially by then.  Summarized briefly, the reasons according to Kim
(1992:98) for that were:
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· with the ending of the Cold War, the superpowers were no longer
interested in securing allies by providing economic and other
assistance to others;
· events in Eastern Europe left those countries with scant resources to
provide for their friends in the Third World while they became
competitors for Western aid and investment;
· with the prospect of a common market in Europe, the EC became
more inward-looking and was barely interested in events outside the
Continent; and
·  lack of success in the Third World in past decades contributed to a
general ‘aid fatigue’ amongst donors.
Basically, due to the above mentioned factor as mentioned by Kim (1992),
the effect on the countries in the SADCC region was devastating as most of
these countries developed an excessive dependency on foreign aid, for
example Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania.
Based on all the mentioned factors, SADCC was confronted with the huge
challenge of representing and transforming the region into an investor
friendly environment.   This makes it apparent why SADCC had to consider
restructuring or face the possibilities of perishing as a non-functioning
regional body.  It could be concluded that the formation of SADC in 1992
from SADCC was a product of the above factors.  The above factors led
SADCC countries to consider a new way of dealing with regional problems,
and the restructuring of SADCC into SADC became an alternative.
On the issue of regime change, transformation or restructuring, Young
(1982:45), Puchala & Hopkins (1982:23) and Krasner (1983:33), as pointed
out in chapter one, approach the idea from two basic viewpoints.  They
maintain that because of the dynamic nature of regimes and the ways in which
they may restructure or change, this is particularly salient.  With that in mind,
Young (1982:45) further maintained that contradictions within the regime
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framework may lead to serious pressure for alterations.  These contradictions
may be from a dynamic point of view, and that can be an element that may
push regimes to fall apart or to be useless.  In this case, contradictions that
existed within SADCC prior to restructuring was that, inasmuch as they
opposed economic dependence in essence, particularly on South Africa,
SADCC on its own depended on donor funding.  Therefore the objective of
economic independence lost substance.
In chapter one, Young (1982:45) also mentioned that the other view regarding
regime change could be a dialectical point of view which looks holistically at
social entities searching for dialectical laws pertaining to change.  Thus, from
the holistic or dialectical point of view the regime may evolve or transform itself
without disintegration, for example the evolution of the EU from EEC.  The
restructuring Of SADCC into SADC in 1992 emphasises the fact that despite
all challenges and troubles or contradictions that existed in SADCC, it chose to
restructure instead of disintegrating.  This could be referred to as evolution of a
regime, or Young’s idea of holistic change, which may involve a regime
changing substantively by preserving norms and changing principles.  This
would usually occur because of shifts in knowledge, information or in changes
with regard to challenges and pressures facing particular regimes.  The impact
of internal and external factors upon SADCC, such as the Cold War and
drought are an example.
3.2 Internal factors
The internal conditions contributing to the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in
1992 are analysed and appraised below:
3.2.1 Development conditions in the region by the early 1990s
Weisfelder (1989:162-163) lists five factors that accentuated SADCC’s
dependency not only on South Africa but on the Western countries as well.
They include global recession, the decline of the South African economy,
sustained drought, destabilisation as discussed and delays in implementing
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SADCC projects.  The most noteworthy consequences for SADCC countries
then, according to Weisfelder includes the balance of payments deficits,
foreign exchange shortages, skyrocketing debts, inflation and sharply
reduced private investment.
During 1982-1984 environmental forces like drought combined with human-
induced catastrophes intensified SADCC’s economic plight.  Over $2 billion
of crops and livestock were lost.  Foreign exchange and scarce resources,
which otherwise might have been expanded in development programs, had
to be diverted to purchase food or transport relief supplies (Weisfelder
1989:162-163).
The continuing dependency of SADCC on aid and funding of its projects in a
way contradicted its objectives of economic independence.  The whole
dependency syndrome of SADCC by fault or default, by the late 1980s,
attracted more questions as to whether SADCC was the right organization
for regional integration in Southern Africa (Lee 2000, Cilliers 1996,
Weisfelder 1989).
By then SADCC was forced to reconsider its structures and operations in
order to convince donors that it was the correct organization to integrate the
region.  SADCC had pressure also from the OAU to demonstrate if it had a
regional vision that could serve as regional bloc for 2010 AEC objective of
integrating the continent as spelt out in the Abuja Treaty of the OAU.
SADCC has in the evolutionary sense been conceived as a formation within
which both economic cooperation and integration of the respective member
countries had simultaneously gone through.  Within the economic
cooperation arrangement, it was envisaged that the industrial branches of
the member countries would, in their diversity, interact or interplay on the
basis of the specialized division of labour, with their respective enterprises
systematically developing and consolidating socio-economic production
linkages culminating in the creation of the commonly shared material wealth
(Krusher 1990:39-40).
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One example of the development disparities in the region relates to
SADCC’s huge decline in agriculture.  In the 1980s, with the exception of
Swaziland, food production per capita declined in SADCC countries.  The
situation was attributed to drought and the prevalence of war, especially in
Angola.  SADCC, however, was equally challenged to further define its
consolidation as an emerging regional bloc.  All the below cardinal
development indices characterised a fundamental decline in economic
growth as well as development in the region.  Trade also registered slightly
below 5%.  Exports levels within the SADCC region in the 1980-1990 decade
averaged 3.9% with imports within the SADCC averaging 3.7% (Chikowore
1999:35).
Moreover, the period between 1980 and 1990 confirmed the mounting
process of de-industrialisation, a gradual stagnation and strangulation of the
economies within member states.  At the end of the 1980s, SADCC could no
longer afford to adhere to its general agreements (as outlined in its founding
and subsequent declarations, agreements and protocols) in the normal way
of conducting its affairs.  It became evident that its institutions and objectives
were unable to achieve results.  Its development under-performance,
displayed since 1980, was becoming apparent even to donors of the
international community, which the Lusaka Declaration explicitly invited to
assist in the achievement of these objectives (SADCC 1980:5; Bressand
1990:52-53).
Some empirical evidence of these socio-economic implications is included in
table four which also indicates the slow economic performance of the
SADCC countries between 1980 and 1990.  This was a clear indication that
although SADCC had a regional objective of improving member countries’
economic performances, it was still not achieving enough to satisfy the
expectations of its members at the time of its establishment.
Table 4: Economic performance of the SADCC countries
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GDP 1980
(US $ million)
GDP 1988
(US $ million)
GROWTH
RATE   % p.a.
Angola 6307 6112 -0.4
Botswana 903 1805 9.1
Lesotho 382 433 1.55
Malawi 1250 1455 1.9
Mozambique 2414 2045 -2
Swaziland 542 746 4.1
Tanzania 5138 6011 2.3
Zambia 3885 4082 0.6
Zimbabwe 5355 7021 3.4
REGIONAL
TOTAL
26 176 29 710 1.5
Source: Hawkins (1989:6)
Table five also demonstrates that SADCC’s objective of minimising its
dependency on South Africa and other actors were failing as most members
were still heavily reliant on external funding.  Furthermore, the international
debt of the organization, both collectively as well as in terms of individual
countries, was increasing.  Table five includes some indicators with regards
to SADCC’s external debt.
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Table 5: Total external debt of SADCC countries, including short term
(current US$ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Angola n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Botswana 156 173 214 234 268 343 390 518
Lesotho 71 83 121 135 135 168 187 241
Malawi 821 812 870 888 885 1022 1132 1363
Mozambiq
ue
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Swaziland 181 168 184 223 177 210 243 293
Tanzania 2564 2690 2989 3405 3473 3879 4066 4335
Zambia 3253 3624 3705 3784 3847 4641 5625 6400
Zimbabwe 785 1246 1842 2302 2067 2195 2340 2512
Source: Davies (1990:69)
As table six indicates, SADCC countries also experienced a decrease in
foreign direct investments towards the end of the 1980s.
Table 6: Net foreign investment in the SADCC countries
(currency US$ million)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Angola n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Botswana 109 88 21 23 62 52 90 125
Lesotho 4 5 3 5 2 5 2 2
Malawi 9 1    - 3   - 1 n/a n/a
Mozambiq
ue
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Swaziland 17 33 -12 1 -1 11 12 38
Tanzania n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Zambia 62 -38 39 26 17 52 n/a n/a
Zimbabwe 2 4 -1 -2 -2 3 7 -31
Source: Davies (1990:3)
Another factor, which compounded the serious economic under-performance
of SADCC member states, relates to South Africa.  As indicated previously,
SADCC was established, amongst other reasons, to decrease economic
dependence on South Africa.  However, towards the end of the 1980s very
little was achieved in this regard.  Instead of reducing economic dependency
on South Africa and achieving equitable regional integration (as the objectives
outlined in the Lusaka Declaration), SADCC countries were still financially
dependent.  In fact, in some cases economic dependency increased.  South
Africa’s policy of destabilisation contributed to this.  As table seven indicates,
SADCC countries experienced a considerable loss with regards to their GDP.
 Table 7: Cost of destabilisation GDP loss 1980-1988 in the SADCC
region (million $-1988 prices)
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Loss
1980-1988
Loss
1988
% of 1988
GDP
Angola 30 000 4 500 90
Botswana    500  125  10
Lesotho    300  50   7
Malawi 2 150 550 30
Mozambique 15 000 3 000 110
Swaziland    200 30  5
Tanzania 1 300 500 20
Zambia 5 000 500 20
Zimbabwe 8 000 1 350 25
SADCC 62 450 10 605 43
Source: Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid -
AWEPAA (1990:12)
The conditions that were imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank after the Cold War in Southern Africa led to the call of
multiparty democracy.  As a result, in Zambia, former President Chiluba - a
former unionist, defeated the one party state under President Kaunda and
Zimbabwe abandoned the socialist move.  The move towards democracy in
the SADCC region had implications on the future operations of the
organization.  In some cases this was due to the expectations from the
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donors who expected SADCC as a regional body to pave the way for
democracy in its member countries (Legum 2000:7).
The change of governments in the SADCC countries necessitated change in
the regional leadership, especially the SADCC vision as a regional
organization.  New and younger leaders who did not participate much in the
liberation struggle against colonialism replaced the founding fathers of
SADCC.  The new leadership however, had different aspirations and had a
new vision for SADCC as a regional organization, especially in terms of the
broader understanding of security, democracy, human rights and
globalization in the region and in the world.  At the top of the agenda was the
fact that SADCC needed to consider the changing world environment and try
to be competitive like other regional structures and move towards regional
integration that enabled countries to trade more with each other and other
countries around the world (Mutschler 2001:139-141).
Killick and Stevens (1991:694) argued that it was at known at the time that
the patterns of aid provision were likely to change, and more disturbing than
the prospect of dwindling aid resources was the fact that aid was increasingly
being tied to political strings by the International Financial Institutions.
Furthermore, the World Bank's 1989 report placed good governance at the
heart of the donor agenda. To that, the obvious way of increasing the
effectiveness of development assistance by the World Bank was to
concentrate more on governments that created an ‘enabling’ policy
environment and had demonstrated the ability to put aid to productive use.
This left governments that did not pass the test with little or no aid until they
could persuade donors that they genuinely had mended their ways or were
replaced by more effective regimes.
Killick and Stevens (1991:694) states that, the ‘enabling policy environment’
called for by the World Bank and others, required free-market economy,
democracy and respect for human rights, and an open economy to the global
market (that is, an export-oriented economy). Whatever the donors'
intentions were, political conditionality raised questions of national
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sovereignty.  With the realisation that aid resources were less forthcoming
than before, Third World countries were compelled to make concessions
they would not normally have made.
Another disturbing development for Third World nations as mentioned by
Parfitt and Bullock (1990: 110) was that international donors began to
coordinate their aid efforts.  The EC, for example, introduced a form of
conditionality - called 'policy dialogue' - in its Lomé aid packages.  In line with
its policy dialogue, the EC also began to work closely with the IMF and the
World Bank.  Under Lomé IV (1989-2000), any state undertaking IMF/World
Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), automatically qualified for
support from the EC.
The implications of the conditions from the IMF and the World Bank not only
had an impact on to the internal governing of SADCC member countries, but
on SADCC as a regional organization in general.  The conditions affected the
operations and the functioning of SADCC by compelling the regional leaders
to respond to the demands and expectations of the IMF and the World Bank
especially that of good governance, respect of human rights and economic
conditions.  As mentioned earlier, these conditions saw a change of
governments in the region.  The implications also meant that SADCC as a
regional body was compelled to oversee that the conditions, as spelt out by
the IMF and the World Bank, were applied by member countries in the
region, and that its institutions reflected exactly what was expected of it
(Killick and Stevens 1991:694).
As indicated in previous tables in this chapter, SADCC countries’ economic
decline continued gradually from its establishment.  Previously, reference
was made to the decline of foreign direct investment, the increase in external
debt and the loss of GDP.  Table eight below adds more empirical evidence
supporting this decline.  In table eight’s case, the dependence on
development assistance is evident.
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Table 8: Net official development assistance to the SADCC countries
[current prices ($ million)]
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Angola 53 61 60 75 95 92 131 135 155 140
Botswana 106 97 102 104 103 97 102 156 149 162
Lesotho 66 104 93 108 101 94 88 108 108 118
Malawi 142 138 121 117 159 113 198 280 329 394
Mozambiq
ue
146 144 208 211 259 300 421 651 821 759
Swaziland 51 37 28 34 30 26 35 45 35 n/a
Tanzania 589 703 684 594 558 487 681 888 973 388
Zambia 278 232 317 217 239 329 464 430 473 388
Zimbabwe 12 212 216 208 298 237 225 294 269 266
Sources: AWEPAA (1990:25)
In conclusion, development conditions in the region, as well as South Africa’s
economic dominance were major factors with regards to the need to address
these issues more directly.  However, these issues did not challenge the
SADCC in a vacuum.  Internationally, changes such as the end of the Cold
War added other significant factors to deal with.   As a result of that, SADCC
was affected by the world events and it was expected to respond to such
factors or challenges.
3.2.2      Political changes in South Africa
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The aim of this section is not to discuss the role of South Africa in SADCC in
general, but to discuss South Africa as a political factor that contributed to
SADCC-SADC restructuring in 1992.  The political changes that were evident
in South Africa towards the early 1990s had a great effect on the
restructuring of SADCC to SADC in 1992.  In fact, Cleary (2001:87)
confirmed agrees that “South Africa’s inclusion to the regional affairs led to
the transformation of SADCC in 1992.”
According to Kongwa (1991:1,) during the summit that was held in Arusha,
Tanzania in the late 1980s, “SADCC leaders recognized that the most
important factor in creating a good vision for regional integration in Southern
Africa was to involve a democratic South Africa in the region and within the
organization itself.  In order to facilitate the process towards the envisaged
relationship between South Africa and the SADCC countries, a regional joint
planning committee was established, comprising representatives of SADCC
member countries and the South African liberation movements.  The
committee’s main functions were: (1) to analyse and assess issues likely to
impact future regional co-operation and effect relations between South Africa
and SADCC members in the post-apartheid era; (2) to identify areas of
possible co-operation; (3) to agree on options, strategies and institutional
arrangements required for the development and management of such
relations and (4) to ensure that SADCC co-operating partners liaised with the
SADCC in order to achieve a co-ordinated and coherent approach towards
the new regional set-up.  This eventually had an impact on the restructuring in
1992”.
Kongwa (1991:1) and Lee (2000:121) maintained that “when the regional
leadership realized that the then SADCC’s principal objective was ‘the
reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the
Republic of South Africa,’ it became apparent that this view may not aid the
process towards the envisaged new regional order and also, that this may
not encourage South Africa to play a rightful regional role, let alone to join
the organization. They decided that the organization should conduct a critical
88
review of its original mandate as represented in the four principal objectives
of the Lusaka Declaration in 1980”.  Leister (1992:3) further maintained,
“Even SADCC spokespersons had on numerous occasions expressed the
hope that an internationally accepted South Africa would replace the
organization’s increasingly reluctant donors”.
According to Chipeta (1999:34), “political changes in South Africa towards
majority rule in the late 1980s and early 1990s made donors seek more
clarity on the future role of SADCC.  Donors that believed SADCC would be
irrelevant once apartheid was defeated, since its formation was to fight
apartheid and lessen all the dependencies apartheid created in the region,
mostly raised this question.  They also believed that the end of apartheid
would mean that the external threat (to the donors) that initially led to the
establishment of SADCC no longer existed”.
In view of the changing situation in the region, the UK minister of state,
foreign and commonwealth office, Linda Chalker responded on behalf of the
UK and cooperating partners stating “the challenge for SADCC and its
members is to provide a new framework for an open and liberal economy
that will draw a newly-democratic South Africa into productive co-operation
with her neighbours” (SAIIA 1991:79).
According to Weisfelder (1989:163) SADCC was offered a mainstay by these
changes as most member countries could no longer sustain the
destabilisation effects that were imposed by South Africa.  The SADCC
Secretariat estimated that damages that were caused by the destabilisation
between 1980 and 1984 had cost member countries around $10 billion.
Extrapolating through 1986 the total was estimated at $18.7 billion and by
the late 1980s; SADCC estimated $30 billion - almost the annual gross
domestic product of the entire region by then!  The tangible components
included direct war damage, extra defence expenditure, higher transport and
energy costs, reduced production, lost exports and tourism, added costs of
imports, lost investments and economic growth, and costs of caring for
refugees.
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Considering the above factors, Abbas (1999:38) acknowledged that the
democratic South Africa offered SADCC a number of opportunities, for
example, SADCC member countries' security improved.  The political
improvements in South Africa then contributed to the independence of
Namibia, which, in a way became a factor as to why SADCC considered
restructuring in 1992.  Namibia offered SADCC countries new alternatives for
trade especially in terms of access to the sea.  The independence also
served as a moral boost for SADCC to liberate the region from minority rule.
Secondly, member countries could do business with a new South Africa
freely.  Thirdly, SADCC, in its efforts to achieve regional integration and
economic independence in general, could use the economic and
communication infrastructure South Africa had at its disposal then.  The re-
integration of South Africa into both global and regional economies
generated hopes of positive offers for its neighbours of more rapid economic
growth, and it also created for the first time the potential for regional
economic integration initiatives to work.  These changes demanded that
SADCC restructure its organizational structure including its modus operandi.
Lastly, since most SADCC member countries depended on aid, they had to
keep abreast with the changes in South Africa, and SADCC indirectly was
forced to react to or restructure in order to accommodate South Africa as a
member and not as an enemy any more.
Considering the stated facts, it can be said that the restructuring of SADCC
to SADC in 1992 was the consideration of South Africa as the factor.  South
Africa was expected to “fill the role of co-operating partners through the
provision of aid and investment capital to SADCC member countries.  This
was as a result of donors hesitating to fund the SADCC Programme of Action
due to the fact that SADCC could no longer be relevant once South Africa
became independent.  Another reason was the end of Cold War, which
meant that Southern African countries were no longer strategic partners in
fighting communism and the Soviet Union (Kongwa 1991:1).
3.3 External factors
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The external conditions contributing to the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in
1992 are analysed and appraised below.
                      
3.3.1    The end of the Cold War
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolizing the end of the Cold War, was
a major international political event.  It also had a major effect on Southern
Africa as a region.  The end of the conflict was precipitated by the growing
Soviet domestic economic crisis, which forced a relaxation of the grip on
Eastern Europe.  United States Department official, Francis Fukuyama,
enthusiastically hailed the demise of the East-West conflict as the “end of
history” (Baynham 1992:87).
According to Roberts (1990:509) the implication of Fukuyama’s assertion
was that the international conflict was a thing of the past.  The end of the
Cold War was accompanied by a resurgence of idealism in some quarters.
The idealists believed that the high degree of interdependence between
countries, especially in the economic field, had ushered in a “new world
order.”  The two major components of the new order were multi-polarity and
the declining importance of military/security issues in international relations.
Roberts (1990) further emphasized that “a new world orders - based on
international law, great power cooperation, and a greater role for
international organizations - created a situation in which force is a declining
utility”.
Based on the abovementioned scenarios, Ravenhill (1990:7311) believes,
however, that “a relaxation in military competition among the major players
did not strengthen the position of the Third World (as occurred during the
period of superpower detente in the 1970s) because Third World countries
were weaker and less unified”.  Ravenhill (1990:7311) further asserted that,
“the disintegration of the Soviet empire affected SADCC member countries in
three important respects.  Firstly, events in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union had a “domino effect” on unpopular governments elsewhere.
Secondly, the socialist bloc could no longer provide economic or military
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assistance to other governments and organizations.  Finally, the successor
countries to the Soviet bloc became competitors for Western aid and
investment”.
According to the Daily News (17-01-1992), the toppling of authoritarian
regimes in Eastern Europe and the United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR)
put in motion an unparalleled global movement towards democratization, and
nowhere was that more evident than in Southern Africa which, according to
many, was experiencing its “second liberation.”
Decalo (1991:155) states that, as a result of the end of the Cold War, internal
pressures for greater accountability and political democracy in Africa
enmeshed with the changed international picture, brought pressures for
change in Africa, as elsewhere.  The stunning and unequivocal collapse of
Marxism resulted in a unipolar world, wiping out the artificially enhanced
global value of the Third World.
A major consequence of the collapse of the socialist bloc, according to
Decalo (1991:156), was that it ended an alternative supply of material and
other support to the Southern African region.  Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union provided a number of SADCC countries, such as Mozambique
and Angola, with aid.  Due to its collapse, such aid was discontinued.  Most
of this was military, but economic assistance also played a part.
In view of the above, Light (1991:269) maintained that, “the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) became defunct and the new
governments of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
Countries (CIS) neither became the resources nor the inclination to provide
any form of assistance to Third World countries and other SADCC countries.
As a result, it became much more difficult to play donors off against each
other.  The decline in military assistance was linked to a new international
attitude to regional conflicts”.  The new thinking, which began with
Gorbachev’s rise to power in Russia in 1985, according to Decalo (1991:156)
meant, “The Third World was no longer an arena for zero-sum competition
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and confrontation between the two superpowers."  Hence, political
settlements were advocated as the answer to regional conflicts.  This had
important repercussions in countries like Angola and Mozambique, and
SADCC in general.  Due to that, these countries, together with SADCC, had
to accommodate such international changes in order to survive.
To add fuel to the fire, the new countries that were created in Europe became
competitors for Western aid and investment.  According to Kim (1992:8) this
elicited a number of sets of responses from the developed countries.  The
first response called for a substantial injection of capital and aid into the
former socialist bloc, arguing that it has long-term benefits for the West.
Sharp (1992:33) holds a view that as the Marshall Plan of the US helped
Western Europe in the postwar, it was therefore regarded that aid to Eastern
Europe would largely flow back to the West in terms of orders for equipment
and consumer goods.  It was also thought that if the East Europeans were
successful in moving fairly rapidly into self-sustained growth that could augur
a period of renewed growth and optimism in West Europe, and if they were
unsuccessful, it was feared that could cause both East and West Europe to
become politically and economically unstable.
However, the Financial Mail (26-07-1991) adds to the above by stating that
despite certain reservations, especially concerning the European Community
investing capital and aid in Eastern Europe and the CIS, the EC established
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to support
private sector development in Eastern Europe and concluded a series of
trade and cooperation agreements to link those economies more closely to
their own.  Significantly, the EC also negotiated association agreements that
paved the way for an expanded Community.  The impact of these
developments on the Third World and on SADCC was consequential.  Apart
from being deprived of a considerable amount of foreign aid that was
diverted to Eastern Europe and the CIS, SADCC found it increasingly
marginalized as Western preoccupation with these former socialist countries
deepened.  The threat of marginalization was accentuated by fundamental
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changes in the international economic and political systems (Chalker
1990:4).
In brief, the end of the Cold War in the region saw the following taking place:
(1) the abandonment of socialism in Angola and Mozambique and by the
ANC in South Africa as a liberation movement in exile; (2) the withdrawal of
Cuban soldiers from Angola and the birth of the Namibian independence; (3)
the introduction of ‘multiparty democracy’ in Southern Africa and (4) the end
of apartheid in South Africa.  These factors had a decisive role on SADCC as
a regional body as whether it would continue or become obsolete.  By the
early 1990s, the imperative for SADCC to restructure in order to deal with
these new conditions became more important.  At the time, the debate
focused on whether to restructure SADCC or to create a totally different
organization.  It was decided that SADCC should restructure to take note of
these factors and try to deal with them.
3.3.2    Changes in the world economy
The changes in the world economy in the late 1980s and the early 1990s had
an impact on SADCC countries and on SADCC in general.  Changes in
global politics were accompanied by changes in international economic
relations. These changes promised to be even more forbidding for Third
World developmental prospects.  Technological changes, the rising tide of
protectionism in the North and the prospect of dwindling flows of foreign aid
and investment all combined to hinder Third World efforts at self-sustained
growth and development, especially SADCC countries.  The following
economic factors could be seen as responsible for the changes in the world
economy, and had an impact on what was in store for the SADCC countries:
3.3.3   Global technological changes
Sharp (1992:20) acknowledges that microelectronics and information
technology became the most important new technologies in the world in the
late 1980s.  The application of micro-electronic technology revolutionized
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several industries, including that of textiles.   Third World countries that were
wishing to undertake industrialization regarded the textile industry as the
“locomotive” industry in the early phases of industrialization.  What was
occurring at the early 1990s was that production in the developed countries
became competitive with production in the Third World.
Bello (1989:16-17) also argues that the changes in the production process
effectively reduced the attractiveness of low wages in the Third World.
Comparative advantage was shifting from production based on cheap labour
to capital-intensive automated production processes.  Moving to the Third
World to take advantage of cheap wages became less attractive - and doubly
so when protectionist barriers were enforced in the United States and Europe,
the upshot being declining rates of foreign investment in manufacturing in
sonic third world regions, if not the outright return of production processes to
the developed countries.
The World Bank report (1991:26) acknowledges that, because most
innovations originated in industrialized countries and its research focused on
problems of local concern, technical advances systematically favoured
industrial country producers and consumers.  Industry studies suggested that
new technology reduced competitive and disadvantaged industrial country
manufacturers.  Some firms in traditionally labour-intensive sub-sectors (for
example, textiles, clothing and shoes) began to reopen operations in high-
wage countries.
Due to this, SADCC was burdened with the declining attractiveness of cheap
labour that was weakened by low demand for raw materials.  Most
substitutes were being developed in the North as new technological
developments effectively undermined the comparative advantage, based on
raw materials and cheap labour that the Third World had traditionally
possessed vis-à-vis the industrialized world.  The erosion of this comparative
advantage consequently brought about diminishing rates of foreign
investment in some SADCC countries like in Zambia, Zimbabwe and
Mozambique (Sharp1992: 20).
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3.3.4    Protectionism in the North:  marginalization of the South
After 1945, international relations were characterized by the global hegemony
of the USA and that gave the system a degree of stability and predictability.
In view of this, Aho and Stokes (1991:160) state that, during the 1990s, US
economic expansion came to a halt.  Rising oil prices, a spreading capital
shortage, tightening credit markets and the deadening burden of massive
accumulated public and private debt took their toll.
Bello (1989:64-65) contends that the economic and technological competition
between the United States and Japan was the central force in restructuring
the world economy.  The dominant trend was the passage of economic and
technological primacy from United States to Japan. What was clearly
transpiring was that with a defensive United States leading the way, the
postwar free trade system was increasingly giving way to a system of
international trade protectionism.
Fears of increasing protectionism in the industrialized countries were
provoked by the imminent formation of a common market in Europe by
December 1992.  However, not everyone believed in the “Fortress Europe”
theory - the term was used by those who believed that the formation of a
common market will lead to a protectionist and inward-looking Europe.
Bressand (1990), for example, believes that there were two reasons why the
EC 1992 project reduced the capacity (if not the will) to implement protection:
(1) the greater diversity of interests in any given sector between the different
countries and (2) the element of due process with long discussion procedures
involving a number of countries, was combined to make it more difficult to
gain consensus for any protectionist measure.  Most observers agree,
though, that a united and self-sufficient EC was likely to become more
inward-looking, especially if the Community was broadened to include East
European countries (Morna 1990; Bello 1989; Bergsten 1990; Notzold and
von der Ropp 1990; Bressand 1990:52-53).
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With protectionist measures increasingly being adopted in the USA and EC,
and with Japan following suit, the possibility of international trade warfare
became real, especially since a tripolar system was inherently unstable.  In that
situation, each bloc felt the other two would link up against it and, therefore,
adopted severe policies (Bergsten 1990:102).
Ironically, the end of the Cold War sharply heightened the prospect of a trade
war.  Throughout the postwar period, the overriding security imperative blunted
trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific economic disputes.  The United States and its
allies, particularly West Germany, made economic concessions to avoid
jeopardizing their global security structures.   Cold War politics, in fact,
sheltered the economic recoveries of Europe and Japan, and America’s
support for them.  The United States seldom employed its security leverage
directly in pursuit of its economic goals, indeed, security and economic issues
remained largely compartmentalized in all of the industrial democracies.
Removal of the ‘security blanket’ could have eroded such support.  In brief,
there was an intimate interaction between the basic international political and
economic transformations, thus, the removal of the security blanket increased
the risk of economic conflict, which could have eroded security ties (Bergsten
1990:98).
The impact of protectionism on SADCC saw member countries forced from
their present peripheral position in the international arena to a position of
marginalization.  Bello (1989:68) warned that the intensified economic and
technological competition among the super blocs were likely to have
contradictory effects on the Third World.  Some regions, because of their
proximity and availability of cheap labour, might be integrated, though in a
fragile fashion, to the competing centers, but for most of the Third World,
marginalization or exclusion was the likely future.
However, Ravenhill (1990:748) believes that increasing protectionism in the
North might have increased competition among Third World countries.
Ravenhill (1990) further argues that “even if trade wars were averted, the
extension of free trade blocs in the North were likely to encourage Southern
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countries to seek association arrangements with, or in some cases such as
Mexico, actual membership of the blocs.  To the extent that the motivation
was to achieve an advantage over other Third World countries, the outcome
was likely to be further divisive of Southern solidarity.”
The increasing protectionism in the North had considerable implications for
SADCC.  As industrialised countries of the North attempted to adjust to
global changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and rapid
globalization, they turned increasingly towards protecting their own economic
interests.  Earlier, reference was made to the decreases in foreign direct
investments and development assistance to the region as a result of
developments in the North.  Indirectly though, a need for a stronger and a
legal regional grouping, as compared to SADCC, was gaining momentum as
regional leaders were forced to confront marginalisation from the North.
3.4 Re-emergence of regionalism
The re-emergence of regionalism in the late 1980s was a major international
political factor that had impact also in Southern Africa and on SADCC’s
operations.  Though regionalism remained on the international agenda
throughout the Cold War, its scope and progress was not limited.  In
contrast, the late 1980s and the early 1990s marked a turning point in the
fortunes of regionalism.  The 1990s saw a striking reappearance of
regionalist rhetoric as well as evidence of concrete progress in various parts
of the world, with the proliferation of new regional groupings as well as the
re-orientation and revival of older arrangements.  The new waves of
regionalism were clearly seen in Latin America.  In 1991, it led to the
establishment of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) comprising
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.  Bolivia and Chile joined the
grouping in 1996 as associate members.  The new wave of regionalism was
also seen in the revival of the Andean integration project, which evolved or
restructured into the Andean Community (Mutschler 2001:139).
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Mutschler (2001:139-141) explains that there are many factors that
contributed to the re-emergence of regionalism in the late 1980s and early
1990s, such as:
· the impact of the Cold War on the transformation of regional groupings
as already explained;
· aid conditions as imposed by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund to the developing countries through the Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP).  (This point is discussed in the next
section);
· global integration that started to go hand in hand with moves to secure
preferential access to the markets of others.  The US complemented
its traditional multilateral commercial policy with a regional focus by
concluding an FTA with Canada in 1988, which, with the incorporation
of Mexico, became NAFTA in 1994; and
· another aspect that contributed to the re-emergence of regionalism
was that by the late 1980s, it become harder to distinguish between
economic and political regionalism.
Mutschler (2001:141) emphasises that “a distinct feature of the new
regionalism was its multidimensional character.  Many initially functionally
specific groups were forced to broaden into more multi-purpose
arrangements in terms of scope.”  While SADCC’s founding motives were
largely geopolitical and strategic, it infused the integration process in
Southern Africa with more direct economic and development objectives.
Conversely, the Andean Pact started out with a decided trade focus, and
has, as the CAN, taken on a more political dimension.  Recognising the
interrelated nature of political, economic and security issues, most regional
groupings around the world started to restructure to address these areas.
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In view of the above, Mutschler (2001:142) concludes that SADCC had to
restructure as it competed for the same benefits as other regional groupings
around the world.  As a result, it was forced to reconsider its strategies,
structures, objectives and its operations in order to be able to meet new
demands that were taking place internationally.  In other words, SADCC
leaders or SADCC countries could not afford to not consider restructuring the
organization in order for it to be in line with new challenges in the world.  As
a result, the institutional arrangements of SADCC had to be modified or
phased out to make way for the new approach in the world affairs.  Other
regional groupings like CAN, under similar circumstances, introduced better
measures in order to attract new investments and aid to their regions.
Another political factor associated with the re-emergence of regionalism is the
multiply membership of regional organizations.  This is indicated in table two.
In most cases, the objectives of organizations overlapped.  By the late 1980s,
as indicated in table two, the region consisted of three major organizations -
the Preferential Trade Agreement for East and Southern Africa (PTA), SACU
and SADCC.  In order to address the issue of the duplication of its
development objectives at the summit in January 1992, the PTA suggested a
merger with SADCC.  This was suggested against the background of the
OAU’s aim of creating an African Economic Community (AEC), a Pan-African
effort to address development issues.  The PTA, as an older organization,
had a much broader membership and covered a greater geographical area. If
such a merger succeeded, it would have been tantamount to SADCC’S
dissolution.  The call by the OAU for the merger between the PTA and
SADCC contributed in SADCC considering restructuring.  The other fact that
was a major blow for the organization and its member countries was the
recognition of PTA by the OAU as a fifth official sub-regional organization,
instead of SADCC.  SADC then came into existence as the counter protest by
the SADCC officials to the call by the OAU to abolish SADCC in favour of the
PTA.  SADCC officials sought to align SADC with the economic policies as it
was envisaged by the AEC then (Abbas 1999:38).  According to Kim (1992:9)
at the SADCC summit in Windhoek in August 1992, the organization rejected
this proposal and launched the restructured SADCC in the form of SADC.
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Furthermore, SACU also created some confusion as it was centred on South
Africa.  As a result, concerns were raised as to whether South Africa would join
SADCC? And if not, questions were asked as to what would happen to SADCC
which was already showing signs of collapse due to financial problems from
donor countries questioning its relevance without South Africa.  Kim (1992)
further explains that, “PTA and SADC had to find some way of rationalising
their structures as there was a great deal of overlapping membership.
Botswana and Namibia were the only two SADC members that did not belong
to the PTA (Botswana opted for membership of SACU instead while Namibia
applied to the PTA for membership)”.  Accordingly, this led SADCC countries
acknowledging the need for organizational restructuring.  SADCC leaders
stated that the membership in the three organizations was becoming
increasingly unworkable, as the final destination of economic integration of
Southern Africa was approached.  They warned that SADCC member countries
would ultimately need to seriously consider the viability of belonging to more
than one regional integration organization (SADCC 1992:7).
3.5 Summary
The Lusaka Declaration that preceded the Windhoek Treaty, which
established SADC in 1992, contained a brief overview and analysis of the
then new opportunities and demands raised by change in the region and by
the external environment.  It also attempted to harness those changes or to
use those changes as a justification and motivation for closer cooperation and
community building purposes.  External driving forces that informed the
change from SADCC into SADC were much more economically oriented than
political or security considerations that underlined earlier establishment of
SADCC.
Economic globalization with its emphasis on economic liberalization,
increased bloc formation and the globalization of finance and production
played a major part in the decision to transform the organization into one that
would, at least in theory, concentrate on regional integration, rather than
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regional cooperation for the sake of strengthening and protecting individual
member countries.
This chapter addressed why SADCC restructured in 1992.  This is the second
research question of the study raised in chapter one.  The question was
addressed by discussing factors and conditions which contributed to SADCC
members’ realisation that the organization established in 1980 is no longer
equipped to deal with changes in the region as well as those external factors
that impacted in the region.
The restructuring of SADCC into SADC through the 1992 Windhoek Treaty
was a prime example of the extent to which the Southern African region took
cognizance of change at various levels and moved towards as well as
adjusted to such change, using it in a positive way to promote and develop the
well-being of the region.  Towards the 1990s, SADCC member states also
concluded that their efforts to achieve the objectives outlined in the Lusaka
Declaration yielded limited results.  What follows is an appraisal of the
development objectives of SADCC as outlined in the Lusaka Declaration
(SADCC 1980:1).
SADCC did not achieve the reduction of economic dependence on South
Africa and other actors.  Secondly, the stated objective of forging links to
create equitably regional integration also yielded limited results.  This
objective was, amongst others, hindered by the duplication of regional
organizations, which aimed to achieve regional integration.  Thirdly, SADCC
as an organization consisting of sovereign states experienced difficulties in
the implementation of regional policies.  The issue of surrendering
sovereignty to a supra-national organization remained an obstacle in this
regard as states continued to enhance their national interests and national
policies at the expense of regional integration.  Fourthly, the stated objective
of “concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework
of a strategy for economic liberation” also produced mixed results.  The
organization’s efforts to secure cooperation manifested, contradictorily, in
greater dependence on stronger economic actors, such as South Africa and
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the international donor community.  Furthermore, the objectives to achieve
economic liberation were compromised due to increased dependence on
these actors.  Lastly, competing development agendas of its member states
also compromised the organization.  This aspect will be elaborated on in
subsequent chapters.  These competing agendas are, for example, evident
in the economic indicators presented in the tables in this chapter. Moreover,
scholars such as those referred to in the literature review of this study are in
agreement that regional economic, political and development integration is
most likely to succeeded when member states enjoy relatively equal levels of
political and economic developments.
In applying regime theory it can be deduced that SADCC, at the end of the
1980s, still adhered to the same principles as those it stood for in 1980.
These principles, as indicated, are contained in SADCC’s founding
document, the Lusaka Declaration.  Similarly, the organization's norms
remained the same.  However, as some of the factors above indicate, the
structure, rules and decision-making procedures of the organization became
inadequate to address the region’s challenges.
The restructuring of SADCC into SADC represented an increased emphasis
on responding to international trends through mobilization of the region’s own
resources, potential and capacity.  Furthermore, the changed international
political landscape at the end of the Cold War, together with the demise of
apartheid in South Africa, shifted international emphasis on traditional military
political security to a concentration on a much broader definition of security
that included economic, environmental and societal security.  Economic
growth and development within a distinctly neo-liberal economic paradigm
became the new ideological driving force that governed decisions, also at
regional level.
In brief it was not only development in the SADCC external environment that
necessitated the change from SADCC to SADC but also the need for ‘mere’
regional coordination to become an attempt at regional integration.  Within the
Southern African region, major changes had taken place during the late 1980s
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and the early 1990s, changing the political face of the region and raising
expectations of peace and security, and an opportunity for development.
Within the region, apartheid came to an end with the un-banning of the ANC
and the release of (South Africa’s former President) Nelson Mandela and
other liberation movement leaders in early 1990.  At that point it was clear that
it was only a matter of time before South Africa would be politically acceptable
to its neighbours and therefore able to join a regional organization.
 The underlying rationale for the establishment of SADCC had therefore fallen
away and with the prospect of the region’s biggest and strongest economy
joining its neighbours, the role and function of SADCC was revisited and a
new organization, taking the changed political nature of the region into
consideration, was formed in the form of SADC.  SADC was therefore not only
a result of or response to changing international trends and demands, but also
a response to a changed political climate within the region.  It was clear that
globalization, and in particular the neo-liberal economic paradigm that was
spread through this process, had a great impact on the way in which the
Southern African region perceived its own future in the early 1990s.
In view of the region’s history and under circumstances of economic hardship
and a host of problems ranging from internal political instability to food, health
and environmental insecurity, looking past and cooperating beyond immediate
national demands and needs, SADC was established in order to create the
enabling environment that would allow for such ‘deep integration.’  On the
other hand, an undeniable strength of the organization lay in its ability to learn
from its experiences and to adjust and change.  The transformation of SADCC
into SADC was the prime example of this advantage.
Against this background, the next chapter addresses the restructuring of
SADCC into SADC.
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Chapter Four
The Establishment of SADC in 1992
4.1 Introduction
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By the early 1990s, as outlined in the previous chapter, SADCC experienced
difficulties and constraints in its operations and implementation of its projects.
These were caused, inter alia, by specific global and regional factors and
conditions. Due to this, the imperative for SADCC’s adjustment, or
restructuring, became more critical.  In terms of the regime theory, the
process could be referred as the reviewing or the restructuring of rules,
norms, principles, and decision-making processes within a regional
organization to enable it to deal with its challenges.  By 1992, SADCC
members decided that, in order to address the levels of underdevelopment in
the region, new structures were needed.  In addition to this, a democratic
transition in South Africa became more evident (SADCC 1992:4; SADC
1994:37).
Chapter three discussed factors that led SADCC to restructure in 1992.  This
chapter addresses the establishment of SADC as a first exercise in the
restructuring of the SADCC/C processes.  Basically, this chapter addresses
the third research question of the study, which is how SADC restructured.
After having discussed why SADCC restructured (chapter three), it is
important that this chapter focuses on the structure of SADC as proof of
physical restructuring. In order to analyse and appraise SADC’s establishment
in 1992, and its subsequent restructuring in 1999, this chapter will firstly
address the structure, functions and the results SADC achieved.  It will also
be realised in this chapter that member states’ efforts to maximise their own
national interests soon manifested in their different approaches to the
restructuring process.
This chapter will specifically cover the period from 1992 to 1999 and the
period after 1999 will be dealt with in chapter five.  By 2004, various other
pan-African integration processes (such as the establishment of the AU in
2002) and its development programme (Nepad), was already functioning,
when SADC became confronted with a possible post-1999 restructuring
process.  This aspect will be addressed briefly in chapter six.
4.2       SADCC into SADC in Windhoek 1992
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As pointed out in the previous chapter, the aim of this chapter is to discuss
the restructuring of SADCC into SADC in 1992.  This will cover the
institutions and organizational structures that were introduced between 1992
and 1999.  A precursor to the establishment of SADC, retrospectively, was a
Summit of Heads of State and Government, which met in Harare, Zimbabwe,
in 1989.  The outcome of this meeting was a decision that SADCC should be
formalised to give it an appropriate legal status, thus taking into account the
need to replace the Memorandum of Understanding with an Agreement,
Charter or Treaty (SADCC 1989:29).
A second precursor was the 1992 annual Consultative Conference of
SADCC held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 29-31 January, which adopted a
policy document: SADCC Towards Economic Integration.  The document
provided a policy framework for discussion and subsequent action on the
best methodology of promoting regional economic integration and
strengthening co-operation.   Furthermore it acknowledged the realities of the
region, like the changes in economic management from pervasive state
economic intervention and controls to market-oriented policies, democracies
replacing single-party political systems and prospects that South Africa may
become democratic and join SADCC.  SADCC members agreed that the
benefits of the above changes couldn’t be realized if the wide disparities and
inequalities between member countries are allowed to continue.  They
recommended, “Policies, strategies and programmes of economic
development should be restructured in such a way that all countries in the
region have a fair share of opportunities for investment, production, trade,
employment creation and other benefits.  In addition, member countries were
urged to consider seriously the wisdom and viability of belonging to one
organization in the region” (existing regional organizations referred to were
PTA to which most SADCC members belonged - Botswana and Namibia had
observer status and the SACU composed of South Africa and the BLNS
countries) (SADCC 1992:41).
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By August 1992, a meeting of a larger SADCC took place in Windhoek.  The
Windhoek Treaty served as the founding document of SADC.  The Windhoek
Treaty is in some ways a major departure from the Lusaka Declaration;
however, both documents underline the principles and norms relating to
sustainable regional development and integration (SADCC 1992:42).
The structure of SADC as outlined in the Windhoek Treaty differs
dramatically from SADCC’s.  The difference is that the Windhoek Treaty
proposed new principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a
form of integration instead of the co-ordination of projects.  However, some
do not share this view.  According to Moloi (1993/4:1) the change from
development ‘co-ordination’ to ‘community’ in 1992 in the Windhoek Treaty,
did not result in major structural changes.  Moloi maintains, “It was merely a
declaration of intent and a vision to work towards”.  Moloi’s argument is
based on the fact that SADC, upon its formation from SADCC in 1992, was
filled with more institutions, protocols, declarations and objectives without
any realistic approach or means on how such goals and protocols would be
attained and managed.  As the result, on paper SADC was different from
SADCC, but in reality most SADC countries in the global markets remained
low in terms of GDP.  The region continued to be covered by instability in
Angola and famine in countries like Zambia and other poor developments in
the region.
However, Tjitendero (1994:7), the speaker of the National Assembly,
Namibia, at the SADC Parliamentary Forum in Windhoek, contrary to Moloi’s
view, maintained that “the signing of the Treaty in Windhoek in August 1992
was not simply a matter of transforming SADC from a loose regional
grouping into a legal entity, but ushered in the spirit of the treaty establishing
the African Economic Community, adopted by the OAU Heads of State
meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in 1991, and changes from the co-ordination
conference to the community was the best possible development for regional
integration in Southern Africa” .
4.3 SADC’s objectives as outlined in the Windhoek Treaty
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Whereas the Lusaka Declaration specifies four principal objectives
(mentioned in previous chapters) the 1992 Treaty committed the new SADC
to an expanded political, economic, development, integration and security
agenda.  The Windhoek Treaty outlines SADC’s objectives as:
· achieving development and economic growth for the people of
Southern Africa through regional integration of development
programmes.  This was aimed at harmonising political and socio-
economic policies and plans of member countries;
· encouraging people and institutions in the region to initiate economic,
cultural and social ties across the region;
· creating appropriate institutions and mechanisms to mobilize
resources for the implementation of SADC programmes;
· developing policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles
to the free movement of capital, labour, goods, services and people
throughout the region;
· promoting a coordinated regional human and development strategy;
· promoting the development and sharing of technology;
· improving economic management and performance through regional
co-operation; and
· harmonising and coordinating international relations of member
countries and securing international understanding and support in the
mobilisation of financial resources in the region (SADCC 1992:42).
Article 5(2) embodied ten strategies and various projects in order to achieve
the above.  These ranged from harmonising political and socio-economic
policies and plans of the member states, through cementing cultural ties
across the region and human resources development, to improved
management and coordination of the foreign relations of member states
(SADCC 1992:43).
SADC’s stated principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures as
outlined in chapter one, reflected the negotiated nature of the regime (as per
109
description provided by Young 1989:37 in chapter one), as well as its
preoccupation with neo-functionalist concerns, primarily through the
promotion of regional development and integration.  The emphasis placed on
the values of ‘balance, equity and benefit’ reflected not only regional realities,
but also a philosophy securely anchored in national states as the principal
agencies of the regime.  This philosophy was reaffirmed in Article 6 of the
Treaty that bound member states to the regime’s principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures (Du Pisani 2001:210).
The 1992 Treaty that established SADC expanded the former SADCC’s role
and power of the Secretariat in three significant domains (SADCC 1992:42):
· SADC was given the responsibility for developing policies establishing
a common market through the progressive elimination of barriers to
the free movement of capital, labour, goods and services.
· SADC’s operational terms required it to be fully involved in the design
and process of regional integration.  Its institutional capacity was
modestly strengthened, though it remained a decentralised regime
with specific sector-coordinating functions allocated to member states.
· SADC’s concerns and agenda included post-Cold War issues such as
good governance, human rights, gender and democratic practice – all
issues of low politics.
As indicated in chapter one, this study is mainly influenced by the realist
approach on regime or regional organization formation in the case of
SADCC/C.  According to Smith and Baylis (1997:4), world politics (or more
accurately for realists in international politics) represents a struggle for power
between states, each trying to maximize their own national interests.  The
formation of SADCC in 1980 displays this.  The formation of SADCC was
characterised by the intent to counter South Africa’s political power on its
neighbours.  At the same time SADCC members expected that through co-
ordination, they would be able to maximise their national economic interests
through collective efforts.  This could be said to be one of the regime
characters.  The restructuring of SADCC norms, principles, rules and a
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decision-making process in 1992 into SADC is part of regime evolutions.
This process is undertaken by regional states on the SADC platform to
safeguard the interest of the region against internal and external challenges
as discussed in the previous chapter.
4.4 SADC’s 1992 structure
Apart from its expanded list of objectives, the new SADC changed its
organizational structure and added sectoral responsibilities.  With regards to
the latter, two more sectors were added due to Namibia and South Africa’s
memberships.  SADC’s organizational structure established in 1992 will be
addressed later (see figure 2).  In a previous chapter (figure 1) SADCC’s
structures and institutions were included
SADCC differed from SADC in terms of regional economic development,
which consisted of ministers, standing committees of officials, national
contact points and sectoral committees of officials.  On a structural level, it
consisted of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was
established in 1996.  It comprised Foreign Affairs Ministers, technical
committees and a rotating Secretariat.  This meant that by 1996, SADC was
leaning on two main pillars, the development section or the economic
section, and the security section.  The Organ was aimed at defending the
sovereign equality of all members, a commitment to democracy, solidarity,
peace, security, rule of law, observance of human rights, military
interventions as a last resort and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Van
Aardt 1997:150, SADC 1996:19).
In this way SADC, and specifically the OPDS, confirmed regime theory’s
claim that a regime such as SADC is based on shared principles, norms,
values and a prescribed decision-making process and structure.  Regime
theory on restructuring maintains that the shared or agreed characters of the
regime or organization are expected to change in order for the said regime to
survive when challenges arise.  The apparent change that resulted from
restructuring was that from 1980 until 1992 SADCC focused on co-ordination
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of projects and the approach was more political.  Hence, after 1992 the focus
became more on integration thus taking an economic approach (Van Aardt
1997:150).
Figure 2: 1992 SADC organizational structures
Source: SADC (1992:3)
What follows is a brief review of SADC’s structure and sub-structures as
outlined in the Windhoek Treaty (SADC 1992:3).  A final appraisal of these
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will be offered in the conclusion of this study.  This will include a discussion
on each structure’s strengths and weaknesses.  Before proceeding, it is
important to indicate that the organization’s structures and procedures are
a confirmation of sorts of the principles of regime theory.
· The Summit of Heads of State or Government consisted of the heads
of state or government of all member countries and was the ultimate
policy-making institution of the SADC.  It was the supreme institution
and responsible for the general direction and control of the functions of
the SADC as well as the achievement of its objectives.  It met at least
once a year.  The Summit was furthermore responsible for the creation
of Commissions, other institutions, committees and organizations as
the need arose.  The Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive
Secretary were also appointed by the Summit.
· The Council of Ministers consisted of ministers from each member
state, usually those responsible for their country’s economic planning
or finance.  They were responsible for overseeing the functioning and
development of SADC and ensuring that the policies were properly
implemented.  The Council advised the Summit on matters of overall
policy and approved strategies and work programmes for the SADC.
Another major task of the Council was to define sectoral areas of
cooperation and their allocation to member countries for coordinating
sectoral activities.  The Council met at least once a year to review the
progress and operations of its subordinate institutions.
· Sectoral Committees and Commissions were SADC instituted
Commissions and Sectoral Committees which guided and coordinated
cooperation and integration policies and programmes in designated
sectorial areas.  The sectors were allocated to individual member
countries to coordinate and provide leadership.  Sectoral Committees
of Ministers supervised sectoral activities.
· The Standing Committee of Officials consisted of a Permanent
Secretary or an official of equivalent rank of each member state.
Usually the official came from a national ministry responsible for
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economic planning or finance.  The Standing Committee of Officials
was a technical advisory committee to the Council of Ministers and also
met at least once a year.  Members thereof had a dual responsibility,
as they were also National Contact Points.
· National Contact Points were located in the national ministry (usually
the national department of Foreign Affairs) responsible for all SADC
matters.  Their responsibilities included regular consultation with and
briefings of relevant government institutions, the enterprise community
and media on matters relating to SADC.
· Sectoral Contact Points were all government Ministries with
responsibilities for SADC sector(s) and worked closely with the
respective Sector Coordinating Units in the preparation of sectoral
policies and strategies, and the formulation of project proposals.
Sectoral Contact Points attended and participated in sectoral meetings,
and assisted Sector Coordinating Units in the monitoring of projects.
· The Secretariat was the principal executive institution of SADC and
was responsible for the strategic planning and management of
programmes of SADC, the implementation of decisions of the Summit
and the Council.  It was headed by the Executive Secretary, who was
appointed by the Summit.  It was also charged with the organization
and management of SADC meetings, the financial and general
administration, as well as the representation and promotion of SADC.
· A Tribunal was constituted to ensure adherence to and to ensure the
proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and
subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate such disputes as may be
referred to it.  Decisions of the Tribunal were meant to be final and
binding.
From the above exposition it was clear that SADC, compared to its
antecedent, offered more space for bargaining and negotiating interaction.
SADC, as a product of a restructuring process, indicates that regimes
continuously transform themselves in order to act, interact and react vis-à-vis
its external environment.    Unlike the former SADCC, a Treaty and a specified
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structure constituted SADC.  SADC’s structures, as outlined above, created a
more empowered Secretariat and Sectors, which were tasked to overlook
decision-making and implementation.  There were also provisions for
imposing sanctions on any of the member states which persistently failed,
without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed under the Treaty or pursue
policies which undermined SADC’s principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures (Article 33, 1-2).  Sanctions were to be determined by the
Summit on a case-by-case basis.
The decentralized nature of the Co-ordination Conference was continued with
the new SADC.  Each member state was allocated the responsibility for co-
coordinating one or more sectors.  This involved proposing policies, strategies
and priorities, and processing projects for inclusion in the sector programme,
monitoring progress and reporting to the Council of Ministers.  After the
restructuring in 1992, there were 21 sector co-coordinating units and
commissions in twelve of the fourteen SADC countries.  Commissions,
assisted by Commission Secretariats, were regional institutions, approved by
the Summit and supported by all member states.  The Commission
Secretariats had a regional staff and were funded directly by member states
through separate contributions (SADC 1992:8).
The sector co-coordinating units were national institutions established in the
appropriate line ministry by the member country responsible for co-
coordinating the particular sector and staffed by civil servants of the particular
country.  Sectoral committees of ministers guided them.  Only the DRC and
the Seychelles were without sector responsibilities (SADC 1999:3).
Having outlined the main structures of SADC, this study now turns to how the
organization performed in terms of its objectives and values and also how its
structures enabled and/or disabled the organization’s performance.
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4.5 Preliminary indications of structural changes
This section will briefly address some of the early indications of the limitations
of SADC’s founding structure of 1992 to 1999. A detailed discussion of factors
that led SADC to consider restructuring in 1999 will be discussed in chapter
five.
The end of apartheid in South Africa led to the increase of SADC
membership.   It now consisted of eleven member states.  Not only did SADC
membership increase, but also South Africa’s role in the region ended the
speculation on whether South Africa would join SADC or COMESA.   At the
time, it was believed that the security of SADC countries would improve.  The
role and objectives of SADC were also expected to change and accommodate
new members (each with their own developmental needs and interests) such
as South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles and the DRC.
The other structural challenge to the Windhoek Treaty caused by the entry of
South Africa was the relevance of the FLS in the region.  The discussions
around this issue led to the establishment of the Organ for Politics, Defense
and Security (OPDS).   Zimbabwe was the first country to chair the OPDS.
The next chapter will discuss political events that served as preliminary
indications for structural change during this period.
4.5.1     The establishment of the OPDS
The establishment of the OPDS is a significant illustration of SADC’s reaction
in order to address issues of regional concern.  Figure three outlines the
OPDS’ structure and how it relates to SADC.
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Figure 3: OPDS structure
 Source: SADC (1996:4)
The following guidelines pertaining to the institutional framework for the Organ
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· the Organ shall operate at the Summit level, and shall function
independently of other SADC structures;
· the Organ shall also operate at ministerial and technical levels;
· the chairpersonship of the Organ shall rotate on an annual and on a
troika basis;
· the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee shall be one of the
institutions of the Organ; and
· the Organ may establish other structures as the need arises.
Malan (1996:4) and Steyn (1998:28) write that the rationale behind the Organ
was twofold.  Firstly, it was argued that the situations in SADC and in
neighbouring states were far from stable and that a central organ could better
respond to situations of conflict and tension.  This argument gained strength
with developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire),
Rwanda, Angola, Zambia and Central Africa.  Secondly, it was argued that the
actions of the United Nations (UN) on African soil were far from successful
and had led to an increasing reluctance by the major powers to deploy troops
in Africa.  The financial crisis of the UN further hampered its peacekeeping
actions.  African countries and organizations were therefore advised to accept
more responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent.
Article 21 of the SADC Treaty spells out a number of areas for cooperation,
including politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security.  In
July 1994, a SADC workshop on democracy, peace and security set SADC on
a course towards formal involvement in security, conflict and military issues.
When the Frontline States dissolved in July 1994, it was decided that it should
be transformed into the political and security wing of SADC.  In March 1995
this was formalised in the Association of Southern African States (ASAS).
However, ASAS never developed and was replaced in June 1996 when the
SADC Organ on Security and Political Affairs was set up (SADC 1996:17).
According to SADC (1996:7), the 1996 summit defined sixteen substantive
political, defence and security objectives to be pursued by the Organ.  It also
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decided on the institutional framework.  The SADC Organ operated at Heads
of State level, but also at ministerial and technical levels.  It was independent
of other SADC structures.  Table nine outlines the main objectives of the
OPDS.  These objectives fall mainly within the spheres of military/defence,
crime prevention, intelligence, foreign policy and human rights.  Table nine
also includes the specific objectives to be achieved in each of these spheres.
Table 9:  OPDS objectives
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Source: SADC (1996:14)
Like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the
SADC Organ was potentially an organization with a comprehensive approach
to security and peace, based on military confidence, economic development,
social justice, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and the
rights of minorities.   According to Cilliers (1999:5), “southern African region,
despite these efforts, clearly still had a long way to go in this regard”.
Furthermore, he states that “the active, ongoing and meaningful pursuit of
such an inspiring list of objectives could not occur only at an annual meeting
of Heads of State and Government and a system of ad hoc and informal
arrangements, but required the regular engagement of member states at
ministerial and technical levels”.  In organizational terms, this was the major
challenge for the structural development of the Organ.
The formation of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security in
Gaborone on 28 June 1996, to fill the gap left by the Front Line States, could
be regarded as one of the major restructuring moves taken by SADC prior to
1999.  This was the first institution to be added to SADC after it restructured
from SADCC in 1992.  After 1992 SADC mainly focused on economic
development, and the SADC Organ was thus established to create a special
forum for political, defence and security cooperation with a focus on conflict
management.
According to Wawa (1998:76) the 1996 Gaborone Communiqué provided for
the SADC Organ to coordinate the region's participation in international and
regional peacekeeping operations.  It also suggested that the region may be
called to apply punitive measures to some of its member states, but specified
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that this should only be done as a last resort once all diplomatic means had
been exhausted and only with the approval of the SADC Summit and as
agreed upon in the Protocol.
Malan (1996:4) further argues that from a policy perspective, the guidelines
raised the need for a comprehensive policy framework in a number of areas.
The first and most immediate were the needs of the Protocol itself.  The
objectives indicated that the Protocol must specify the procedures and broad
guidelines under which SADC would undertake punitive action against its
member states and, it seems, non-member states also.
States such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa were
instrumental in the establishment of the OPDS.  Despite consensus on the
imperative to establish a security structure under SADC’s umbrella, tensions
among member states started to surface.  Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe
became a leading figure in the efforts to use the OPDS for the benefit of
Zimbabwe.  It was also threatened by the regional status of the new South
Africa.  In addition to this, Zimbabwe was alleged to have considerable
economic interests in a war torn DRC, the unstable Great Lakes region and
Angola.  The above discussion is in line with the realist theory’s view on
regimes that states enter into agreements and form regimes in order to
advance their national interests, by diplomatically doing it collectively.
4.6 An appraisal of SADC’s performance 1992-1999
After its first restructuring in 1992, SADC failed to improve the economic and
political conditions in the region – the very task it was established to address.
In comparison to its predecessor, SADC had a much more detailed and
widened scope of objectives.  However, despite these, it was for example
unable to address the conflict in Angola, which continued as if no restructuring
took place.  In essence SADC was, at least on paper, capable of addressing
the Angolan conflict.  In this case, SADC’s inaction severely compromised its
principles and objectives.
Baregu (1999:23) maintains that the economic situation of member countries,
particularly Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, Angola and
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Swaziland to a large extent, continued to decline.  By 1999 the aggregate
economic growth rate was at 1.8 per cent.  However, this figure was still below
the growth target of 6.0 per cent as defined in the United Nations New Agenda
for Development in Africa as the minimum growth rate required for sustainable
economic development.  To halve poverty in SADC by the year 2015, an
average annual growth rate of almost 6.5 per cent was required for the region.
South Africa, which is the largest economy, accounts for 75 per cent of the
SADC GDP.  The diversity among the fourteen SADC member states made it
difficult to have an overall view of the economic performance in the region as
it included economies ranging from the least developed to the more
developed ones.
Significant variations in economic growth, which has been a characteristic
throughout the 1990s continued despite efforts of restructuring in 1992.  The
major factors that influenced economic performance included the overall
international economy, domestic economic policies, level of governance and
the degree of political stability in member states and the region as a whole.
Political instability included the conflicts within the DRC involving several
SADC member states, and a UNITA military campaign in Angola. SADC had
neither the capacity, nor the resources or political will to deal with these
conflicts despite the change from Conference to Community in 1992. The
realities in the region increasingly demanded a joint effort to resolve conflicts.
Chikowore (1999:333) further maintains that the inflation rate in SADC
countries after 1992 became a trouble factor to the character of SADC and
member countries.   Inflation has continued to grow in some countries despite
more focus by member states on policies that increased monetary discipline
and a reduction of budget deficits.  The inflation rate among members of the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), namely, South Africa, Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland grew by less than 10 per cent, the same as
in Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania between 1992 and 1999.
Mozambique experienced an increase in its inflation rate as a consequence of
difficulties caused by floods, while in Malawi and Zambia the inflation rate
exceeded 10 per cent.   The level of inflation remained very high in countries
affected by civil strife, namely, Angola and the DRC.   In 2000, the inflation
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rate exceeded 500 per cent in DRC.   It was 325 per cent in Angola and 55
per cent in Zimbabwe.
The other key challenge that was facing SADC countries was the issue of
external debt.   According to the African Development Indicators for 2001, the
total external debt of SADC stood at US$80,295 million at the end of 1999.
The countries that recorded the highest debt levels, in nominal terms, were
South Africa, the DRC, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.  The
following countries, namely Angola, the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania
and Zambia, were classified as severely indebted low-income countries, and
were eligible for assistance under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative of the IMF.  The debt overhang had an adverse impact on investment
and economic growth in the region.   Since the external debt was mainly owed
by the state, debt service payments limited the ability of governments to invest
in physical infrastructure and human resources as well as to increase growth-
enhancing expenditure in education and health.  These factors constituted
major setbacks to the SADC aspiration of developing and integrating Southern
Africa (Chikowore 1999:4).
SADC’s performance up to 1999 was influenced by the economic conditions
mentioned above as well as its correlating political instability.  The above
situation left the SADC leadership with no option but to review all operations
within the organization.  Political crises within the region managed to test the
viability of SADC in dealing with such pressing issues.  The decision to
undertake the restructuring exercise was influenced by such political
situations within the region.  This debate is discussed further in the next
chapter.
4.7      Summary
This chapter is aimed at discussing how SADC restructured.  The main
theoretical base of the discussion on how it restructured was influenced by
Young’s (1982) perspective on regime change or transformation.  Young
emphasises that one of the reasons regime change or transform takes place
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is because of pressures that is exerted to the regime by its members or
pressures that the regime itself is faced with.  Young (1982) further maintains
that when regimes are faced with such a challenge, alterations in their
structures such as principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures
are inevitable or could be expected.  This chapter has discussed the structural
changes in SADC in line with the regime theory as perceived by Young
(1982).
SADC was created in 1992 with the twin goals of achieving economic
development and political stability through regional trade liberalization and
political and economic integration.  SADC member states also expected to
use the institution as a way of reducing their vulnerability on external financial
shocks induced by fluctuations, political instability and uncertainty in the rest
of the world.  The SADC Treaty of 1992 called on its member states to
promote peace and security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the
peace settlement of disputes.  However, the Treaty gave prominence to
SADC’s ministers of economic planning and finance in constituting its Council
of Ministers, thus giving less priority to issues of politics, defence and security.
In an effort to rectify the situation, the 1996 SADC Summit of Heads of State
and Government met in Gaborone and launched the OPDS, which operated
at summit, ministerial and technical levels, independently of other SADC
structures.
Prior to the establishment of the OPDS, this chapter pointed out that South
Africa’s entry into SADC added another dimension to the operation of the
organization.  Furthermore, the increase of membership after South Africa
with the joining of Mauritius, Seychelles and the DRC added more
responsibilities and expectations on SADC as a regional body.  Despite the
restructuring in 1992, this chapter argued that little changed in terms of
achievements.  Instead, SADC’s challenges regionally and internationally
increased, thus, exerting pressure on the organization to respond to or cease
to exist if it fails to survive.  As early as 1996, preliminary signs of restructuring
began to be evident, as discussed in this chapter, through the establishment
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of the OPDS to enhance SADC to be in touch with regional challenges,
especially the political challenges that were causing instability in the region.
As discussed in chapter one on the issue of regime change, transformation or
restructuring according to Young (1982:45), Puchala & Hopkins (1982:23) and
Krasner (1983:33), the same applies to SADC in 1992 while transforming itself
from the SADCC.  The mentioned scholars approach the idea from two basic
viewpoints.  Young (1982:45) states that contradictions within the regime
framework may lead to serious pressure for alterations.  These contradictions
may be from dynamic point of views, and that can be an element that may
push regimes to fall apart or to be useless.  In this instance, this study could
site the fact that although SADC established the OPDS, it failed to equip it
enough, that instead of it being a “talk show” it would be an institution based
on sanctions that were agreed upon as early as 1992 of good governance,
democracy and respect for human rights.  Instead of the leaders respecting the
principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes of the organization
and the Organ, they found themselves in conflict on how disputes ought to be
solved in the region.
The Lesotho, Angola and the DRC conflicts are examples in this case.  Young
(1982:45) also mentions that the other view regarding regime change could be
a dialectical proven point of view, which looks holistically at social entities
searching for dialectical laws pertaining to change.  Thus, from the holistic or
dialectical point of view the regime may evolve or transform itself without
disintegration, like the evolution of SADCC into SADC in 1992.  Instead of
SADCC continuing with irrelevant principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures it inherited in 1980 and in 1992, it decided to restructure and
establish new institutions as from 1999.
Puchala and Hopkins (1982:8) mention the concept of regime disintegration as
the ‘revolutionary change’ and the concept of regime adaptation as the
‘evolutionary change’.  Evolutionary change, or Young’s idea of holistic
change, may involve a regime changing substantively by preserving its
principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures.  As mentioned, this
would usually occur because of shifts in knowledge, information or in changes
with regard to challenges and pressures facing particular regimes.  The regime
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adaptation or evolutionary change in a regime is particularly relevant to the
restructuring of SADCC to SADC because, the former was establish to operate
in a period when South Africa was still regarded as an “enemy state”, while the
latter was established to operate in a period when South Africa was regarded
as a strategic ally to the integration of the region.  The subsequent chapter
discusses factors that led SADC to consider the second restructuring exercise
from 1999.
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Chapter Five
The Restructuring of SADC from 1999
5.1 Introduction
Chapter three introduced a debate on factors that led SADCC to consider
restructuring in 1992.  Chapter four discussed why SADC was formed and
how it operated.  This chapter will focus on why SADC began to restructure
in the late 1990s after it first restructured in 1992.  It will also discuss how
SADC restructured from 1999.  Although the emphasis in this study is to
appraise and analyse mainly political factors that had a role in the
restructuring of SADC as in previous chapters, recognition of economic
factors both regionally and internationally will not be completely ignored.  It is
important to note that most economic factors had political implications, and
vice versa.
These factors, as in previous chapters, will be discussed in terms of the two
levels in this study, namely regional as well as international.  Regimes, as
indicated in chapter one, are established to assist states in dealing with
shared issues.  SADC was established in 1992 to address issues of mutual
concern.  In this regard, the Windhoek Treaty (regarded as the founding
document of SADC) signed on 17 August 1992 declares inter alia “a mutual
commitment by member states to deeper and more formal arrangements for
cooperation and integration under the framework of a new organization”
(SADC 1992:42).
SADC continues to be identified as a regime in this chapter.  In chapter one,
Krasner’s definition was identified as the preferred conceptualisation.  In
analysing SADC’s restructuring, the defining elements of a regime will be
looked at.  During its various restructuring exercises SADCC/C had to take
cognisance of its principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures.
At the time SADC was established, specific conditions prevailed in the
region.  By the time of its second restructuring process various other
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conditions prevailed.  It is important to note that conditions and factors
discussed in this chapter were the conditions and factors SADC was created
to deal with in 1992.  Such conditions and factors had an effect on SADC’s
operations and in turn, required that it respond or react to such change.
The Windhoek Treaty represents SADC’s main principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures. The most important principle for the
organization was to improve economic conditions and deepen trade links
among member states in the region.  This was to be done by facilitating the
free movement of goods, people and services; and by ensuring that the
region enjoys political stability, by removing trade barriers to the flow of
capital in the region. In a normative sense, the Windhoek Treaty specifies
general standards of behaviour and identifies the rights and obligations of
member states.  In this regard, an example of a basic norm specified is that
of trade liberalisation, peace and security as well as regional development
community.  The latter is an essential characteristic of SADC as a regime.
By the late 1990s, as discussed in chapter four, it was apparent that the
region was still underdeveloped and SADC countries were still dependent on
South Africa and more dependent on international donors.  The regional
economy, according to Gibb (2001:79), was built upon the region’s single
dominant economy located in South Africa, for example migrant labour,
mining, water, transport and increasing regional trade.  The continuing
inequalities and dependency of most member countries undermined SADC’s
ability to develop and integrate the region. A call for an alternative
organization or regional structure started to be inevitable.  SADC officials
started to realize the need to again restructure the organization in order to be
able to deal with all the needs and challenges that prevailed in the region as
discussed above.
Despite the restructuring of SADCC to SADC in 1992, by the mid 1990s
SADC began to experience difficulties and constraints in its operations and
implementation of its projects, such as SADC’s dependency on international
donors by member countries, the decline of living standards in the region, the
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decline of the rule of law, the increase of SADC projects with more of them
having no regional benefit and more.  SADC (1999:54) maintained that the
situation was due to the fact that its secretariat lacked power, authority and
resources required to facilitate regional integration.  It also maintained that the
situation led sector co-ordinating units in member countries to become highly
uneven in their ability to pursue and implement policies.  It further argued that
its work plan lacked a clear regional focus despite the 1992 changes.  Another
constraint was that the SADC work plan covered too many areas, and the
majority of projects were found to be mainly national.
In chapter three, Young (1982:45) maintains that contradictions within the
regime framework may lead to serious pressure for alterations.  These
contradictions may be from a dynamic point of view, and can be an element
that may push regimes to fall apart or to become obsolete.   After 1992,
contradictions that existed included the issue of multi-membership SADC
members belonged to, as mentioned in chapter one.  Others included to a
large extent the dependency of SADC projects on donor funding, which
further undermined commitment to economic liberation and commitment to
total integration as proclaimed in the Windhoek Treaty. Young also warns
that the persistence of contradictions within a regime can lead to serious
pressures that could result in major alterations.  By this, Young means
changes within the regime’s norms, rules, principles and decision-making
procedures.  This chapter outlines factors and conditions that contributed to
SADC’s second restructuring, the 1999 restructuring process.  The main
focus will be on how these factors had an effect on SADC as a regional
structure and also as a regional or institutional regime as explained in the
first chapter.
5.2 Internal factors
The internal factors contributing to the restructuring of SADC in 1999 are
analysed and appraised below:
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5.2.1 The end of Apartheid in South Africa
As discussed in the previous chapters, the 1990s heralded a new era in
Southern Africa.  The 1992 restructuring exercise was influenced by the fact
that South Africa might end apartheid, whereas the 1999 restructuring
exercise was informed by the fact that apartheid had officially ended in South
Africa in 1994.  As discussed in the previous chapters, the release of South
African (former) president, Nelson Mandela, in 1990, the independence of
Namibia and peace processes in Angola and Mozambique brought much
needed peace and stability to the region.  These were signs for SADCC that it
had to refocus itself.  As pointed out in chapter three, SADCC therefore
adopted the Windhoek Treaty at its 1992 summit, which led to the
establishment of SADC.  This meant a change in focus and objectives, from
regional political cooperation to (economic) integration. Furthermore, SADC
became a legal body and upgraded its central secretariat (SADC 1992:4).
In August 1994, South Africa joined SADC.  Despite the major restructuring of
its domestic, social, political and economic systems, re-establishing its
relations with Southern African countries, and inheriting a very weak
economy, it still joined SADC.  South Africa is perceived by many third parties
as the 'engine of growth' pulling the wagon of economic growth and political
stability in the region.  According to Cheru (1994: 5) the announcement by
South Africa that it will join SADC resolved a long dragging speculation on
whether South Africa would join the PTA or whether it would strengthen its
ties with SACU.
South Africa's accession increased SADC’s international credibility and made
it a sought-after partner with which to dialogue and cooperate.  However,
SADC was still faced with some problems and difficulties.  After joining SADC,
Mandela placed emphasis on democracy, human rights and the rule of law
throughout the region.  This was perceived by some as South African ambition
to dominate the rest of the region, both economically and politically (Roberts
2003:69).
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According to Roberts (2003:76) this meant that SADC leaders had to consider
these factors within their respective countries.  This also meant that SADC, as
a regional organization, was tasked with an obligation to oversee that such
conditions were put into place by member countries.   In addition to that,
South Africa’s emphasis on democracy, rule of law and human rights became
an issue also emphasised by international donors like the EU, the United
States of America (USA) and the Nordic countries as a condition for funding
SADC projects.
According to Cheru (1992:39) “another factor brought by South Africa into
SADC was monetary harmonisation”.  The World Bank and the African
Development Bank, in view of the success of the CFA in Francophone West
Africa, envisaged this.  The absence of a common currency was a major
impediment to intra-regional trade.  The other contributions that South Africa
made or was expected to make were to improve financial administration,
customs administration and to contribute to domestic resource mobilisation
and allocation.  Lastly, South Africa was also expected to play a huge role in
conflict resolution in the region and in the continent as a whole.  That required
a system with an institution in which this could be dealt with (Schoeman
1998:6).
These expectations and responsibilities that South Africa was expected to
fulfil meant that SADC had to reposition its institution and its approach to
integration.  The inherited SADCC structure did not seem adequate to
accommodate the expectations and global challenges that were taking place
in the region.  To state that South Africa initiated change in SADC’s principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures in 1999 could sum up the role it
played after it joined SADC in 1994 (Schoeman 1998:6).
Cheru (1995:39) further maintains that the inclusion of South Africa into SADC
gave SADC member countries, especially its neighbouring countries, stability
because it meant that they did not have to worry about attacks from South
Africa.  It also meant that some SADC countries could start spending less on
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defence, as South Africa became a non-hostile nation towards the regional
countries after the end of apartheid.  It also ended speculations that it might
join COMESA.
5.2.2 The restructuring of the OPDS
The FLS had a very flexible approach to conflict prevention and security in
Southern Africa.  However, the transition to democracy in most Southern
African countries and the adoption of the SADC Windhoek Treaty formalised
the approach to conflict prevention.  The formalisation of the approach
towards security could also be regarded as the factor that triggered the need
for SADC to restructure in 1999.  For a detailed discussion on the formation of
the OPDS, refer to chapter four (SADC 1996:6).
The formation of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security in
Gaborone on 28 June 1996, to fill the gap left by the Front Line States, could
be regarded as one of the major restructuring moves taken by SADC prior to
1999.  This was the first institution to be added to SADC after it restructured
from SADCC in 1992 or the alteration of a regime as Young might refer to it in
chapters one and three.  After 1992 SADC mainly focused on economic
development, and the SADC Organ was thus established to create a special
forum for political, defence and security cooperation with a specific focus on
conflict management.
According to Wawa (1998:76) the 1996 Gaborone Communiqué provided for
the SADC Organ to coordinate the region's participation in international and
regional peacekeeping operations.  It also suggested that the region may be
called to apply punitive measures to some of its member states, but specified
that this should only be done as a last resort, once all diplomatic means had
been exhausted and only with the approval of the SADC Summit and as
agreed upon in the Protocol.
Malan (1996:4) further argues that from a policy perspective, the guidelines
raised the need for a comprehensive policy framework in a number of areas.
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The first and most immediate were the needs of the Protocol itself.  The
objectives indicated that the Protocol must specify the procedures and broad
guidelines under which SADC would undertake punitive action against its
member states and, it seems, non-member states also.
Due to the above, Van Tongeren (1998:71) maintains that the SADC Organ
was never made fully operational due to a difference of opinion over whether
the SADC Organ was meant to be an organ of SADC or an independent body.
A fatal clause in the Communiqué that was released after the Gaborone
Summit in 1996 approving the establishment of the SADC Organ, read that
the Organ shall 'function independently' of other SADC structures.  Zimbabwe,
the Chair of the SADC Organ then, interpreted this to mean that the SADC
Organ should function totally independently of SADC control.  This led to a
diplomatic conflict between South Africa and Zimbabwe.  The realist theories
on regimes might deem this as a power struggle between states with a
specific region or area trying to maximise its own national interests at the
expense of each other, as well as the region as a political unit.
The main thrust of the Zimbabwean argument was that SADC was a donor-
funded economic development body, and that the sub-region could not entrust
its political and security functions to it.  South Africa, the former SADC Chair,
argued that the clause referred to the intention that the SADC Organ should
not function like the other SADC sectors (under SADC then, member states
were each given responsibility to coordinate specific sectors, such as food,
infrastructure, trade and others – refer to chapter 3).  South Africa argued that
conflict management was too important for it to be the responsibility of any
one member, and that is why it should operate differently from the rest of the
SADC functions (Van Tongeren 1998:71).
According to De Coning (1999:3) the SADC Organ impasse would have been
little more than an embarrassing footnote in SADC's history, if it was not
directly responsible for SADC's inability to respond to the conflicts in Angola,
the DRC and Lesotho in a more cohesive manner.  The vacuum created by
the impasse resulted for instance, in a situation where some SADC countries
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decided to intervene in the DRC under SADC auspices, whilst others
preferred a diplomatic solution to the problem.  Similarly, there were still
questions over the mandate and decision-making processes that led to the
SADC military intervention in Lesotho in September 1998.  In both cases,
SADC as a legal entity and its Executive Secretary and Secretariat, had no
role or responsibility for these operations carried out under its auspices.
De Coning (1999:5) continues by saying that the misunderstanding
concerning the independence and the role of the Organ between two elderly
Head of States (former president Mandela of South Africa and president
Mugabe of Zimbabwe) not only caused embarrassment, but also meant that
SADC lacked the will and know-how to deal with integration issues in the
region, and more importantly, security.  SADC also lacked a diplomatic
mechanism to in dealing with differences in its leadership and the approach to
conflict in the region.  The tussle in the SADC leadership and the Organ’s role
cannot be ruled out as a factor that led SADC to take measures against such
an embarrassment in future.  What this meant was that SADC began to be
pressured to re-investigate the role of the Organ, and furthermore, to come up
with guidelines that would avoid another similar situation.  Young (1982), in
chapter one, refers to this as contradictions within the regime that pressures
the regimes to implement major alterations.  The Organ became one of the
major issues affecting the restructuring in 1999.  The impasse around the
SADC Organ Chairperson, and the differences in approach to especially the
DRC conflict, constituted the greatest challenge faced by SADC in its short
history.  In view of the abovementioned problems at the SADC level, the
August 1999 Maputo Summit decided that all SADC institutions, including the
SADC Organ, need to be reviewed within six months, thereby creating a
sense of urgency and momentum.
In brief, this meant SADC began to realize again that it was not working.  It
also realized that it was gradually approaching a leadership crisis and that the
‘independence’ of the Organ from SADC contributed to slow the pace in
solving regional conflict.  The leadership crisis also reflected badly on SADC
134
from the investors’ point of view.  For SADC to attract investors to the region,
it needed to restructure the OPDS to ensure regional stability (SADC 2000:4).
In addition, Tsie (1998:23) maintains that the establishment of the Organ in
1996 marked an important era in SADC’s development.  However, the turning
point that led the Organ to be drawn into the whole restructuring exercise was
the tussle between the leadership over the DRC and Lesotho conflicts.  In
brief, this meant was that SADC could no longer afford any misrepresentation,
especially after the Cold War.  The region wanted as much assistance as
possible from the Western countries, which proved to focus on the Eastern
European countries.  The restructuring of the Organ and the whole
organization was the least that could have been done to save face.
According to De Coning (1999:5) the failure of the OPDS to deal with conflict
in the mentioned countries marked a major turning point in the life span of
SADC as an organization.  The conflicts tested the capability and viability of
the organization.  Moreover, these conflicts exposed the fact that SADC had
no mechanism to deal with security issues though they claimed to have an
Organ designed to overlook such situations.  These conflicts further displayed
that SADC was “toothless”.  This could be referred to as regime failure.
5.2.3 Regional political crisis
Political factors in some way relate to OPDS’ failure in ensuring that regional
political crises were contained.  However, to emphasise factors per category,
it was seen to be wiser if these crises were discussed separately from the
OPDS as an institution, with SADC designed to overlook these factors.  The
political crisis in the region became another factor that led SADC to consider
the restructuring exercise in 1999.  The conflicts involved the Angolan crisis,
the DRC crisis, the Swaziland political instability and the Lesotho crisis.  Other
political conflict included the succession issue in Zambia after the former
president Chiluba proposed a third term for himself.  The third term issue after
became a regional issue and soon donor agencies insisted on clarity from the
regional leaders that such considerations were not in the pipeline.  The
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question of liberal democracy became the issue of the day.  Leaders such as
the Namibian president Nunjoma and the Zimbabwean president Mugabe
became causalities of this debate.  At SADC level this debate needed much
clarity as to whether actions of tampering with constitutions continue in the
region, or not.  That resulted in a SADC parliamentary committee being
formed to look at issues regarding the constitutional irregularities in the region
(Schoeman 1998:6).
As discussed before, the DRC crisis saw the involvement of SADC countries
in the conflict and that resulted in some diplomatic conflict among member
states.  According to Van Tongeren (1998:73), “the conflict led to confusion on
whether SADC should intervene, and whether those countries that intervened
(Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola), did so on their own or under the auspices
of SADC.  The diplomatic conflict, mainly between South Africa and
Zimbabwe, saw the independence of the Organ reviewed as discussed, but
most importantly, the diplomatic rift between the two elder state men, Mandela
and Mugabe. This exposed SADC’s lack of capacity in dealing with conflict -
especially among member countries in the region”.
According to Patel (2001:7) the Lesotho crisis was another factor that
exposed the lack of SADC ability, and particularly the OPDS, in dealing with
regional conflict.  The crisis began in May 1998 when the Kingdom of Lesotho
held a parliamentary election, the second one after military rule that had
lasted from 1986 to 1993.  Before these elections the political atmosphere
was highly charged with the opposition parties, particularly the Basutuland
Congress Party (BCP), questioning the legitimacy of the ruling party Lesotho
Congress for Democracy (LCD) and representation in the legislature.
According to Baregu (1999:2) “the major issue of contention was how, in July
1997, the LCD had split from the BCP as a faction, declared on its own a party
and formed a government on the basis of having a majority of members of
parliament.  This move was largely seen as a parliamentary coup and was
strongly but unsuccessfully opposed by the opposition parties in the run up to
the 1998 elections.  In the event, the LCD won the elections with an
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overwhelming majority taking 79 out of a total of 80 seats.  The election was
declared free and fair by local and international observers.  The other political
parties that claimed that the LCD had rigged the elections met the outcomes
with dismay and anger.  They began a protest campaign that included
camping outside the King’s Palace and demanded that the King should
dissolve Parliament, dismiss the LCD government and establish a government
of national unity whose main task would be to make preparations for and
organize another round of elections”.
The SADC military intervention in Lesotho led by South Africa and Botswana,
just as its counterpart in the DRC that was led by Zimbabwe, evoked mixed
reactions among SADC members, Africa and the world at large.  Baregu
(1999:2) maintains that one of the greatest shortcomings identified with regard
to the SADC interventions in Lesotho and the DRC, was the lack of a coherent
policy concerning decision-making processes which needed to be followed in
order to approve a mission under SADC auspices, for example an Interstate
Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) meeting of Defence Ministers
(which was the level at which the DRC Mission was approved) or a SADC
Organ for Politics, Defence and Security at the Foreign Minister level, or
SADC Summit level (which was the level the Lesotho Mission was approved
at) and more.  They also had to determine how that decision should be taken,
that is, should the appropriate body adopt a United Nations Security Council-
type resolution that can become the mandate for the mission, and should that
decision be made public and transparent?
According to Peter-Berriers (2003:2) SADC was confronted with some
questions that needed immediate attention after these crises.   Firstly, they
needed to determine what kind of missions SADC should undertake and what
kind of missions SADC have the capacity to undertake in terms of
peacekeeping, military observers, civilian observers, human rights monitoring
missions, peace enforcement, military interventions and SADC’s undertakings
in the enforcement operations (as was the case most recently in Lesotho and
the DRC).  Secondly, would it seek prior authorisation from the UN Security
Council as required under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and what is SADC's
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relationship with the AU in this regard?  Should it at least inform the AU of its
intentions prior to undertaking such an intervention?  Lastly, SADC needed to
answer how its Missions would be financed.  If donor money was accepted,
what should the principles be that govern the relationship between the donors
and the SADC mission to ensure that only SADC will determine the mandate,
objectives, duration, exit strategy and overall approach of the mission?
The above questions left the SADC leadership with no option but to review all
the operations within the organization.  Political crisis within the region tested
the viability of SADC in dealing with such pressing issues.  The decision to
undertake the restructuring exercise was influenced by such political
situations within the region.  The abovementioned debate again is in
agreement with Young’s theory of contradictions within a regime.  An analysis
based on Young’s theory means that SADC‘s structure was not capable of
dealing with regional issues although it was established to be a regional
organization.  SADC was mainly caught up in a situation where it indirectly
violated or opposed its own principles, rules, norms and decision-making
procedures.  In the above case this refers to the principles of good
government and democracy that were under attack by SADC member
countries, rather than foreign countries.
5.3 External factors
External factors contributing to the restructuring of SADC in 1999 are analysed
and appraised below:
5.3.1 The restructuring of the EU
As mentioned in the previous chapters, SADC was established on the EU
model.  After the post Cold War period in 1989, the international environment
brought about major changes in the EU.  The enlargement of the East
became an important point on the agenda and calls for changes in the
structure, policies and institutional arrangements of the EU increased
dramatically.  With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and the
establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU
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began to put greater emphasis on the political dimension of its external
relations. These developments were expected to impact its future relations
with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (Graumans 1997:6).
The rational behind the EU relations with developing countries after the
integration has changed.  Security issues have started to receive renewed
and increased emphasis.  In the Green Paper, the EU stressed that its
political dialogue with the ACP states would have its place in the common
external policy (Graumans 1997b: 24).
In this respect the Communication to the Council (March 1996) on ‘the EU and
the issue of conflicts in Africa: peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond'
is of interest.  The EU stated that it wanted to play a facilitating and supportive
role as it acknowledged that fostering peace, stability, democracy and human
rights in conflict situations was nearly impossible (Graumans 1997c:1).
To forge relations with ACP states the EU envisaged three aspects through
the Green Paper.  Firstly, a mutual commitment on issues likes good
governance, democracy, human rights and the rule of law - the so-called
essential elements clause.  Secondly, they needed to determine whether
there was political dialogue and what it concerned.  Issues included the
geographic configuration (multilateral, bilateral or regional), the priorities of
dialogue (national security, migration, illicit trafficking) and the level of
dialogue (ministerial, technical working parties).  Thirdly, the EU referred to
the linkage between political and cooperation components.  This was
envisaged through increased selectiveness of aid and adjusting the practical
modalities of cooperation in order to facilitate ownership of reforms by these
countries (European Commission 1996:25, Graumans 1997, 1998:34).
In the Guidelines for the negotiation of new cooperation agreements with the
ACP countries, written one year after the publication of the Green Paper, the
EU stipulated how the EU-ACP partnership could be brought into the Union's
foreign policy.  It stated that more resources for conflict prevention, a political
dialogue with greater depth and extended scope and an institutional basis for
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more effective and open dialogue were envisaged in the future EU-ACP
partnership (European Commission, 1997:14).
In the Mandate (June 1998), the essential elements clause was again
stressed as an important part of the future agreement (European Commission,
1998:7).  The mandate provided relatively clear definitions of what was
understood by the concepts in the essential elements clause.  It also
reaffirmed the need for a deeper, flexible (geographically and in terms of
levels of representation) and wider-ranging political dialogue to include all
matters of common, general or regional interest.  Other important elements
that reinforced the political dimension of a future ACP-EU partnership, were
the recognition that an active and organised civil society, equity and social
development are an integral part of a secure and democratic political
environment; the support of socially oriented market-based economic systems
in the ACP; the importance of peace building policies and the prevention of
violent conflict; the importance of developing post-conflict dialogue and
strengthening the links between emergency aid, rehabilitation and
development and dialogue on migration (European Commission 1998:9).
Graumans (1996:13) maintained that the implications of the EU Green Paper
on SADC was that the organization had aligned its institutions and structures
with the EU conditions, firstly as donor to SADC, and secondly as an
influential and strategic partner for SADC if it wanted to achieve deeper
integration as the EU had proved to be a leading organization in the world.
The expansion of the EU not only meant that it was becoming one of the
powerful organizations in the world, but it also meant that its focus, in terms of
financial aid, were to be better channelled to new members, mostly from
Eastern Europe, who would then become the largest beneficiaries of aid and
tough competitors for SADC countries.  The restructuring of SADC was also
meant to strengthen the relations between the Southern Region and the EU
as donor organizations.  As a result SADC institutions began to accommodate
and reflect the demands emphasised by donors such as the EU, for example
the adherence to human rights, the rule of law, transparency and good
governance.
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5.3.2 Globalization
According to Mazrui (2000:1) “on the threshold of the twenty-first century,
Africa’s capacity for development and to be part of the world economy was a
question that ranked higher than ever on the agenda of international
institutions, governments and researchers.  As a new period of great changes
in the world economy began, the staying behind of Africa probably confirmed
the afro-pessimistic feeling that the continent will never be able to ‘adjust to
the challenges of globalization’ and take a ‘normal’ place in international
economic relations”.
Mazrui (2000:2) further emphasises that “globalization is not a very recent
phenomenon as it began at least at the beginning of the nineteen century.
What happened in the last decades was just a rapid acceleration of
globalization.  In a sense, Africa had also taken part in the ancient movement
of globalization when the continent was the heart of the transatlantic slave
trade and later when it was the butt of colonial expeditions.  To date,
globalization carries two interrelated consequences.  On the one hand,
homogenisation (making all of us look similar) and on the other hand
hegemonisation (making one of us the superior).
The dialectic of homogenisation/hegemonisation is especially relevant in the
economic field as globalization is not simply the rapid development of trade
and investment throughout the world which makes many people in most of the
countries adopt quite similar ways of life and uniform patterns of behaviour.  It
also represents a more abstract process, according to which some economic
ideas and theories are spreading from some specific countries or regions to a
global context (Mazrui 2000:2).
Mazrui (2000:2) continues to say that “in this sense, one can argue that
globalization is partly the translation of an ‘intellectual’ hegemonisation
process on the part of a uniformising thought”.   The world-wide transfer of
those ideas and the content of those theories are highly controversial and
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constitute one of the central debates regarding the compatibility of the
globalization of the world economy, especially with regards to Africa’s
economic efforts through the AU, Nepad and sub-regional organizations in
individual countries on the continent.
Furthermore, Mazrui (2000:3) maintains, “Globalization, as conceived and
practiced, denies poorer countries access to the processes and lessons of
historical development. It erases the perspective of history”.  Mazrui (2002:3)
emphasizes this point by stating “we (Africans) do not ask for a turn at
imperialist rule, but not one of the more advanced countries arrived at their
present levels of development without state ownership and state intervention,
without unilateral tariff regulation and protectionism, without unfettered powers
of taxation and of state spending, at some time in their history”.
On this note, Piriheiro (1996:3) warns that “globalization is not only
institutionalised in policies and programmes of the International Monetary
Fund IMF and World Bank (Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes),
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
International Labour Organization (ILO), and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), but is also powerfully and directly promoted by various private
financial institutions which influence and control investments, as well as the
movement of billions of US dollars around the world each day.  Countries
which do not privatise, intervene in the economies, raise taxes and do not cut
spending, are given lower investment ratings by such private institutions”.
Lee (1997:218) noted that “SADC countries, with globalization increasing
around the world, are handicapped in their efforts to promote economic
integration, coordination of policies in agriculture, energy, the environment,
education and training, food security, freer trade, and the movement of
people, by their own differing levels of development.  Current prolonged
negotiations between South Africa and the EU, in the context of the Republics'
obligations under the Customs Union and SADC, suggest though that not only
do European Socialists become protectionist in Government, but they also
show little interest in helping to resolve internal contradictions hampering our
progress towards regionalism”.
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According to Lee (2000:218) “global levels of economic challenges facing
SADC include the process and effects of globalization which encompasses,
among others, financial, trade and technological forces.  The agenda of the
WTO, The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP as well as the
USA's Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are all key challenges and
opportunities for SADC.  Therefore, SADC could not afford to be left behind
or to be marginalised by these processes”.  In acknowledging this, SADC
(2002:4) maintained that its global development agenda of crucial importance
was still being championed by the UN and was expressed in the Millennium
Declaration and other United Nations led International Conventions through
the Millennium Development Goals.  Due to the above, SADC noted that it
had to align its agenda and structures with such initiatives, and that the
restructuring exercise was as a result of steps taken to counter such
challenges as globalization.
5.3.3 External debt and financial aid
The issue of SADC members’ dependency on financial aid and the ever-
increasing debt to financial institutions became a factor that led SADC to
consider the restructuring exercise.  The dependency continued despite the
restructuring of SADC in 1992 that promised to deal with the situation.
Another blow to SADC was the fact that dependency continued despite the
end of the Cold War with which it was hoped that SADC countries might be
able to access the world market and be able to boost their profiles on the
world stage (SADC 1992:43).
In several countries, the debt burden became extremely onerous.  The stock
of external debt in SADC stood at $69.12 billion in 2001.  External debt in
relation to GDP doubled in Angola, the DRC, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
On average, over the period 1992-2000, it represented 173 percent of GDP in
Angola, 175 percent in DRC, 124 percent in Malawi, 116 percent in Tanzania,
202 percent in Zambia and 238 percent in Mozambique.  However, in a few
SADC member countries, notably Botswana, Namibia and South Africa,
external debt remained stable at relatively low levels in relation to the GDP
(SADC 2003:4).
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SADC (2003:5) contended that due to SADC members’ debt positions, access
to external sources of funds, other than official sources on terms of high
concessions, remained limited.  Resource-seeking FDI and project finance,
associated with privatisation and public-private provision of infrastructural
services, became the main means for filling the savings-investment gap in
these countries.  They remained highly dependent on ODA for this purpose
though.  Consistent with that outcome, aid dependence in SADC remained
high at almost the same level in 1999 as in 1980 as measured in net ODA per
capita.  Given some of the countries' aid-dependence and high debt-burdens,
maintenance of sound macro-economic policies in these countries may, for
the foreseeable future, depend heavily on massive debt write-downs and very
large continued aid flows.
According to Isaksen (2002:16) the other factors that made the restructuring
exercise necessary was that five of the SADC member countries became
eligible for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC).  Two of these
countries, namely Mozambique and Tanzania, reached the completion points,
another two, Malawi and Zambia, reached the decision points and the DRC
was being considered.  This simply meant that SADC was not working, and to
correct its mandate, it had to reconsider its structures and operations in order
to deal with the situation.  This also meant that somehow SADC was not doing
enough to help other member countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania and
Malawi to break away from the cycle of poverty.
This led to some questions as to whether SADC was viable as a regional body
in Southern Africa, especially from international donors.  The continuation of
poverty within SADC members also highlighted that there was no trade
balance.  This further proved that SADC countries did not trade enough
among each other as compared to the EU and NAFTA, despite the emphasis
of the Windhoek Treaty in 1992 that established SADC from SADCC.  From
this point of view it became more necessary that SADC should try to turn the
situation around and start to address the poverty cycle within the region.
144
According to Mr. Horst Brammer (Deputy Director Department of Foreign
Affairs, South African government, at the SADC desk, interview 23 March
2002, Pretoria) the persistence of the above problem within SADC members
meant that SADC’s principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
were not functioning properly.  He further stated that this also meant that
SADC was loosing touch with reality and it had to re-look its operations and
institutions to address these problems.  The dependency syndrome of most
SADC members and the organization itself exposed that most members were
not committed to the organization though in dependency.   This was said to be
happening in many channels, for example the lack of financial accountability,
corruption, lack of democracy and lack of mechanisms of member states to
collect tax revenues.  Lastly, this exposed members’ lack of commitment
concerning empowering the organization in fulfilling its mandate through
paying membership fees.  This issue also became a factor when the SADC
mandate was reviewed.
5.3.4 External trade and trade policies
Foreign trade plays an important role in the economies of SADC member
countries.  Trade data of SADC countries reveals a number of features.
Firstly, trade is a relatively more important component of GDP in small
countries like Lesotho and Swaziland than in large countries like South Africa.
Total merchandise trade of the SADC increased between 1991 and 1998
(SADC 1999:34).
The SADC Barometer (2003:4) points out that the export trade from Angola,
Botswana, DRC, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia was dominated by oil or
mineral exports.  The oil and mining industry plays a significant role as major
foreign exchange earners and are a source of input to industrial development.
While oil and mining ventures are capital intensive, they still generate
substantial employment opportunities directly and indirectly through linkages
with other supply and input sectors.  In other countries, agriculture
commodities dominate export trade.  The bulk of imports of SADC countries
are intermediate and capital goods.  Only South Africa and Zimbabwe have
significant capacity to produce such goods.
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Available data on the terms of trade show that most SADC member countries
alongside with the majority of other African States have been experiencing a
long-term decline in their terms of trade.  This trend was particularly
persistent between 1980 and 2000.  Within Southern Africa, South Africa's
intra-regional trade was concentrated on the SACU countries due to the
existence of a customs union and a common monetary area.  Of South
Africa's exports to the Southern African region, which amounts to 19 percent
of total exports, 13 percent go to other SACU member countries.  Five out of
7 percent of South Africa's imports from Southern Africa come from other
SACU member countries (Van Schalkwyk 2003:23).
Among other Southern African countries, Tsie (1996:34) maintains that
Lesotho is overwhelmingly dependent on South Africa for its export market.
A significant proportion of Zimbabwe’s, and to some extent Malawi’s exports
also finds markets in Southern Africa, mainly in South Africa.  Otherwise, for
the majority of the countries in Southern Africa, the OECD is the major export
market.  Asian export destinations are significant for Angola, Mauritius,
Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia.  The bulk of imports of
SADC member countries originate in the OECD.  For the DRC, Mauritius,
Seychelles and Tanzania, Asian sources account for significant proportions of
their imports, whilst for Angola and South Africa, NAFTA is a significant
source of their imports.
According to Van Schalkwyk (2003:23) intra-regional trade in SADC is
influenced by both the SADC Trade Protocol and bilateral trade agreements,
which member countries negotiated prior to entry into force of the Trade
Protocol.  The Trade Protocol provides for the continuation of existing
bilateral arrangements as long as they do not contradict the protocol.  Intra-
SADC trade was estimated at 24 percent, which means that the major share
of trade is with the rest of the world.
5.4 Other factors that led to SADC restructuring
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SADC (2002:61) states that other issues that it had to respond to or look at as
a regional organization included good political and economic governance,
entrenched in a culture of democracy, transparency and the respect for the
rule of law as represented in the RISDP.  There were several factors that
facilitated the move towards restructuring in order to achieve deeper
integration and poverty eradication.
SADC (2002:62) states the following as factors that were also behind the
restructuring exercise:
· the intensifying spread of HIV and AIDS in the region;
· the need for gender mainstreaming and the empowerment of women;
· the need for rapid adoption and internalisation of Information
Communication Technologies;
· the need for diversification of regional economies through, inter alia,
industrial development and value addition;
· the need for trade liberalisation and development;
· the need for liberalisation in the movement of factors of production;
· the need for research, science and technology innovation,
development and diffusion in the region;
· the need for the creation of an enabling institutional environment;
· the need for private sector development and involvement; and
· the need for the development of a balanced and socially equitable
information and knowledge based society.
The above factors are interrelated and supportive of each other and none can
meaningfully impact the integration and poverty eradication agenda if
implemented in isolation.
According to SADC (2002:64) all were crucial for moving towards sustainable
development and required careful sequencing and timing if they were to be
effective as catalysts for deeper integration and poverty eradication after the
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restructuring exercise.  Other factors are highlighted below as listed by
SADC:
(a) Population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
According to SADC (2003:56) in the year 2002, it had a combined population
of approximately 210 million people with a total GDP of USD 226.1 billion.
During the same year the GDP grew by about 3.2 per cent, which was above
the population growth rate of approximately 2.1 per cent.
As shown in Figure four, the 2002 output in SADC was extremely uneven,
reflecting mainly differences in resource endowment and economic size of the
different member countries. South Africa is the largest economy in the region
in terms of GDP.
Figure 4: SADC GDP 2002
Source: SADC Statistics Database (2003)
The average regional GDP growth rate during the 1990s and the beginning of
the 2000s were significantly positive despite a slow start in 1990 to1992.
Strong signs of economic recovery in the region started showing in 1993 and
gained momentum in 1996 with a SADC average GDP growth rate of 5 per
cent.  However, in the following years the growth pattern fluctuated
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considerably from year to year and reached 3.2 in 2002 (see Figure five
below).
Figure 5: Growth rates in SADC, 1999-2002
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
1999
2000
2001
2002
Source: SADC Statistics (2003)
According to SADC (2003:57) improvement in economic performance was
largely attributed to positive political developments in the region as well as to
the introduction of macroeconomic reforms in most member states, which
occurred at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.  However,
economic performance on the whole remained fragile and most SADC
countries continued to be exposed to natural disasters and adverse external
shocks.  This, according to SADC, was the situation that needed a lot of
attention and improvement.  The restructuring exercise was therefore aimed
at addressing that.
(b) SADC Structure of Production
SADC (2003:57) further listed another factor that compelled the restructuring
exercise, namely the fact that the structure of production of SADC countries
was characteristic of a developing region where large shares of GDP
originate in primary sectors of production such as agriculture and mining,
whose total contribution was, on average, over 50 percent of the total GDP.
Statistics on SADC (2003:58) showed that only Mauritius and South Africa
have sizeable manufacturing sectors at approximately 25 percent of GDP.
The formerly sizeable manufacturing sector of Zimbabwe was not sustained
due to several factors, including the influx of cheaper foreign goods, higher
input costs and shortages of foreign exchange for importing inputs.
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Zimbabwe instead, gradually became more reliant on services than before.
The rest of the member countries have relatively small manufacturing sectors.
They depend on services, agriculture or mining.  In addition to having a small
manufacturing sector, SADC maintained that its economies do not produce a
diversified range of manufactured products.  They produce a similar range of
products such as foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing and
footwear, which are agricultural-resource based.  South Africa and Zimbabwe
have significant mineral-resource based manufacturing industries also, but
vertical integration in the different structures of production is lacking (SADC
2003:57).
Manufactured goods contribute substantial proportions to the total formal
merchandise exports in South Africa, Mauritius and Zimbabwe. Some of
these countries’ export levels are higher than the 16 percent average ratio for
Middle East and North Africa, but they were all below the world average ratio
of 78 percent and the average ratios for all low and all high-income countries
of 75 percent and 81 percent respectively in 1997 (SADC 2003:58).
In the mid 1990s, the average percentage of the labour force in industry in
SADC was only slightly higher than 15 percent.  The following countries had
above average percentages: Mauritius, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia.
In the period 1991 to 1999, there was positive growth of manufacturing value
added (MVA) in many SADC member countries.  During this period, the un-
weighted average rate of growth of MVA in the SADC was 5.2 percent.  The
un-weighted average rate of growth declined during the first five years of the
decade as a few countries in the region experienced negative rates of growth
of MVA (SADC 2003:58).
SADC (2002:49) admitted that the situation was no longer conducive for
regional integration and that the whole restructuring exercise was aimed at
dealing with these problems.  It was hoped that, with better and improved
SADC plans and institutional structures, these disappointing scenarios could
be reversed.
(c) Per Capita Income
Another factor was SADC's average level of per capita income, as measured
by the Gross National Income (GNI), was said to be very low and has been
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declining in most countries over the last three decades.  In the year 2002,
SADC average GNI per capita stood at USD 1,563.  The Seychelles, a SADC
country with approximately only 82,000 inhabitants, had the highest GNI per
capita at US $6,530.  Other high-income countries in the region included
Mauritius (US $3,830), Botswana (US $3,100) and South Africa (US $2,820).
The low per capita income countries in the SADC region, with income levels
below USD $500, were the DRC (US $80), Malawi US $160), Mozambique
(US $210), Tanzania (US $270), Zambia (US $320), and Zimbabwe (US
$480) (SADC 2003:59).
According to Majaju (1997:89), if the region is to achieve the Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) of halving the poverty level by 2015, GNI per
capita must grow consistently over the next few years at rates of
approximately 10 per cent.  This is of particular relevance to the less
developed countries in the region.  GNI per capita growth should also be
accompanied by appropriate policies of wealth distribution to achieve poverty
reduction.
SADC (2003:59) maintained that the main contributing factors to the current
level of per capita income included the distorted and underdeveloped
structures of production, poor economic performance, problems in macro-
economic management and unfavourable international economic
environment.
(d) Inflation and Interest Rates
As compared to the 1980s, most SADC countries performed relatively well in
stabilizing inflation rates, particularly since the early 1990s.  In 2002 the
average inflation rate in SADC was approximately 25 percent.  Sound
macroeconomic policies and inflation targeting pursued by most member
countries were the underlying factors contributing to the lowering of inflation
within the region.  In analysing the overall SADC trend in inflation in the
1990s, it was important to observe that the average inflation rate was
negatively influenced by high inflation rates experienced in those countries
that were involved in prolonged political turmoil and/or civil wars and
therefore, running essentially on war economies (SADC 2002:51).
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Figure 6: Inflation and interest rates
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Despite improvements in overall macroeconomic management, which
impacted positively on inflation in the last decade as reflected in a significant
decline in inflation rates, inflation remains one of the major challenges to
national efforts for economic recovery and for regional cooperation and
integration and poverty reduction.  Interest rates remained high in all SADC
member countries.  There were wide variations between countries with
single-digit inflation and interest rates mostly below 20 percent, and high
inflation countries with interest rates ranging from about 40 percent to as high
as over 100 per cent.  One of the main reasons that accounted for high
interest rates in the region was the tight monetary policy intended to reduce
inflation.  The restructuring exercise was aimed at dealing with this problem
by eventually harmonising monetary policies within the region with the aim of
creating deeper integration (SADC 2003:68).
(e) Savings and Investments
Savings and investments are central determinants of the rate and pattern of
economic growth in SADC economies.  By increasing domestic savings and
using the resources in productive domestic investment, SADC economies
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were expected to strengthen the region's prospects for accelerated economic
growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development.  Between 1980
and 2001 regional Gross National Savings (GNS) fell short of regional Gross
Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF).  In 2001 the average SADC GDCF was
16.75 percent of GDP against a regional GNS of 15.85 percent of GDP,
leaving a resource gap of -0.9 percent.  Among individual countries, there
were wide disparities between saving and investment rates, with most
countries recording negative resource balances (Van Schalkwyk 2003:11).
Van Schalkwyk (2003:16) states that as far as FDI is concerned, SADC as a
Community, attracted on average only USD 691 million in the early 1990s,
but FDI to the region quadrupled in the second half of the 1990s standing on
average at USD 3061 million during 1995-98.  This figure accounted for more
than half (55 percent) of all FDI flows directed to the SSA region.  Individual
SADC countries appeared to have performed relatively well compared with
other Sub-Saharan countries.  Six SADC countries (South Africa, Angola,
Zambia, Lesotho, Tanzania and Namibia) were among the top 10 recipients
of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa during the second half of the 1990s.  As a
result, Southern Africa emerged as a strong pole for attracting foreign
investment to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  From 1995, more than 25 percent
of FDI to the Sub-Saharan Africa region was directed to Southern Africa.
The outlook for investment in SADC would not be complete without bringing
the cross-border regional dimension into the picture.  South Africa, Mauritius
and Zimbabwe are the main sources of cross-border investment into other
SADC countries.  Currently, intra-regional investments in the SADC-region
are concentrated in the following sectors: mining, tourism, transport, finance,
manufacturing, retail, telecommunications, agriculture and fisheries.  The
main avenues for FDI in SADC are privatisation and public-private provision
of infrastructural services.  Most countries are also attracting resource-
seeking foreign investment flows.  In general, efficiency and market-seeking
investment flows remain proportionately small.  This was identified as a
problem in terms of integration by SADC, and the restructuring was aimed at
dealing with it.
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(f) Fiscal Balances
Despite efforts during 1990-2000 to bring negative fiscal balances to
sustainable levels, most SADC countries continued to experience relatively
high budget deficits.  However, with only a few exceptions, all SADC member
countries improved their fiscal positions during the 1990s.  On average,
budget deficits have been reduced in a significant number of SADC countries.
The control of capital expenditures, tax reforms (including the improvement of
tax collection and the broadening of the tax base) and privatisation of state-
owned enterprises were said to have been the underlying reasons for these
improvements.  Further reductions in budget deficits have proved difficult to
achieve, given SADC countries' commitment to eradicate poverty through
increased public provision of health and education facilities and services (Van
Schalkwyk (2003:19).
(g) Current Account Balance
According to SADC (2001:5), the overall annual average current account
balance for the period 1990-2000 was negative 7.0 percent.  However, an
analysis of the underlying trends during this period revealed three categories
of countries.  The first category represented by Botswana, Namibia, and to a
certain extent Mauritius, enjoyed rising current account surpluses throughout
the period of analysis.  The second category included South Africa,
Swaziland, Seychelles, and Zimbabwe.  According to SADC (2003) these
countries experienced a modest level of current account deficits, which do not
exceed, on average, 5 percent of GDP during the period of analysis.  The
third category of countries, with high and deteriorating current account deficits
include Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
The above situation had a negative reflection on the progress of regional
integration in Southern Africa.  Mostly, it had a negative reflection on the
donors who began to see SADC as not working.  Fears among the SADC
leadership were that, if the situation persists or if nothing is done to the
situation, COMESA could become a favourite destination of the international
donors.  In other words, the restructuring exercise was also aimed at dealing
with this problem.
5.5         The restructured SADC:  structures and objectives
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The SADC Heads of State and Government convened an Extra-Ordinary
Summit on 9 March 2001, in Windhoek, Namibia, at which they approved a
Report on the Restructuring of SADC Institutions and which spells out the
enhanced objectives and Common Agenda for SADC based on the objectives
as outlined in Article 5 of the 1992 Windhoek Treaty.
Isaksen (2002:87) maintains that the report on the restructuring exercise
articulates a more explicit Common Agenda, which takes into account a
number of principles such as development orientation, subsidiary market
integration and development, facilitation and promotion of trade and
investment and variable geometry.
Based on the above principles, SADC’s Common Agenda is to include:
· the promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-
economic development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the
ultimate objective of its eradication;
· the promotion of common political values, systems and other shared
values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic,
legitimate and effective; and
· consolidation and maintenance of democracy, peace and security.
In contrast to the country-based coordination of sectoral activities and
programmes, SADC has adopted a more centralised approach through which
the 21 Coordinating Units have been grouped into four clusters, namely
Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Food, Agriculture and Natural
Resources; Infrastructure and Services; and Social and Human Development
and Special Programmes, instead of 21 sectors as it was previously.
5.5.1 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)
In line with the restructuring mandate and in order to provide strategic
direction to the organization and to operationalise the SADC Common
Agenda, the RISDP was established.  The RISDP will be implemented in
three phases over a 15-year period (SADC 2001:62).
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According to SADC (2003:73) the RISDP reaffirmed the commitment of SADC
member countries to good political, economic and corporate governance
entrenched in a culture of democracy, full participation by civil society,
transparency and respect for the rule of law.  In this context, the African
Union's Nepad programme was embraced as a credible and relevant
continental framework, and the RISDP as SADC's regional expression and
vehicle for achieving the ideals contained the rein.  The RISDP emphasises
that good political, economic and corporate governance are prerequisites for
sustainable socio-economic development, and that SADC's quest for poverty
eradication and deeper levels of integration would not be realised if these
were not in place.
The RISDP is said to be indicative in nature, merely outlining the necessary
conditions that should be realised towards achieving these goals.  In order to
facilitate monitoring and the measurement of progress, it sets targets and time
frames for goals in the various fields of cooperation.  The purpose of the
RISDP is to deepen regional integration in SADC.  It provides SADC member
countries with a consistent and comprehensive programme of long-term
economic and social policies.  It also provides the secretariat and other SADC
institutions with a clear view of SADC's approved economic and social policies
and priorities (SADC 2002:7).
According to Isaksen and TjØnneland (2001:19) the RISDP is expected to
deal with political crises in the region, thus fulfilling the mandate of the AU.
Pressing issues involve the electoral and democratic issues in Zimbabwe in
particular.  The other big challenge the RISDP is expected to deal with is the
involvement or the promotion of the civil society into government decision-
making processes in the region.  The Southern African region is regarded as
performing badly when it comes to respect and consultation with civil groups.
An exception is placed on South Africa, which seems to be a leading country
together with Botswana when it comes to democracy in the region.  Whether
or not the RISDP will be successful remains to be seen.
5.6           New SADC structures and institutions
The new institutions that were added during the restructuring exercise that
began in the late 1990s are mentioned below.  It should be said that there is
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not much to comment on in terms of these institutions with regard to the
advantages and disadvantages, because they are still new, and nothing much
has been seen or written about it as yet.  Only time will tell whether they are
functioning as they should or not.  For the purpose of this study, only the
description of these institutions will be mentioned and to a lesser extent, their
objectives.
Figure 7:  SADC 2002 Organizational Structure              Source:  SADC (2002)
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(a) Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM)
One of the institution that was added as the result of the restructuring exercise
was the ICM that would ensure policy guidance, coordination and
harmonisation of cross-sectoral activities.  The ICM will comprise at least two
Ministers from each member state.
(b) SADC National Committees
National Committees have been established in each SADC member country
and their main function is to provide inputs at the national level in the
formulation of regional policies, strategies, the SADC Programme of Action
(SPA), as well as to coordinate and oversee the implementation of these
programmes at the national level.  Another major change as a result of the
restructuring exercise is that the Heads of State and Government approved a
radical restructuring of SADC institutions to 'squarely face the daunting
regional and global challenges.'  Following consultations over the past years
at ministerial level, SADC proposed the restructuring and centralization of its
functions, from 21 sectors based in 14 countries and dealing with a diverse
range of development issue from health, environment and mining to trade,
tourism and investment, to four clusters to be located at the SADC
headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana.  The Heads of State demanded that
the SADC sectors be reduced into four Directorates or clusters, which are as
follows: Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Infrastructure and Services;
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR); and Social and Human
Development and Special Programmes.  This was regarded as a major boost
to SADC’s operational methods as it was felt that the organization had a lot of
sectors, which caused the duplication of projects and as a result, wasted
money.  Some projects were regarded as having little regional value.  The
new set-up was said to eliminate these duplications (SADC 2002:43).
5.6.1 New SADC objectives
As compared to the Windhoek Treaty, SADC expanded its objectives but
decreased the sectors from 21 to four clusters as mentioned.  The objectives
below are provided under Article 5 of the SADC Treaty:
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· Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance
the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.
· Evolve common political values, systems and institutions.
· Promote and defend peace and security.
· Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-
reliance, and the inter-dependence of member countries.
· Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and
programmes.
· Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of
resources of the region.
· Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective
protection of the environment.
· Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and
cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region.
To achieve its aim, SADC planned the following:
· Harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of member
countries.
· Mobilise the peoples of the region and their institutions to take
initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the
region, and to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes
and projects of SADC.
· Create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of
requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and
operations of SADC and its institutions.
· Develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to
free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the
peoples of the region generally among member countries.
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· Promote the development of human resources.
· Promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology.
· Improve economic management and performance through regional
cooperation.
· Promote the coordination and harmonisation of the international
relations of member countries.
· Secure international understanding, cooperation and support, mobilise
the inflow of public and private resources into the region.
· Develop such other activities as member countries may decide in
furtherance of the objectives of SADC.
The signatories of the SADC Treaty agreed that under-development,
exploitation, deprivation and backwardness in Southern Africa will only be
overcome through economic cooperation and integration.  The member
countries also recognised that achieving regional economic integration in
Southern Africa requires them to put their full support behind SADC to act on
behalf of all Southern Africans for their common prosperity, peace and unity.
5.7 SADC justification of the 1999 restructuring exercise
The restructuring of SADC in 1999 can be traced back to the early 1990s
when the membership increased from 10 to 14 members with the addition of
South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, and the Seychelles and the
Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997.  The increase required SADC to
consider improved regional security and redefine its approach to regional
security as was done with the increment of the European Union from 14
members to 25 members in 2004.  As a result of the increment the SADC
Programme of Action (SPA) was formulated.  SPA covered cooperation in
several economic and social sectors and implemented several infrastructure-
related and other projects.  SADC also developed protocols in a number of
areas of co-operation, which provided the legal framework for co-operation
among member countries (SADC 2000:54).
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According to SADC (2000:55), the reason for restructuring in 1999 was due to
constraints the organization was encountering within the secretariat which
were basically administrative and regional.  SADC stated the following
reasons for the restructuring: (1) lack of institutional reforms for effective
transformation from SADCC into SADC; (2) lack of synergy between the
objectives of the Treaty on the one hand and the existing SPA and
institutional framework on the other; and (3) lack of appropriate mechanisms
capable of translating the high degree of political commitment into concrete
programmes of community building and integration.  The other point
emphasised by SADC was that the decentralised system was costly and slow
considering the fact that some members seldom paid their membership fees.
SADC further stated that the other element of complication in the restructuring
exercise was that it was difficult within the decentralised system to distinguish
which of the projects were those of SADC and which projects belonged to
national governments.  As a result donors would often negotiate with national
governments for projects that undermined the SADC authority as a regional
body.  The approach further led member countries to compete and often
create certain projects that in return had less regional interests.  That led to a
situation where the secretariat lost control of prioritising projects in terms of
benefits in that member country’s interest to certain projects.  SADC then felt
that due to this situation, the decentralised system encouraged more
inequality among members than integration per se (SADC 2001:5).
Due to the above factors or problems, Mr. Ajeo Bramdeo (Assistant Director,
Department of Foreign Affairs Multilateral Desk SADC restructuring, interview
28 March 2001, Pretoria) explained that the objective of restructuring was to
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its policies and programmes and
to further implement a more coherent and better co-ordinated strategy to
eliminate poverty in the region.  In order to underline the restructuring of
SADC institutions and provide a clear orientation for the policies and
programmes of the organization (medium to long-term), the Extraordinary
Summit also approved that the Secretariat prepare the Regional Indicative
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) which is guided by the vision of SADC.
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Another element that was stated by Mr. Bramdeo (interview 28 March 2001,
Pretoria) on the SADC restructuring exercise was that SADC wanted to bring
the organization closer to the people and seek greater popular participation
because the former SADCC was often accused of being an elitist organization
functioning at the level of Heads of State.  To correct this, SADC formulated
Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, which states that the organization will seek to
involve fully the peoples of the region and non-governmental organizations.
However, this is disputed by Tsie et al (1996:48) who state that, regarding the
SADC article under discussion, with the exception of South Africa, the attitude
of most governments towards the involvement of any non-governmental
actors - NGOs, research organizations or academics - is generally hostile.
Furthermore, trade unions were rare outside South Africa, Namibia, Zambia
and Mauritius.  As a result, this cast doubts on whether the article would be
viable in SADC after the restructuring.
Despite SADC's attempts to adjust to the new context and to build on
development in the region, the transformation from a political grouping to a
bureaucracy aiming to integrate its member countries was still an ongoing
process.  SADC also envisaged that the loose structures did not facilitate
enforcement of its Treaty.  As a result, the findings of a major rationalisation
study were presented in 1997.  In the study, the conclusion was drawn that
SADC should move from a project approach steered by cooperating partners,
to the harmonisation of policies and procedures that will enhance integration.
The main challenge for SADC was seen to be the effective achievement of the
objectives set out in the Treaty.  That demanded major restructuring (SADC
1999:34).
For SADC to address the above problems and other institutional problems,
the Heads of State and Government approved the restructuring of SADC
institutions at the Extraordinary Summit held in March 2001, in Windhoek.
Under restructuring, the twenty-one sectors were grouped into clusters under
four Directorates at the SADC Secretariat (to be discussed later).  At the
national level, SADC National Committees were to co-ordinate their respective
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individual member states relating to SADC.  At the regional level, an
Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) was created to co-ordinate the work
of different clusters.  The new structure also included the Troika system and
the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security.
5.8 Summary
The restructuring exercise was never going to be an easy task.  As in 1992,
SADC had to restructure in terms of external as well as internal factors.
Whether this initiative would eventually integrate the region to the desired
level remains to be seen.  However, the consideration to re-examine SADC
structures and operations needs to be applauded considering the challenges
mentioned in this chapter.  SADC institutions and structures as designed in
1992 were based on the decentralised approach and would not have made
the organization survive ultimately.  Also, the goal of total integration would
have remained a distant dream.
The Lusaka Declaration that preceded the Windhoek Treaty, which
established the new organization (SADC) in 1992, contained a brief overview
and analysis of the then new opportunities and demands raised by change in
the region and in the external environment and attempted to harness those
changes or to use those changes as a justification and motivation for closer
cooperation and community building purposes.  External driving forces that
informed the change from SADCC into SADC were more economically
oriented than the mainly political-security considerations that underlay the
earlier establishment of SADCC.  However, as chapter four pointed out, the
change from Co-ordination to Community in 1992 was not enough to
strengthen SADC as a regional organization aimed at integrating the region’s
economy.
By the late 1990s, as was the case in the late 1980s during the SADCC
tenure, factors such as economic globalization with its emphasis on economic
liberalization, increased bloc formation and the globalization of finance and
production, regional political crisis, debt crisis among member countries, the
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restructuring of the EU and the inefficiency of the OPDS in dealing with
security in the region,  played major roles in the decision to transform the
organization in 1999 into one that would, at least in theory, concentrate on
regional economic integration, rather than regional cooperation for the sake of
strengthening and protecting individual member countries.
This chapter addressed the factors and conditions which contributed to SADC
members’ realisation that the organization established in 1992 was no longer
equipped to deal with changes in the region as well as those external factors
that impacted the region.   The restructuring of SADC in 1999 is a prime
example of the extent to which the Southern African region took cognizance of
change at various levels and moved towards the adjustment to such change,
using it in a positive way to promote and develop the well-being of the region.
Towards the late1990s, SADC member states also concluded that their efforts
to achieve the objectives outlined in the Windhoek Treaty yielded limited
results.
SADC did not achieve the reduction of economic dependence on
international donors, nor did it achieve improved trade among member
states.  Although SADC aimed to promote solidarity, peace, security, human
rights, democracy, rule of law, evolvement of common political values,
systems, and institutions, it failed to deal with conflict in the region as war in
the DRC remained unsolved.  Instead the conflict seemed to be solved by
South Africa as member not SADC as a regional body.  SADC also seemed
to fail to come up with policies that could deal with the situation in Zimbabwe
and Swaziland.  Secondly, SADC as an organization consisting of sovereign
states experienced difficulties in implementing regional policies.  The issue of
surrendering sovereignty to supra-national organizations remained an
obstacle in this regard as states continued to enhance their national interests
and national policies at the expense of regional integration.  Lastly, the
organization continued to be compromised by competing development
agendas of its member states.  This aspect was elaborated on in the
previous chapters. These competing agendas are, for example, evident in
the economic indicators presented in the previous tables and economic
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indicators in this chapter. Moreover, scholars such as those referred to in the
literature review of this study are in agreement that regional economic,
political and development integration is most likely to succeed when member
states enjoy relatively equal levels of political and economic developments.
In applying regime theory it can be deduced that SADC, as in chapter three,
by the mid-1990s was still adhering to the same principles as those it stood
for in 1980 until 1992.  These principles, as indicated, are contained in
SADCC’s founding document, the Lusaka Declaration and the Windhoek
Treaty.  Similarly, the organizations’ norms remained the same, except for
the fact that sectors increased and administrative institutions were added.
However, as in the 1992 restructuring, some of the factors above indicated
that the structure, rules and decision-making procedures of the organization
by the late 1990s became inadequate to address the region’s challenges.
The restructuring of SADC in 1999 represented an increased emphasis on
responding to international trends through mobilization of the region’s own
resources, potential and capacity.  Furthermore, the changed international
political landscape at the end of the Cold War, globalization, and the demise
of apartheid in South Africa, shifted international emphasis on traditional
military political security to a concentration on a much broader definition of
security that included economic, environmental and societal security.
Economic growth and development within a distinctly neo-liberal economic
paradigm became the new ideological driving force that governed decisions,
also at regional level.
In brief it was not only the development in SADC external environments that
necessitated the change in 1999 but also internal factors within the Southern
African region, such as major changes that had taken place during the late
1990s which, in turn, changed the political face of the region and raised
expectations of peace and security, and an opportunity for development.  The
underlying rationale for the establishment of SADCC had therefore fallen
away and with the prospect of the region’s biggest and strongest economy
joining its neighbours, the role and function of SADCC was revisited and a
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new organization, taking the changed political nature of the region into
consideration, was formed in the form of SADC.  SADC was therefore not only
a result of or response to changing international trends and demands, but also
a response to a changed political climate within the region. It was clear that
globalization, and in particular the neo-liberal economic paradigm that was
spread through this process, had a great impact on the way in which the
Southern African region perceived its own future in the 21st century.
In view of the region’s history and under circumstances of economic hardship
and a host of problems ranging from internal political instability to food, health
and environmental insecurity, looking past and cooperating beyond immediate
national demands and needs, SADC was established in order to create an
enabling environment that would allow for such ‘deep integration.’  On the
other hand, an undeniable strength of the organization lay in its ability to learn
from its experiences and to adjust and change.  The restructuring of SADC
from 1999 is the prime example of this advantage.
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Chapter Six
Concluding Remarks and Recommendations
6.1 Introduction
The study on the analysis and appraisal of SADCC/C restructuring has
provided an inside understanding of the factors underneath the restructuring
processes. On both processes, namely, the 1992 and the 1997 restructuring,
SADCC/C has shown that it mainly reacted to external factors as the main
base of changing the operations of the organization. Regime theory in this
study helped to identify four crucial research questions on restructuring of
SADCC/C as a process. These include: why was SADCC formed? Why it
restructured? How it restructured and what was the significant of the process?
This study has managed to analyse and appraise factors behind SADCC/C
restructuring.
This concluding chapter will provide a brief overview of the politics of the
SADC restructuring as contained in this study and will highlight key points for
future research.  However, before this study can begin with an overall
overview, it must be pointed out that, as indicated in chapter five, the
restructuring of the OAU into the AU, and the introduction of the Nepad
programme in the continent, had an impact on SADC.  This is viewed as a
possible restructuring SADC will adhere to in the future. In brief, this thesis
foresees a possible restructuring with SADC as a result of the AU and Nepad.
Since both programmes are at the continental level, SADC is expected to
comply with their objectives. As noted in the previous chapters, regimes
restructure to accommodate challenges as well as opportunities occurring
within their areas. Therefore, it is expected of SADC to align its programmes
with those of the AU and the Nepad programme.
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This chapter will also discuss the impact of the mentioned programmes on
SADC as the future possible restructuring in SADC as an organization.  With
these planned programmes at continental level, SADC as a sub-regional
body, is expected to comply with them.  Therefore, an analysis and appraisal
of the AU and Nepad programmes and their relation to SADC will be covered
as another foreseeable restructuring exercise within SADC in the near future.
The discussion could also be viewed as a future research projects on SADC
restructuring.
The main aim of this chapter, however, is to present concluding remarks
based on the research questions raised in chapter one and discussed
throughout. Finally, this chapter aims to present recommendations for future
studies on this topic.
6.2 Concluding remarks and recommendations
In the introduction of this dissertation, this study emphasised the importance
of regional organization and factors, which they are expected to deal with.
The first chapter mainly introduced the problem of the study regarding the
restructuring of SADCC/C.  The research questions of this study were
therefore summed up into four broad aspects in order to represent the
problem of restructuring.  A research question that was raised in chapter one
was why regimes are formed?  The second question was why regimes
restructure?  The third question was how regimes restructure?  The last
research question of the study was what is the significance of restructuring in
SADCC/C?
The realist approach on regime formation in chapter two showed that power
plays a crucial role as a threat to discipline weaker states and it forces weaker
states to seek co-ordination. Chapter two in this study indicated that SADCC
emerged as a direct response to both the adverse position of African states in
the international economy and the dangerous external environment, which the
South African apartheid government posed.  In seeking to restructure the
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historical patterns of asymmetrical economic relations with South Africa, the
member states hoped to create and legitimize an alternative regional
economic order which reflected an ideology of liberation.  Previous political
and diplomatic cooperation within the FLS provided the foundation for an
organization which would seek the coordination and harmonization of national
policies to achieve economic autonomy.
Realist theories on regime formation also argued in chapter two that the
reason why states choose to form or observe a regime is because they realise
that they are operating in a co-ordination and confronted with same
challenges. The risk of not co-ordinating moves them into less advantageous
terms.  With that in mind, states therefore form regimes consisting of rules,
norms, principles and decision-making processes to help them deal with
problems and thus create opportunities for their regions or areas.  This was
apparent in chapter two when analysing the SADCC 1980 structure.  The
structure was designed to co-ordinate developmental projects rather than
regional integration in the form of a borderless region as in the case of the EU.
Chapter three addressed why SADCC restructured in 1992.  This was the
second research question of the study raised in chapter one.   The question
was addressed by discussing factors and conditions which contributed to
SADCC members’ realisation that the organization established in 1980 was
no longer equipped to deal with changes in the region as well as those
external factors that impacted the region.   The restructuring of SADCC into
SADC through the 1992 Windhoek Treaty was a prime example of the extent
to which the Southern African region took cognizance of change at various
levels and moved towards an adjustment to such change, using it in a positive
way to promote and develop the well-being of the region.  Towards the 1990s,
SADCC member states also concluded that their efforts to achieve the
objectives outlined in the Lusaka Declaration yielded limited results.  What
follows is an appraisal of the development objectives of SADCC as outlined in
the Lusaka Declaration (SADCC 1980:1).
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Chapter three raised several factors as reasons behind the restructuring of
SADCC to SADC in 1992.  The first factor was the failure of SADCC to
reduce economic dependence on South Africa and other actors. Secondly,
the stated objective of forging links to create equitably regional integration
also yielded limited results.  This objective was, amongst others, hindered by
the duplication of regional organizations, which aimed to achieve regional
integration.  Thirdly, SADCC as an organization, consisting of sovereign
states, experienced difficulties in implementing regional policies. The issue of
surrendering sovereignty to a supra-national organization remained an
obstacle in this regard as states continued to enhance their national interest
and national policies at the expense of regional integration. Fourthly, the
stated objective of “concerted action to secure international cooperation
within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation” also produced
mixed results.  The organization’s efforts to secure cooperation manifested,
contradictorily, in greater dependence on stronger economic actors, such as
South Africa and the international donor community. Furthermore, the
objectives to achieve economic liberation were compromised due to
increased dependence on these actors.  Lastly, competing development
agendas of its member states also compromised the organization.  This
aspect will be elaborated on in the summary of subsequent chapters.  These
competing agendas, for example, were evident in the economic indicators
presented in the tables in this chapter.  Moreover, scholars such as those
referred to in the literature review of this study were in agreement that
regional economic, political and development integration is most likely to
succeeded when member states enjoy relatively equal levels of political and
economic developments.
Chapter four discussed how SADC restructured.  The main theoretical base of
the discussion on how it restructured was influence by Young’s (1982)
perspective on regime change or transformation.  Young emphasised that one
of the reasons regimes change or transform is because of pressures that are
experienced by the regime because of its members or because of other
pressures that the regime found itself faced with.  Young (1982) further
maintained that when regimes are faced with such a challenge, alterations in
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their structures such as principles, rules, norms and decision-making
procedures are inevitable or could be expected.  Chapter four pointed out that
the emphasis on the creation of SADC structure in 1992 was more on
economic integration as opposed to economic co-ordination as was the case
with SADCC.
The structural analysis in chapter four revealed that SADC was created in
1992 with the twin goals of achieving economic development and political
stability through regional trade liberalization and political and economic
integration.  SADC member states also expected to use the institution as a
way of reducing their vulnerability to external financial shocks induced by
fluctuations, political instability and uncertainty in the rest of the world.  The
SADC Treaty of 1992 called on its member states to promote peace and
security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the peace settlement of
disputes.  However, the Treaty gave prominence to SADC’s ministers of
economic planning and finance in constituting its Council of Ministers, thus
giving less priority to issues of politics, defence and security.  In an effort to
rectify the situation, the 1996 SADC Summit of Heads of State and
Government met in Gaborone and launched the OPDS, which operated at
Summit, Ministerial technical levels, independently of other SADC structures.
Chapter five, like chapter three, addressed factors and conditions which
contributed to SADC members’ realisation that the organization established in
1992 was no longer equipped to deal with changes in the region as well as
those external factors that impacted in the region.   The restructuring of SADC
from 1999 was presented as a prime example of the extent to which the
Southern African region took cognizance of change at various levels and
moved towards the adjustment to such change, using it in a positive way to
promote and develop the well-being of the region.  Towards the late1990s,
SADC member states also concluded that their efforts to achieve the
objectives outlined in the Windhoek Treaty yielded limited results.
The reason behind the restructuring in 1999 as described in chapter five
were said to be because SADC did not achieve the reduction of economic
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dependence on international donors, nor did it achieve improved trade
among members states.  Although SADC aimed to promote solidarity, peace,
security, human rights, democracy, rule of law, evolvement of common
political values, systems and institutions, it failed to deal with conflict in the
region as war in the DRC remained unsolved.  Instead the conflict seemed to
be solved by South Africa as member rather than by SADC as a regional
body.
SADC also seemed to fail to come up with policies that could deal with the
situation in Zimbabwe and Swaziland.  Secondly, SADC as an organization
consisting of sovereign states, as mentioned before, experienced difficulties
in implementing its own policies.  The issue of surrendering sovereignty to
supra-national body remained an obstacle in this regard as states continued
to enhance their national interests and national policies at the expense of
regional integration.  Lastly, the organization continued to be compromised
by competing development agendas of its member states.  This aspect was
elaborated on in the previous chapters.  These competing agendas are, for
example, evident in the economic indicators presented in the previous tables
and economic indicators in this chapter.  Moreover, scholars such as those
referred to in the literature review of this study are in agreement that regional
economic, political and development integration is most likely to succeeded
when member states enjoy relatively equal levels of political and economic
developments.
In chapter one, regime theory was referred to as a perspective in International
Relations that focuses on cooperation among actors, states or countries in a
given area, and as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and
procedures around which countries’ expectations converge in a particular area.
Little (2001:303) maintained that regimes consist of four defining elements,
which are: principles; norms; rules; and decision-making processes.  Firstly,
Krasner referred to principles as represented by coherent bodies of theoretical
statements about the international order.  Secondly, he referred to norms,
which specify the general standards of behaviour, as well as identifying the
rights and obligations of states.  These norms and principles form the
172
foundation of the character of a regime and can only be changed by
transforming the nature of the regime.  Thirdly, the defining element of a
regime in the study was identified as rules it operates according to.  These
rules are mainly designed to resolve conflicts, which may arise among
members and their interpretation of principles and norms.  Lastly, a decision-
making procedure underlies a regime. These procedures identify specific
prescriptions for behaviour, the system of voting and for implementing these
decisions.
Regime theory in this study successfully analysed and appraised factors
behind the restructuring of SADCC/C since its formation in 1980. Regime
theory made it easy to identify SADCC/C as organization which is subject to
survive depending on whether member countries adhere to their set rules,
principles, norms, and decision-making processes. Regime theory has
helped to identify the fact that failure by member countries to observe their
own rules in this case SADCC/C Treaties as well as other protocols could
lead a regime to failure or restructuring.
Regional integration is about much more than can be captured in economic
models or bilateral trade statistics. Regionalism is a matter of economics
only, but of politics, security concerns and intangibles such as perceptions.
The experiences in Latin America and in the EU in this study showed that
while it is imperative that regions offer conditions of democratic stability along
with sustained macro-economic reform, little is achieved without concerted
political leadership, vision and international persona. SADC so far is moving
towards this direction, but it remains ahead as compared to other regional
blocs in the continent.
As pointed out in the introduction, this study foresees possible restructuring
due to the transformation of the OAU into AU and the drafting of the Nepad
programme. Below, these factors are discussed as possible research fields
on SADC restructuring.
6.3 The transformation of the OAU into the AU
173
In chapter one of this study, Stoker (1995:54) was quoted as stating that
regime theory holds substantial promise for understanding a variety of
responses to regional organizations changing or restructuring.  It emphasises
the interdependence of regional and non-regional forces in meeting economic,
political and social challenges within a geo-regional area of regional
organizations.  In this case, continental developments cannot be ruled out as a
major influence on SADC principles, rules, norms and decision-making
procedures.
When the OAU was established in 1963, there were fewer international and
regional organizations in the continent. Their mandates and tasks were much
more limited. In the intervening years, matters changed substantially.  Within
Africa, a range of sub-regional organizations had developed in response to
specific challenges.  These include SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, Inter-
governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union
(AMU) and more. In addition, international organizations, especially the UN,
have taken on larger and more complex mandates.  During the birth of the AU
one of the major challenges was how to relate to these other organizations.
After the transformation in 2001 there were immediate issues regarding
linkages between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs).  For
historical reasons, there was no structural relationship between the OAU and
the RECs.  This was regarded as problematic given the peace and security
mandate of the OAU, alongside the fact that the principal responsibilities for
enforcing peace and security have been assumed by the RECs.  According to
Short (Deputy Director in the Multi-lateral desk at the Department of Foreign
Affairs, South African government, interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) an
immediate question before and after the transformation was regarding the
kind of interface required between the AU and the RECs such as SADC and
others in the continent, or whether there should be several structures specific
to the functions of RECs (for example one for peace and security, one for
economic integration, and more) or was one single interface required?
According Short, deputy director in the Department of Foreign Affairs South
Africa (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) another issue that SADC had to
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consider was the AU’s objectives, which were the long-term issues of
integration or cooperation between the AU and RECs.  A longer term,
strategic question was, does the AU propose to integrate RECs into its
structure or to cooperate with them or would the RECs continue to exist as
autonomous entities as the AU was established. Or was it envisaged that over
time they would gradually be absorbed into the AU?
Short (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) continued that the other question
was if the ‘integration’ or absorption scenario was followed, how would it have
occurred?  Furthermore if the ‘cooperation’ scenario was followed, which was
the most realistic given the relative capacities of the organizations as they
existed, mechanisms would have been required to promote and monitor
consistency between RECs’ policies and their compatibility with the long-term
aim of regional convergence.  The stated scenario became a serious factor in
which REC’s operations and existence into the new AU was to be looked and
acted upon.  This means that in the near future regional organizations like
SADC have to align themselves to the proposed structures of the AU as
emphasized above.
AU Constitutive Act (2000:3) states that another AU task is to promote good
governance, democracy and human rights.  Democratic decision-making
within the AU is seen as a complex task and some clarifications of the
principles are said to be required before structures are established and
mandates are given.  Just like in the European Union, theoretically, it operates
on the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, whereby decision-making powers are
delegated to the most devolved competent authority.  But the tendency of
disgruntled parties to appeal against lower-level decisions, leads to an upward
drift in authority.  Where roles are not clear, mandate disputes between
different bodies can lead to paralysis of the decision-making machinery.
Eventually, the SADC Organ will have to look at and adjust this issue.
Short (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) further maintained that in the
African context, prior to the establishment of the AU, the challenges were
likely to arise in the area of liaison between the African Parliament and
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national and sub regional parliaments, such as the established East African
Parliament.  Another set of challenges rose in the field of the rule of law, and
the extent to which regional instruments such as the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights are justifiable through regional mechanisms.  In
these respects it was important that the AU promotes existing regional
organizations. The Zimbabwean land situation serves as an example for
SADC’s attention through the AU structures or protocols on conflict resolution.
Masemola (2002:6) acknowledged that the transformation of the OAU into the
AU played and will continue to play a huge role in transforming sub-regional
organizations in the continent.  As per AU Constitutive Act, sub-regional
organizations were expected to reflect almost the same as institutions that
were carried by the AU as a continental body.  Due to the transformation at
the continental level, by 1999, SADC began to restructure its institutional
framework to comply with AU requirements.  SADC began to introduce organs
or structures that can be compared to the AU in its restructuring plan, like the
Tribunal, the Council, the Integrated Committee of Ministers (IMC) and the
SADC Parliamentary Forum (like the Pan African Parliament [PAP] in the AU).
Basically, it can be said that changes that were taking place in the OAU-AU
transformation had a bearing on the SADC outlook in terms of organizational
structure and regional mandate.  It is expected that once the AU is in full
operation other changes are to be expected in the RECs, most importantly in
SADC as a pilot project.
6.4             The drafting of the Nepad programme
The creation of Nepad in the continent by African leaders contributed to the
SADC restructuring exercise.  The linkage between Nepad and the SADC
RISDP was adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance at their
meeting in Blantyre on 13 September 2001, which came to the conclusion
that, in terms of relationships, SADC is part of and feeds Nepad as the latter is
premised on the RECs.
According to SADC (2001:3) the ministers recognized that Nepad is regarded
as a major economic framework and process within the Union, in that SADC is
176
a recognized REC of the Union.  It was therefore important to SADC that it
aligned itself to the mandates as spelled out in the AU Constitutive Act.  It was
decided that the development of the RISDP and the SADC restructuring
process should take Nepad into account, and where appropriate, the SADC
and Nepad programmes should be harmonized.  SADC should also take
Nepad into account in the ongoing review of SADC programmes.
The mandate for the Nepad had its genesis at the OAU Extraordinary Summit
held in Sirte, Libya during September 1999.  The Summit mandated President
Mbeki of South Africa and President Bouteflika of Algeria to engage Africa's
creditors on the total cancellation of Africa's external debt.  After the South
Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, held in Havana, Cuba
during April 2000, President Mbeki of South Africa and President Obasanjo of
Nigeria were mandated to convey the concerns of the South to the G-8 and
the Bretton Woods institutions IMF and the World Bank.
The adoption of Nepad was considered as one of the most important
developments of recent times for its conception of a development programme
placing Africa at the apex of the global agenda by:
· creating an instrument for advancing a people-centred sustainable
development in Africa based on democratic values;
· being premised on recognition that Africa has an abundance of natural
resources and people who have the capacity to be agents for change
and so holds the key to her own development; and
· providing the common African platform from which to engage the rest
of the international community in a dynamic partnership that holds real
prospects for creating a better life for all.
According to Nepad (2001:23) its primary objective is to eradicate poverty in
Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a
path of sustainable growth and development so as to halt the marginalisation
of Africa in the globalization process.  At the core of the Nepad process is the
African ownership, which must be retained and strongly promoted, so as to
meet the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples.  While the principle of
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partnership with the rest of the world is equally vital to this process, such
partnership is expected to be based on mutual respect, dignity, shared
responsibility and mutual accountability.   The expected outcomes are:
· economic growth and development and increased employment;
· reduction in poverty and inequality;
· diversification of productive activities;
· enhanced international competitiveness and increased exports and
increased African integration.
According to Brammer (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) the founding of
Nepad in the continent and the fact that the programme was to be
implemented through regional organizations meant that SADC had to comply
with its objectives and reflect types of institutions in which the programme
could be easily implemented.  Brammer further emphasised that the impact of
Nepad had a lot of implications for the restructuring exercise.  One of the
reasons was that since the programme was mainly initiated by South Africa,
the Southern African region through SADC was regarded as an example of
the programme.  Therefore, it made more sense to propose that SADC be one
of the regional bodies to restructure and fall in with the Nepad vision of
eradicating poverty throughout the continent by using the RECs as main
building blocs and by contributing to the AU’s success.
Brammer (interview 23 March 2002, Pretoria) further maintained that the
introduction of Nepad meant that SADC had to look at issues such as
governance, human rights issues, democracy, economic trade with the
continent and among regional members, the inclusion of civil society and Non-
Governmental groups into government decision making processes, for
example.  This basically boiled down to the fact that SADC had to construct
institutions that would deal with the issues that were ignored in the past.
6.5 Future areas of research
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This study is not, and has not attempted to be the last word on the SADC
restructuring or regional integration in Southern Africa.  Rather, its focus has
been on the factors that led SADC to restructure in 1992 and in 1999.
Moreover, the issue of the SADC restructuring was approached through the
theory of regimes as described by Young (1987).  As such, there are areas of
research in this dynamic field that are relatively unexplored and deserve the
attention of the serious student or scholar.  The most important of these
include:
After assessing the existing literature, this study identified gaps in chapter one
that it believes need attention from a research point of view.  These included
the following: most literature on regional integration in southern Africa has
been on economic integration and how regional economic can be shaped to be
in line with the EU. Other gaps included the fact that most literature focussed
on the evolution of the concept security in southern Africa and how SADC
should operationalise the concept in its projects. The work that focussed on
SADC restructuring, however, failed to look at external factors that propelled
the process. The study on the restructuring of SADC mainly answered four
questions as mentioned in chapter one and in this chapter. For future research
the following questions need attention:
· How do international trends such as globalization affect or shape
structures and operations of regional organizations in this case SADC?
· What factors might be involved in understanding the dynamics, focus,
and structure of different types of regional organization especially in
southern Africa?
· Why might regional and sub-regional co-operation appear particularly
significant for southern African countries?
· What might constitute the key challenges facing SADC and its member
countries in the future?
This aimed at discussing political factors that contributed to SADCC/C
restructuring. In both processes (1992 and 1999) these factors were
successfully identified. However, it also appeared that most factors that
propelled the restructuring exercise had economic and social symptoms.
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Despite this, the study managed to explain that the restructuring exercises in
SADCC/C were not as a result of the organization failing to deliver, but as a
complex process that consisted of many factors.
6.6 The way forward for Southern African integration
With the above lessons learned through conducting research in this study,
one could suggest two types of economic integration, which have been tried
with varying degrees of success to be applied in the African context.  One is a
monetary union, which involves the coordination of macro-economic policies
by regional economic blocs.  This would ensure fiscal consistency in external
payments and harmonize the exchange rate policies of the member states.
The only impediment to it is the one of sovereignty as raised earlier.
However, it is valuable because it stimulates the free movement of people,
capital goods and services.  This aspects needs to be considered further in
the restructuring of SADC.
The other approach paramount to integration is one of creating a common
market.   This stimulates economic cooperation among states that want to
maintain their sovereignty.  The focus here is on the removal of tariff walls.
Often, common markets are expected to lead to a monetary union and this is
also the key roadblock to its acceptance.  In SADC in particular there has
been a slow move towards this direction.  However, the problem that still
remains is the question of sovereignty.
In the African context a major source of difficulty in terms of integration has
been the size of both the population and economies of scale and the size of
markets.  One way of mitigating the effect of this problem is economic growth
coupled with the diversification of exports that can improve the ability of small
economies to lobby for the improvement of price regimes for primary products
and by attracting foreign direct investment.  Another strategy should be
promoting and expanding trade, movement of capital, people, goods and
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services.  This is bound to assist the member states as benefit to all and will
be more so if they can pool their resources together.
Collective efforts should also be made to improve the precondition for
enhanced integration through joint efforts aimed at improving roads,
telecommunication and large industries, which are unaffordable for the small
states.   Coupled with this, measures should be taken to remove tariff walls
and encourage the division of labour, stimulate specialization in production
and spur economies of scale.  Equally crucial is improving the economic and
political environment for technological innovation and development by
providing incentives.  Other measures include encouraging people to produce
enough food through appropriate policy measures.
Another important factor is conflict resolution and the improvement of relations
among people by capitalizing on cultural, educational and scientific
cooperation.  This in turn will reduce tension and assist efforts focused on
confidence building measures.  It will also absorb political tensions and
improve the environment of dialogue and dispute settlement.  It is also
important to create awareness of the value of supra-national political
organizations as a way of removing the fear of loss of sovereignty over macro-
economic policies to a Monetary Union or a Common Market.
One effect of this is that expectations of unequal distribution of benefits and
losses will subside.  However, special attention should also be paid to the
comparative advantage of the weaker states via specialization.  An important
measure is for continental organizations to provide active support and
stimulation to small sub-regional economic blocs.  They should show the
complementary nature of the small blocs so that they support each another.
Further, they play the role of harmonization and strategic linkage among small
blocs so that they can coordinate their action when their common interests are
at stake.
The efforts being made by the OAU in the context of the discussions on the
future of LOMÉ (EU-ACP) is one exemplary illustration of how big
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organizations like the OAU should conduct itself.  The small economic blocs in
turn, such as SADC should create mechanisms for preventing conflicts and
promoting a culture of tolerance.  One reason for this is that integration is best
developed in a climate of trust and confidence among nations and their
populations.  One way of stimulating this ambiance of harmony is capitalizing
on commonalties and promoting equality in diversity.  Enlightened leadership
is bound to lead the way in such efforts.
According to Axelrod (1984:78) and Gauher (1985:34) another way of
encouraging integration is learning from the experience of other regions,
which have achieved a measure of success.  Europe has, for instance, rose
from the ashes of a very destructive world war and achieved a common
market and is now striving towards achieving monetary union at the end of
this millennium. There are other less advanced success stories in North
America and Asia that emulate this one.  One should though, be fully
cognisant and fully appreciative of inter- and intra-state economic
collaborations as a way of mitigating political conflicts and reducing external
interference because of the solid front which small nations present under a
common cause and banner.  Further it is important to:
· Promote joint and integrated planning.
· Map out policies on shared trans-boundary resources like international
rivers, lakes, grazing areas,
· Develop common strategies of combating drought, natural and man-
made mishaps, crime, and more.
· Jointly develop a common approach to combat environmental
degradation and promote sustainable environmental
development programs in the region.
· Strengthen bilateral links, which in turn provide a basis for multi-lateral
cooperation.
· Make short-term compromises in the interest of long-term goals and
benefits.
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· Make provision for common security arrangements as a way of warding
off external aggression and domestic strife.
· Ensure that the initial contributions to the benefits of economic blocs
are equitably distributed to guarantee the continued interest of member
states in the bloc.
· Harmonize relations among economic blocs by introducing division of
activities and niches of specialization.
· To minimize duplication of activities and undesirable competition.
· Develop conflict prevention mechanisms through a sub-regional
agenda of education and edification and mediate actively in conflict
situations.
· Introduce a sub-regional food security strategy.
· Create a compensatory mechanism to ward off fluctuations caused by
price instability.
· Stimulate the free movement of people, goods and services as
appropriate.
The issue of restructuring in SADC has been one of the most difficult
exercises ever taken on by the organization.  In both instances, thus 1992 and
in 1999, the organization was caught reacting more to external pressures than
being proactive in setting trends initiated by the organization itself for the
development of the region.  Compared to the European Union, the
restructuring exercises were initiated more as a proactive move towards
integration rather than reactive measures in attaining regional security, as is
the case with SADC.
The above is influenced by two major challenges identified by the SADCC in
the 1980s, which were a threat of marginalisation at the international level and
a transformation of regional relations in the shape of post-apartheid South
Africa.  As a result of that SADCC undertook a major change in direction in
1992.  The then newly formed SADC began working on its explicit goal of
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economic integration in the region.  Regional economic integration was, at
that stage, the perceived solution to the problems that plagued the
organization since its inception in 1980 as it moved into the second decade.
However, by the mid-1990s SADC was still confronted by the same
challenges, that of economic dependency on Western countries.  To make
matters worse, SADC found itself confronted with more challenges than
before, such as globalization, which poses a major threat to the organization
survival in the global economy.
The restructuring of SADC institutions and operations will however not change
the long-standing pattern of dependency and South African domination in the
region.  For this to occur, an active policy of restructuring is required.  This will
require a total commitment by member countries to democracy and
compromise on sovereignty to allow the secretariat to implement policies.
Furthermore, member states’ commitment and loyalty will be required in terms
of membership payment and their total dedication to one regional body so as
to avoid the duplication of membership with other regional organizations such
as SACU, COMESA and others.  That would bring about a sort of loyalty and
sense of direction and urgency to the organization, thus avoiding a situation
whereby member states can play regional organizations against each other in
the region.
If SADC is to avoid future marginalisation, it has to counter the challenges
presented in this study.  This means that SADC has to have an early warning
mechanism whereby such threats can be identified in time and be countered
before they can pose a threat to the organization as experienced previously.
This will require more political will from regional members than what SADC
had in the past.
Despite all the pitfalls, SADC remains better regional organizations in Africa
compared to ECOWAS, EAC and others as far as cooperation is concerned.
This is one reason that the AU decided to use SADC as pilot project in
integrating the continent. The AU in determining the relationship between the
continental organization and the RECs will also use SADC.  This is well
184
demonstrated by the confidence shown by the AU and the New Partnership
for the Development of Africa in regarding SADC as one of their building blocs
towards the total unification of the continent.   The decrease of brutal conflicts
in the region, as compared to East Africa and West Africa, is also a sign that
the region is heading in the right direction, but it is important to note that a lot
remains to be done in order to integrate the region.
At the time of completion of this study (August 2005), SADC member
countries celebrated 25 years of the organization since it was founded in
1980. SADC leaders recognized the important contributions the organization
made with regard to regional integration at political, economic, and social
level. Although not all of the objectives outlined in the Windhoek Treaty were
achieved in the past 25 years, some successes are noticeable such as:
· Since 1980, SADC countries have signed more than 23 protocols in
areas such as energy; corruption; health; trade; extradition; education
and training; fisheries; mining; politics, defence and security
cooperation; tourism; forestry; mutual legal in criminal matters; and
others.
· SADC has also signed declarations on gender and development;
information and communications; productivity; and HIV/AIDS.
· In this period, SADC countries drafted a charter with regard to Regional
Tourism Organization of Southern Africa. And also signed a charter on
fundamental social rights within SADC region.
· Lastly, SADC thus far has signed Memorandums of Understanding on
macroeconomic convergence, and also in taxation and related matters.
As indicated above, over the past 25 years, SADC members continued to
institutionalise principles, norms, rules, and decision-making processes.
Furthermore, SADC as a regional organization or as an institutionalised regime
will continue to restructure in response to regional and global changes and
challenges. Integration is, after all, a process not a single event.
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